

THE  
REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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NO. 1.—JANUARY, 1901.

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I.

NATURE, AN ORGANIZED SYSTEM.

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FIRST VIEW OF NATURE A CONFUSED PICTURE.

The first impression which is made upon us as we look out into the world is the unbounded variety and richness of the material existences. The forms of life which swarm in the sea, that flit in the air, which creep on the earth, are truly innumerable. So when we descend the scale of being and come to vegetable life the number of living plants, from the cedar of Lebanon to the hyssop growing out of the wall, from the redwood trees of the Yosemite valley to the microscopic growth in fermentation—the mind feels its inability to count them even by millions. And when we get still lower in the order of Nature and contemplate the grains of sand, the dust of the desert, the molecules of the mountain or the crust of the globe, the impression grows upon us that the world is made up of a countless number and infinite variety, each having its several place and separate function in the cosmic economy. They seem to us at first view like the world does to a mature man whose eyes have been opened by the surgeon's knife. All looks blurred; a confused mass without form, a chaotic panorama.

## CLOSER INSPECTION REVEALS ORDER.

But a closer inspection reveals a wholly different category of existence. Like to the man with his sight restored, there gradually appear order and regularity among the objects of vision. But to see this more perfectly we must look at a portion of the scene isolated from the rest of the mass. For if the attention is not limited the power we possess will be spread over too much space to integrate any part, or segregate one individual object from the others. The picture presented to childhood is a mass of light and shade mingled together so as to form a crowded field; attractive by the richness of its coloring and the vastness of its extent yet bewildering by its conglomerate variety. In this respect the childhood of each person is like the childhood of the world. There is a beautiful combination of the outlines, but no distinct picture of the several parts.

POETRY DEALS WITH OUTLINES: SCIENCE WITH  
EXACT FIGURE.

Poetry deals with the general effects: science with the individual parts in their relations to specific functions and separate acts. The Greeks had the most exquisite idea of the general proportions of the human body, and hence their statuary and paintings, as the ideal representation of the beauty of form, have scarcely been equaled—certainly never surpassed. Yet they were not anatomists. In truth the dissection of the human body was deemed sacrilegious. The botanical analysis of a flower, the breaking up of a jewel to measure the crystals of which it is composed, destroy their beauty as apprehended by the senses, apart from the scientific value which a knowledge of the internal structure discloses. But the advance of knowledge brings with it the discovery that each minute part, when fitted to its place, effects the same for small areas and individual existences which the *tout ensemble* did for a larger picture. Thus the minute subdivisions when examined closely are found to be a reproduction on a smaller scale of what was conspicuous in a larger field and a completely organized life. For the connection of parts is quite as complete,

and their dependence one part upon another as necessary in the minutest insect, plant, or grain of dust, as in the king of beasts, the sequoia of Yosemite, or the granite peak of Mt. Everest.

#### UNITY AMID DIVERSITY.

We contend that in the application of the general laws of the physical world we find a perfect unity of action. The attraction which brought Newton's apple to the ground draws the moon to the earth, the earth to the sun, the sun to the great center of the universe of suns. There is not a grain of dust which floats in the sunshine, a drop of water thrown up by the spray of a bore on the coast of Bengal, a crystal of the glacier on the sides of Mt. Elias that is not perfectly obedient to the laws of gravitation which holds all things together. For this makes the materials of the whole visible earth and heavens members, organs, so to speak, of the universe; the *many* turned into *the one*. The problem which tested the logical sagacity of a Parmenides was how the many could become the one, and *vice versa*. This is the great question which riveted the attention of the Greek philosophy, that highest exponent of human speculation. For this philosophy admitted the diversity because this was patent to the senses and a fact of deduction; and quite as certainly the unity of nature. These are parts of the same necessary result, deduced from the laws of thought; the coördinates of being involving each other.

#### THE ONE IN THE MANY AN "ANTICIPATION OF NATURE."

But with all early speculation this unity in diversity is rather a presentiment, an "anticipation of nature"; a doctrine of faith rather than of scientific knowledge. For they knew little of the grand forces which control the material universe or the laws according to which these act. They grasped the combination which the senses gain from a general impression, rather than the more perfect synthesis which follows a scientific analysis. But modern science is synthetic, and all philosophy is tending toward monism. Hence there can be only one universe; and every organized being

must be a monad, and the exemplar of every other. No matter how complicated the structure, how large the extent, how varied the work to be effected, there is unity of organization. There is no being of which we have knowledge whose anatomical structure is so complicated as that of man, or of such diversified action. He can make any kind of movement; adapt himself to every condition of locality, climate, or manner of life. He can turn his hand to any work however strange, wide of extent, or subtle in its applications. What he cannot do by his own strength he can effect by harnessing the powers of nature to do his bidding. And yet he is the most intensely individual, the most completely unitary in his thought and volition of any organ that is conceivable. It is moreover, worthy of notice that unity of organ and function appears to increase *pari passu* with complication of structure from the lowest forms of animal life—such as molluscs and jelly fish—up to the most intricate in structure and action. There is everywhere diversity in unity, the many in the one; but especially in man, which is most emphatically the microcosm of nature.

#### ALL PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE HELD TOGETHER BY THE SAME FORCES.

This same unity or organized system may be seen in the passive effects as completely as in active striving or purposes. As all matter is mutually attractive, so if any part be affected by an external influence this conveys the force received, in due part to all with which it is connected. If a ball be struck, whatever force is given to one part of it is transmitted in the proper proportion to all its parts, and from these in turn to those with which it unites in an organ or system. If the force be not sufficient to neutralize its inertia this force is distributed equally throughout its structure, provided this be uniform; and the members in their turn by the force of inertia absorb the force of impact which is not lost, but becomes latent like the major part of nature's forces at all times. But if the blow be sufficiently powerful to become kinetic then it is conveyed to those bodies with which the receiver



is in touch, and in exact proportion to its intensity and their capacity for reception and absorption. And when forces act in different directions the resultant is an exact integration of these, however various be their quantity and direction. This may be seen and clearly understood when a ball is struck simultaneously by two forces acting at right angles to each other, when the resultant will be found to be their diagonal. When the number of forces is increased beyond two, there arises a problem beyond the power of expression by the most profound analysis known up to this time. And yet we must not forget that the bodies of the solar system are acted upon by at least 48 forces arising from the interaction of the major planets; and if to these be added those occasioned by the 200 known asteroids, we have a problem which transcends the compass of human thought. For the difficulty of computation increases in geometrical ratio as the number of forces acting on each body is increased, and therefore must rise to infinity—or at least to the  $n$ th power. There is a field for mathematical discovery, seemingly without limit.

#### PROBLEM OF THE THREE FORCES.

For calculus of the most far reaching and subtle power cannot as yet integrate the movements caused by only three forces. But when there is a problem clearly presented to the human intellect this never can rest until it discovers a solution. We, therefore, confidently expect that the facts of nature here involved will be explained in the coming ages. For these facts are surely integrated in the movements of the universe, which from age to age obey all the complicated laws involved in this bewildering maze; and, according to the theories of the ablest astronomers, will move on harmoniously as an organized system—forever! To express in terms of human science what is now expressed in the coördination of nature will require something as much in advance of integral calculus, double quaternions, or higher algebra, as these are superior to decimal notation of the savage, or the Diophantine arithmetic. A vista, both attractive and awe-inspiring, arises before the mind that has confidence in the unlimited expansion

of human power to grasp the infinite reach of those laws which control the organized system of nature.

#### BUT FORCES TO THE $n$ TH NUMBER INTEGRATED IN NATURE.

For however various and complicated these forces be, and their actions in directions the most diverse, we see that they bring about a uniform result; they act with various energies and velocities, and yet integrate their effects in movements so uniform that the place of any one of these bodies of this system can be calculated with such accuracy, even with our present imperfect methods and instruments, that its position could be fixed at any point of time ten thousand or a million of years in the future.

#### ALL MOTIONS IN THE SOLAR SYSTEM TENDING TOWARD A CERTAIN RESULT.

Perhaps nothing can give us a better idea of a systematic action than this. For the motions of the different members of our system are not in the same direction, nor alike in quantity. If they were in the same direction they would either convey the bodies receiving them altogether to one goal, or asunder to complete isolation. Were centripetal force to operate alone in the solar system, all would quickly fall together, be burned up, and return at once to that primeval state of incandescent gas, of which geologists have such perfect knowledge. If they were propelled by centrifugal force alone they would go off in a straight line; and each taking the direction it happened to have at the time when the centripetal impulse ceased, would get further apart forever. But they are interrelated, so as to form a group which we call the solar system; a community of neighbors obeying one common law by which they are kept forever in the same relative positions during their continued revolutions. Hence they must move in ellipses—not in straight lines impelled by one force; not in diagonals by two; but in courses which can be represented by drawing a plane at different angles of elevation through a cone, and which are the resultants of the most various forces acting in the most complicated schemes. By these means

they are made to move faster or slower in an orbit, which at the perihelion and aphelion is almost circular; while at points intermediate, is almost a straight line—yet varying between these points by every conceivable degree of curvature. Here we evidently have the greatest degree of diversity yet integrated into an infallible monistic system.

#### UNITY OF STRUCTURE IN SINGLE ORGANISMS.

In like manner if we descend to the structure and functions of the individual organism, whether telescopic or microscopic, we find that there is a correspondence between parts which becomes more conspicuous in exact proportion to the thoroughness of investigation. There is no more convincing proof possible in our present stage of scientific knowledge than the well authenticated cases wherein zoölogists have reconstructed the entire skeleton of an extinct animal with only one, or a very few, of the bones as a nucleus. There was, for example, discovered in the marshes along the Amazon a single bone which was believed by the workman who dug it up to be different from that one corresponding to it in the skeleton of any known animal.

#### CUVIER'S RECONSTRUCTION OF AN EXTINCT ANIMAL BY MEANS OF A SINGLE BONE.

This was taken to the eminent zoölogist Cuvier, who at once concurred in the judgment that it was different from that of any member of the animal kingdom, either alive or extinct, which had then been classified. But he undertook, by his knowledge of comparative anatomy, to construct an entire skeleton in plaster from the data afforded by this single bone. After this had been done, and the savant had staked his reputation on the accuracy of his construction, the remaining parts of the skeleton to which this single one belonged were found. The real bones correspond exactly with those of the skeleton manufactured according to the indications afforded by the single one first discovered. This seems like the ultimate triumph of scientific knowledge; a proof of human sagacity which leaves no room for greater skill

in the interpretation of nature. But this *chef d'oeuvre* of science has its counterpart, and its necessary condition in the perfection of nature's systematic order. The bone in question was a single one of a system embracing hundreds of distinct parts. There were conformations on each end which showed its relations to its fellow. But this fellow had not been found. There were fissures or indentations, and projections, for the insertion or attachment of muscles and tendons. But these had wasted away and utterly disappeared. These muscles and ligaments whose places of attachment were marked on the one specimen, and whose joining thereto might be conjectured, had other ends, the shape of which could not be known, as they neither existed themselves, nor the bones to which they were originally joined. But this is only the beginning of the real difficulty. The first bone joined to either end of that one before the naturalists eye might be conjectured from the marks which this one presented. Then, for the third bone in the connection, there is neither end nor shape, no projection or depression for the attachment of muscles, nor muscles to be attached, which might afford some clew—there is, in a word nothing in the case itself apart from the analogy of nature to aid as a guide in construction. How wonderful must be the sagacity which directs the imagination to travel through each successive part of the skeleton, farther and farther at each step from any guidance, more and more uncertain in geometrical ratio at each remove. Hence if the feat of building up the complete skeleton by the aid of a single member of a complicated system could be effected, we may ask: Is there anything impossible to human sagacity provided it works upon a system of which all the parts are, as Kant says, "reciprocally means and ends?" We should rather say that where all things are teleological, and therefore can be read backwards or forwards equally well, this fact gives the power of deciphering all the hieroglyphics of nature's book, which otherwise could not be comprehended in any of its parts. Thus, to use Leibnitz's conception: the moral mirror, the universe of thought and the universe in time and space, reflect each individual occupying its right place and performing its appropriate functions.

**ALL NATURE CONSTRUCTED ON REGULAR TYPES.**

Yet this transcendent power of reconstructing any part of nature which has disappeared from actual existence, or the predicting of that which shall be in the future, rests exclusively upon the fact that there are typical forms in nature which are parts of an organized system in which one part answers another so completely that each may be said to contain the whole just as the whole actually and physically contains the parts. These are coördinate, and so connected that one involves the other, and cannot exist without it. By a knowledge of these facts which had been observed in thousands of complete specimens, where each bone of the entire structure could be seen occupying its place and exercising its function; then, by projecting the knowledge thus gained the naturalist could see what ought to be in each vacant space in order to satisfy the conditions of a system discerned through comparative anatomy. Again, by proceeding to the organization of the essential features of the extinct and unknown creatures there are two things demonstrated: That the elements of matter and the functions of force are arranged in an unbroken order and system; and the mind of man is made their counterpart in order to know and utilize the richness of the universe which is boundless. Nor does the marvel of the comparative zoölogist stop here. The savant could recreate the whole structure, clothe it with flesh and skin, provide it with means to secure its food; and then furnish it with meat to nourish, a stomach to digest, a laboratory to manufacture blood and assimilate the nourishment; with excretory organs to void the refuse; thus completing its reconstruction and then showing its mode of life. There are innumerable functions to be coördinated in the production of a living creature, each one of which is dependent upon every other.

**FORMER AGES OF THE WORLD AS WELL AS EXTINCT  
ANIMALS CAN BE IDEALLY RECONSTRUCTED.**

This must have been foreseen and provided for in the workshop of nature before the creature could be in a condition to

live, even though its sustenance was ready at hand, and the environment of life external to its structure fitted to respond to the internal organization. For if the creature belonged to an extinct species which lived in a different geological age from our own, there would have to be an environment suited: consisting in a state of things exceedingly diverse from any we have seen. The earth was hotter at the poles than it is now at the equator. The fossil remains are found imbedded in a coal or drift formation removed from the animal's habitat. If the conditions of Nature were not suited to its existence it could not have lived then. Yet it must have lived in order to die and leave behind itself traces which could be deciphered and integrated to such degree that the geologist does not hesitate to picture both itself and its environment. He creates both his animal and his ideal world, and says: This belonged to the cretaceous, the silurian, or the palaeozoic age. These different periods, admit that they were just as the consensus of geologists represented them, must have had their beginning which grew out of something preceding them; and were in turn followed by something after them; and all these various and dissimilar data had some thread running throughout from the first *incunabula* of organized matter down to the days of *homo sapiens*; who, by means of these traces, which are read and understood, has been able to remount to these periods and recount all the varied history of the earth. Like the zoölogist with his single bone, the geologist with a section of the earth's crust, broken and separated in the diversified strata which have been upheaved by volcanic action, have been broken asunder by earthquakes, have been covered by floods and ground down by glaciers covering whole continents, still, despite all these disintegrating agencies the skeleton of the earth at any particular period of her life can be reconstructed ideally with the same scientific accuracy that the extinct animal is built up again in plaster.

Two thoughts force themselves upon every reflecting mind: these are the coördination between the content of nature and the content of logic, as the expression of the intellectual conception which embraces it; and the unified system of nature must be a

fact else it could not be perceived; and the results of scientific action would not be consistent unless there were a basis of fact on which they rest. Hence, the unified results of these two factors acting in concert prove beyond dispute that the conception of a unitary system is a counterpart of the system. This truth will be illustrated by examples.

#### SIMILARITY OF ACTION IN DISSIMILAR AGENTS.

If we take two departments of nature the most diverse, such as the vibration of the atmosphere in producing sound and colors, and the combination of chemical elements in their definite proportions we will find that they are systematized by an exact numerical relation. And if we stretch an elastic substance, whether animal tissue, vegetable fiber, or metallic cord, and strike it so as to produce vibration, the movements have a fixed law of rapidity depending on the tension of the string, its length and weight. Its movements are constant within limits determined by these conditions, and cannot be made to swerve from them. The laws of harmony, the sweetness of musical tones, can be expressed with mathematical accuracy. The string sets the air in motion, and the waves are conveyed to the animal organism and thence to the mind where they are apprehended as spiritual qualities, because the force of the quantity of the material in motion is translated into something which the mind can grasp and appropriate. If the string of a definite weight, length, or tension, vibrate occasionally and fitfully there could be no harmony because there is no regularity in the wave movements. Nor is the power of appreciation confined to the animal organism and its appreciation thereby by the mind, but it will influence a metallic plate as readily as the tympanum; or another string stretched in proximity which will receive and transmit the system of vibrations to another, and this in turn, indefinitely. Here the animal tissue is in systematic relation with the metallic or other kind of string, and both in sympathy with intellectual action; counterparts of each other; a unity of result from the utmost diversity of material and action.



## SOUND AND COLOR PRODUCED BY VIBRATION.

Again, if we set the air in motion with sufficient rapidity of vibration all the colors of the spectrum can be produced in succession by the increase of this undulatory action. The rapidity necessary to produce any one of the colors seems beyond the power of man to measure or even conceive—amounting to billions of vibrations per second for dullest shades, and becoming still more immeasurably rapid for the brighter hues. The truth involved in this process, however, is transparent. For we see the correlation between a definite number of movements in the material which vibrates and the waves of air which produce tones and colors; showing that these two departments of nature are subject to the same laws, and are therefore parts of a system. For the resulting phenomena of tones and colors can be produced in no other way than by obedience to those laws which coördinate movements which by transmission to the air produce changes of sound and modifications of light. Now there is, no doubt, a great diversity between the impression which the air receives and the effect this has on our sensations caused by rapidity of movement. Certain degrees produce harmony, both to the animal and the neighboring string or sensitive plate. Were there not a fixed rate, a definite relation between the vibrations of the string and our sensations, no harmony could be produced. And to prove that it is not a Kantian category of the mind, a *mould*, so to speak, which shapes nature and creates the regular movement—we find that no art can make a certain length of string vibrate in any other rate than that which the fixed law of its nature expresses. It is therefore neither the vibrating string nor the receptive ear which causes the pulsations to occur with a fixed degree of rapidity; but there is a correlation in nature between the external and internal which brings about the cause acting through the material, and the effect perceived by the spiritual.

## PYTHAGOREAN THEORY OF NUMBER ILLUSTRATED.

The combination of atoms so as to produce masses, whether of diverse elements in forming compounds, or of collections of the

same material to effect aggregations, shows that this is done in every case systematically. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers is confessedly obscure, and was no doubt an esoteric deliverance guarded with religious reverence. For it was a fixed usage that the members of this philosophic brotherhood should not divulge his teachings. His pupils were not permitted to give any reason or explanation of their doctrines except: "He (i. e. Pythagoras) said it": *αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἡ*. But we can gather from a few hints left, especially by Aristotle in his history of philosophy in the first book of his metaphysics, that Pythagoras believed that numbers have a controlling influence both upon material and spiritual things. For the present we will consider the former, that is: Numbers preside over both the essence and formation of the object, and its functions as a factor in the orderly arrangement of the universe. In pursuance of this idea a special number presided over the formation and actions of each individual material thing and its character, and of every special manifestation of power, of goodness, or of intellect. Translating these statements into modern scientific language we have the Daltonian law of definite proportions. Hydrogen and oxygen combine by volume  $H_2O$ , or by weight 8 to 1. These elements cannot be made to unite in the formation of water in any other proportion; but their action is constant without variation on this basis.

#### THE FORCES WHICH CONTROL NATURE HAVE THEIR CO-EFFICIENTS IN NUMBERS.

So, also, of each compound substance; whether solid, liquid, or gaseous. They have their own numerical weight or measure to which they will rigidly adhere without variation—no matter how they may be tortured in the chemist's alembic. And when they are aggregations so as to form masses of any conceivable size, what held good in the combination of the smallest atoms persists in regulating the formation of the largest bulk; this is only an aggregation of the atomic proportions. We see, moreover, that in the external configuration of all substances, the same mysterious powers of numbers prevails. If the liquefied

mentioned shoots into a crystal it has its own number of facets, whether galena, kupfer or precious diamond. If the water congeals to snow, hail or a sheet of ice, the crystalline shape is preserved with unvarying exactitude. Each substance, whether precious stone or stalactite, exhibits its appropriate structure, controlled by the presence of a constant number. However much the object may vary in its outward appearance, its size, its shape, its inner structure, its essence, so to speak, is always subject to the unvarying law of crystalline formation. The entire material universe is thus united and held together by a universal system, which is apparent to the eye of science in the atom of dust trodden under foot, or in the granite mountain which rises in solemn grandeur to receive the first light of the morning. Numbers thus rule the world; or rather they are the expression of a force that is always active according to fixed law which is capable of being enunciated in terms of numbers.

#### COMPLICATED ORGANIZATION OF ANIMAL LIFE.

The bodily structure of a plant and an animal are widely diverse from each other. The one is soft, pliable, and automatic in movement; the other is hard, rigid, and moves as it is moved *ab extra*. The material of both is nourished by a fluid which circulates through a vascular system; but in manner and by methods entirely different. In the animal there is a central machine or force pump, which sends out from an automatic reservoir the life-giving current to the extremities, at every opening of the valves, at every paroxysm of the muscles. The fluid which is sent out to nourish the system is red; composed of particles infinitesimally small and almost perfectly elastic. These are transmitted through one system whose ramifications can be traced a certain distance, but which gradually become so minute that no eye can follow up their complicated web-like structure. Then, at some transition point, they pass over into an entirely different system, which begins as minute as the others are where they end; but which increases until its ramifications become visible again; and continue their enlarging course when finally they empty

themselves into the common receptacle to begin anew their alternating movement. Here we have a fluid which is manufactured within the animal system, and is the concentrated nourishment which is sent to every part to invigorate and increase the growth before maturity; to support the body when at its prime of strength; and to retard decay when the powers have begun to fail.

#### LIVING ORGANISMS EFFECT THEIR OWN PURIFICATION.

But this fluid itself must be purified from the excreta which it gathers as a scavenger—for it performs the double function of nurture and purification—in its passage through every nook and corner of the animal frame. It comes in contact with the air and moisture during its progress through the lungs, and thus keeps itself pure while cleansing the whole system which it supports. This admirable process of carrying life into every part by a circulating fluid—in the case of the higher animals, blood; in the lower, especially in insect life, we may call it *ichor*, or any other name which seems to be appropriate, but is essentially the same—moves in like manner, and effects a corresponding purpose. This may be seen in the minutest organism which can be examined by the magnifying power of the glass to aid our organs of vision; and doubtless continues to the *n*th degree of smallness, being evidently a part of an organized system which ramifies all nature.

The like offices for growth and support are accomplished in the same way substantially in the vegetable as in the animal kingdom, the differences being that there is no immediate reciprocal action within the system. For the nourishment drawn from without, after being once used, is given back to the source whence it was derived. There is a vascular system beginning in the remotest roots, continued through the trunk and branches, and ending with the twigs and leaves. The action is not through diverse channels emptying into each other, as the arteries and veins; but one system appears, by direct and reflex action, to perform the functions of both. For through foliage, which corresponds to the lungs in

the animal economy, the tree breathes and draws its nourishment from the nitrogen and oxygen of the atmosphere. This may be proved from the fact that growing crops are powerfully stimulated by feeding them with nitrogen, and that the water supply may be drawn from the air exclusively—not only to support life, though there be no water poured upon the roots, but, by the same means, the growth continued. For the leaves will drink in a moderate shower of rain and prevent it from reaching the earth and wetting the roots—as though the method of absorption through the leaves were the more direct way of appropriating moisture. In like manner the foliage respires as well as inspires, or *breathes in*—so that it becomes, just as in the method by lungs, an excretory process—in the case of vegetables the only way for the exercise of this function—to purify the system by casting out the residuum of food after absorbing the needed supply of nurture. This process of vascular circulation, of respiration and absorption, is, in the vegetable world, carried on in every organism; whether the oak of Bashan or the minutest growth that the microscope discloses. There is a completely organized system in each and every genus, as well as individual, differing in essentials as to means and methods of their application, but achieving the same results.

#### RECIPROCAL ACTION IN LIVING ORGANISMS COPIED IN MACHINERY.

The same power of duplication and correlative action, which man copies in the reverberating movement of his engines where is noticed the fundamental condition of all movement, *i. e.*, that action and reaction must be equal—is here seen as in the unit of expulsion. Thus for the life movement, as the reverberation in circulation may be called, there is a corresponding adaptation of external nature to the processes of intellectual life. The latter may be called subjective, the former objective; and there is such a correlation between the two just as in the vascular system, that the one works into the others hands. The vascular system would be of no use were there not something either ready prepared, as

the air and water, for its appropriation, or of such a kind that the energies of the body can elaborate them, first by analysis and then by combination, so as to get the materials appropriate for nurture and growth.

NATURE, A CALCULUS OF DIFFERENTIATING AND INTEGRATING.

Thus, the highest processes of Nature are a never-ending employment of differentiating and integrating by which her modes of marking out her sublime results are the counterpart of the calculus in its dealing with pure quantity. For the differential calculus in separating factors into their minutest elements prepares the way for the integral to connect them again into the expression of whole numbers just as the process of growth completes its products.

There is the external or objective constitution of things corresponding precisely with the internal structure, so that there is reciprocal action as the order of nature; showing that the one thing is placed over against the other whereby both become component parts of one organism. Thus the ideal and the real are counterparts of nature organized into a system. They are the external and internal *Replica* of one organization; which, as a hemisphere, would be mutilated unless it existed double, and hence we have nature in its corresponding halves effecting a complete unity.

LIVING ORGANISM DEPENDENT UPON THE MUTUAL CO-  
OPERATION OF THE SEVERAL PARTS.

But we have, if possible, a still more far-reaching and cogent proof of organized system in the reciprocal formation and function of the different parts in the living animal. There are in each animal the most diverse constituents. We have spoken of the blood as the means of disseminating nurture. There are the bones constituting the frame-work of the whole organism. There are the ligatures, or cords which hold these together. There are the processes and sockets by which movement in every direction is effected. Next, there are muscles with cord attachments at the ends and swelling out into masses in the middle for developing

and applying power. There is the flesh for giving roundness and beauty to the figure, with adipose as fuel to consume for heat, and as a repository of strength in case of failure through lack of food, when the system is able to use it; or a savings bank deposit on which to draw when disease cuts off the supply coming from without. Externally there is the skin for a covering—sometimes furnished with an exterior coating in the shape of hair, wool, or fur, to preserve the heat generated by the bodily workshop for its comfort and protection against external injuries. There are the nails for protecting the finger ends in man; for seizing prey or repelling enemies in the case of wild animals; the organs of sight, hearing, touch, and smell, as sentinels and sources of pleasure. The body as a workshop takes in raw material in the form of food, and manufactures it for its own behoof. The same article of nourishment, being of one constitution, is taken into the body, and by its magical processes is manufactured into a supply for the waste of every part of its own machinery—bones, muscles, joints, flesh, hair, vitreous humors of the eye, tympanum of the ear, eye lashes, nails of the fingers and toes, and innumerable other portions of the system. The elaborative processes of life analyze the articles taken into the stomach, where the proper elements are segregated from the rest and manufactured into the appropriate nourishment for the growth, maintenance, and repair of each diverse organ. Nothing would seem more astonishing than the process of natural manufacturing of the most diverse products from a single kind of food material, were it not for the fact that it is so common that, like all other wonderful processes of nature, their familiarity prevents them from arresting our attention. And unlike the instruments of human industry this one renews the loss occasioned by the wear and tear of its own operations; thus keeping up its own efficiency.

THE MOST PERFECT ORGANISM IS THAT WHICH  
REPAIRS ITS OWN WASTE.

The machine, skillful as it may be effected by man's ingenuity, wears out and cannot counteract this tendency; for every sort of



work it does exhausts so much of its energy. But the machine of the body repairs itself while continuing its work. Nor can any device of human industry make more than one kind of fabric by the same set of tools operating upon the same raw material. But here we have many that are already known and described, and doubtless many more nutritive substances which are yet unknown to science. The organized system that can effect such diversified and contrary results, and yet make them all coöperate to one general purpose, must have a degree of subtilty and accuracy wholly beyond human attainment; and shows an adaptation, a unitary arrangement of parts to the whole, and to diversified results, which far transcends the grandest efforts of man.

RECIPROCAL ACTION THE CLEAREST PROOF OF A PERFECT ORGANISM.

But the converse, or reciprocal, action is equally conspicuous and quite as wonderful. Each of the different factors—the blood, bones, muscles, flesh, skin, nails, all and several have a coördinate action. These several parts which are nourished and caused to develop are necessary to the well-being of the entire system. They are constituent parts of the machinery, which, as a whole, has its appropriate functions that could not be effected without the coöperation of each part. There are some machines so constructed that they can be reversed, and so move in an opposite direction. But they can move only in one direction at one time; and the work which has been done by direct action is counteracted or destroyed when the reverse movement occurs. But in the animal machine both processes take place at the same time in normal action. It is only when destruction or dissolution is being effected that action is exclusively in one direction. In proportion as the healthy process is active and energetic, in the same ratio will the direct and reverse movement be efficient. The more that is manufactured and therefore the more wear and tear of the machinery, the more nutriment is furnished to repair the loss. Hence, in this complex automaton the more there is lost the more there is

gained. So that if a complicated machine, such as a chronometer, or a Corliss engine, or silk manufactory, or a modern printing press displays an organized system as the result of patient thought and repeated experiments of skill, then the action of the animal body—being far more complicated, doing a diversified and contrary work, at the same time manufacturing its products while repairing its waste and healing its own breakages—shows subtlety and completeness of system beyond which no flight of imagination can travel.

#### PROOFS OF ORGANISM IN NATURE INEXHAUSTIBLE.

In these several illustrations the unity or system in the works of Nature are by no means exhausted. We can turn in no direction without seeing similar examples which might be shown to be equally conclusive in favor of the view that there is system running through the whole. For each part by being a constituent of the whole, must both bear its share in the work and receive its needed aid. The most minute organization could neither be independent with reference to the several members of the larger system including it, nor fall out of its place without a break in the continuity. At first sight this seems absurd and contradictory to our common experience. We see creatures, both animate and inanimate, produced and destroyed without seemingly making the least difference to the course of nature.

#### WASTE IN NATURE NOT REAL, THOUGH APPARENT.

The bird is killed in wantonness by the sportsman; the fish is caught for amusement and thrown out upon the sand to struggle and yield up its life in convulsive throes; the robber waylays the traveller, takes his money; and, on the principle that "dead men tell no tales," takes his life; leaving his body for food to hyenas and his bones to bleach in the desert gulch where no eye will ever look upon them. The fishing smack is wrecked by the passing steamer; the miserable toilers go down into the watery depths while the majestic vessel moves on, too careless or too inhuman to stop her course and attempt an atonement for the

wreck which her carelessness has made—the waves close calmly over the drowning men ; and, except for the distress at Provincetown in the fisherman's darkened cottage—nature would make no sign. But we deceive ourselves in all such cases. In the exhaustless fecundity of nature she seems able to make good her losses. Our attention is diverted from what we have seen, but now see no more, to that which is before us at present. Close reflection, however, will prove to us that in the accounting which nature makes, every loss as well as every gain must be entered in order to make a correct balance-sheet. In her bookkeeping, like the accounts of a correct banking system, the smallest item must be as scrupulously enumerated and accounted for as the largest ; the cent as certainly as the million dollars. There could be no whole without the parts which constitute it. The genus has its species ; these in turn their subalterns until we arrive at the individual, the atom ; and this, however small the division of matter be carried in order to reach it, has a foothold in the universe which no power but that which created it can either destroy or displace.

NO EFFORT IN VAIN AND NO FORCE LOST IF NATURE BE  
AN ORGANIZED SYSTEM.

This thought gives comfort to the humble mind, to the one who though striving to do good work sometimes feels that his efforts are too insignificant to make any impression on the great world ; and therefore he is spending his strength for naught. Perhaps to the majority of men this thought gives no trouble, because they have no misgivings as to the importance of their place in the world. For egotism is quite as marked in the narrow-minded who has never been beyond the confines of his own hamlet, as in the world's conqueror. But, to that man who has faith in an Omniscient Presence who appointed him his destiny and place—which may always be made an important one by filling it ; or to the man of science who can see that no individual or element, however small relatively, but has its indispensable appointment—to each of these there is the unshaken

assurance that all parts belong to a system, which for its completion requires the atom just as truly as the world.

#### ORGANIC THOUGHT THE COUNTERPART OF ORGANIC MATERIAL.

The objective also has its correlation in the subjective. The organ would have no significance without the power which works through its instrumentality. The machine is made with reference to the power which shall wield it; or more properly the power and the machine are coördinated by a higher principle, which arranged both of these factors with reference to each other's action. There is an unmistakable correspondence between these, which Leibnitz called "Preëstablished Harmony," which causes these two systems to move *pari passu* because they are actuated by unity of purpose. Descartes represented these coördinates as working together through "occasional causes." This was an unfortunate and misleading phrase; since it appears to signify that the causes operated now and then, the ordinary meaning of "occasional"; while the intention of the author was to assert that these causes operated on the occasion of any phenomenal action. But the thought is the same by whatever name we choose to designate the coördination between physical action through material organs, and the metaphysical or spiritual energy, which either institutes these, as was done by creative energy, or discovers and comprehends them, which is the problem of knowledge. The phrase used by Schleiermacher, who saw as deeply into the roots of things as any thinker, expressed the physical and spiritual coördination by a most happy turn: "The content of thought should correspond to the content of nature." This is the goal of science toward which the mind is ever striving, but which, like the progress of the asymptotic curve toward the straight line, can reach it only at infinity. But the process of knowing and the thing to be known are getting nearer by constant approach. Therefore, since the comprehension of the intellect is ever with increasing firmness grasping hold of external nature, there is an infallible evidence that they are coördinates of an organized system. The ego is constantly getting in touch with the non ego because they were adopted by infinite wisdom for each other.

AGNOSTICISM IN PRACTICE BELIES ITS OWN THEORY.

This every man of every faith admits in practice, though he may deny it in theory ; for a consistent agnostic would be a *lusus naturæ*. Hence it follows as the condition of knowledge that there must be a double system, one over against the other ; and the constitution and relations of these to each other is the ultimate object of quest. The two counterparts must be alike, else there would be no striving of the one after what the other possesses nor ability of the latter to satisfy the quest. But Nature unlocks her door to the "Open, Sesame!" of him who interrogates her in accordance with her laws, and whose mind is receptive enough to admit without prejudice the facts just as they are disclosed ; and who in turn has sagacity enough to build them up into a system which is coördinate with reality.

CONCLUSION : MAN BEING A PART OF ORGANIZED NATURE  
IS CAPABLE OF COMPREHENDING IT.

To the man of eager desire for knowledge, whose mind is as fair and truthful as external Nature ; in a word whose intellect has been so purged from prejudice and error that it has become a constituent part of that subject which he is investigating, there is room for unending progress, with assurance that he is standing on unshaken basis. To him all nature in every part of her kingdom, whether material or spiritual, past, present or to come, all alike seems to be a part of an organized system ; and therefore as he is himself a part thereof he possesses an intellect fitted for its comprehension.

## II.

### ENGLISH VERSIONS OF THE DIES IRÆ.

BY THOS. C. PORTER, D.D., LL.D.

Amongst the famous hymns that have come down to us from the Middle Ages the highest place has been awarded to the "Dies iræ" of Thomas de Celano, a Franciscan monk of Italy, who died about the year 1255. A host of eminent divines and laymen in Germany, England and America, Protestants as well as Roman Catholics, have with one accord chanted its praises during the last half century, and the interest awakened has given rise to a multitude of versions in these countries. Their number in the German language is said to be at least 100, and in the English, over 235. Of the latter, Dr. Schaff, in his "Literature and Poetry," names 150, and indicates, by asterisks prefixed, 12 of them, which he considers the best. To the list he adds the following critical estimate: "One good translation is worth a hundred poor ones and will outlive them. Many were still-born or not born at all. But the ever-increasing number is a proof of the popularity and untranslatableness of the 'Dies iræ,' the greatest religious lyric of all ages."

The bringing over of a lyrical poem of the first rank into another language is indeed a difficult task, if the aim be, as it should, not a translation or a paraphrase merely, but a reproduction, that shall bear as strong a likeness to the original as possible. For the attainment of such a result the metrical form must be preserved. It is an essential element and cannot be abandoned without loss. Dr. Neale, who followed this rule in his other hymns from the Latin, when he took up the "De Contemptu Mundi" of Bernard of Cluni, found in its peculiar meter an insuperable barrier and therefore wisely created from its substance his "Celestial Country," which is in fact a new poem, equal,

and perhaps superior, to the old. Examples of this kind are, however, extremely rare.

And now the question arises in regard to the "*Dies iræ*." Has its meter as used in our English versions been successful, or is it defective? In order to test the matter, let any one compare with its first line, *Dies iræ, dies illa*, these translations of it: *Day of wrath! O day of mourning!* (Dr. Irons), *Day of vengeance, without morrow* (Gen. Dix), *Day of wrath, that day of burning* (Dr. Coles), and it will be felt at once that they are less compact, and hence weaker, because they contain more letters, for the pronunciation of which a longer time is required. Counting the letters in all their stanzas, the average proportion to those of the original is as 13.7 to 10, the wonderful compactness of the Latin being largely due to its lack of articles and its fewer prepositions.

A further impediment to complete success lies in the triple, double-rhymed trochaic endings of the stanzas. Unlike the German, our language is too poor to furnish enough of the best kind, and the critical ear is wounded by the terminal *ings* of too many present participles, as well as by the endings, *ission*, *ution* and *ation*, which in Shakespeare's day were trisyllabic.

Fortunately both these obstacles disappear, if the original metre, trochaic tetrameter, be slightly modified, made catalectic by dropping the final syllables. That has been done in the versions of Archbishop Trench, Dean Alford and Dr. Schaff. The lines are rendered thereby more compact, for the letters in all the stanzas of the three versions named bear the average proportion of but 11.6 to 10 in the Latin. Moreover, enough perfect single rhymes are attainable.

The meter thus modified is, perhaps, as near to that of the original as the genius of the English language will permit. And yet, it is not altogether exotic. It plays its part in one of our grandest and most popular hymns, the *Rock of Ages*, with the only difference that its rhymes, are triple, a feature not at all detrimental to the peculiar dignity of the poem, if the third line be read at a lower pitch of the voice.



Defective rhyme does indeed more or less injure the standing and the value of a lyric poem. Sidney Lanier, himself a master of verse, has written: "If the rhyme is not perfect, if it demands any, even the least, allowance, it is not tolerable. No rhyme but a perfect rhyme is worth a poet's while." Dr. Stryker, in his little book on the "*Dies iræ*," approves of this severe judgment, and says of Dean Alford's version: "It is terse, clear and of great dignity: but not without the false junction of 'penned' with 'contained'—a slip of the graving tool which mars all the cameo." And yet, by a strange oversight, in his own three versions "afford" is expected to chime with "Lord," "creature" with "nature" and "peace" with "these." That false rhymes are far too common in the poems of almost all of our English bards cannot be denied, but there is a wide difference in their character. Some leave no really bad impression and may receive toleration, whilst others are very offensive to a pure taste and act like "the dead flies in the ointment of the apothecary," or Horace's "poppy in Sardinian honey," or the opera singer's blundering note or mispronunciation before an Italian audience. But the worst examples of the sort abound in our hymn-books, in lyrics prepared for the service of the sanctuary and sung every Sunday by thousands and thousands of worshippers. The ancient Hebrew was not allowed to place a defective victim on the altar of the Lord. His lamb or goat had to be "without blemish and without spot." If blind, or crippled, or lame, or diseased, it was rejected by the priest. And so it ought to be here and now. Good Dr. Watts, who wrote a few excellent hymns in faultless rhyme, nodded like Homer when he penned

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A follower of the Lamb,  
And shall I fear to own his cause (cos),  
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Some of the translators have adopted a measure in which the trochees are converted into iambs, with a manifest loss of power. This is evident from the fact that

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But, important as the choice of the right meter is for the reproduction of the hymn, much more is needed. The circumstances connected with its birth demand careful consideration. Carried back, therefore, along a line of almost eight centuries, imagination brings us to a learned and devout monk seated alone in the secluded cell of his cloister. A friend and associate of St. Francis of Assisi, he lives in an age of extraordinary religious fervor. After long and profound meditation upon that most certain and tremendous event of the future, the drama of the last judgment unfolds itself before him step by step in solemn and distinct vision. The outside world has wholly vanished from his thoughts. His mind is centered on one thing only, and that is, "the wrath to come." In this exalted mood he is truly inspired, and writes without the least taint of an ambition for literary fame or the design even of preparing a hymn for the

jects the formula above, and whose principal, but not exclusive thought is that the value of Christ's sufferings and death lies in the impression which they are calculated to make of the love of God.

In the meantime, in the mysticism of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there was a line of thought that was preparing the way for the Reformation, which was to make its appeal to the individual conscience, and eventually to discard the authority of the church. With this change of thought there also came a change in the views of men in reference to the atonement. These mystics, of whom Wessel is, perhaps, as good a representative as any, held that Christ was, at the same time, God, priest and sacrifice. He brought about reconciliation at the same time that He was the God who was reconciled. They attached great importance to the principle of love, holding that the Spirit of Christ must be appropriated by a living faith. Sometimes it is said that man is reconciled by taking up his cross and eradicating self. In one of their hymns they sing, "through *God we* shed our blood, on account of which our sins shall be pardoned." There is here an approach to the old Greek idea of the solidarity of the race in Christ.

When we pass over into the Reformation period, we do not at first find any great break with the doctrinal position of the Roman Church. The first effort of the Reformers was to put an end to certain practical abuses. Theologically, however, it soon became a movement back to the position of Augustine on the doctrine of predestination, and to the idea of God as asserted by Anselm. The Reformers all accepted the three great ecumenical creeds. So also on the doctrine of the atonement they held with Anselm that the sufferings of Christ objectively possessed an infinite value. But they differed from Anselm in a very important respect. Anselm taught that, by the gift of his life, Christ paid the *debt* that was due to God. The general view of the Reformers, with some modifications, is that Christ made satisfaction by the *vicarious endurance of the punishment* due to sin. They were for the most part Thomists, and held with Aquinas that Christ

in His humanity has voluntarily endured every variety of suffering, including the pain which springs from sympathy with fallen man. Luther is very emphatic in speaking of Christ as taking upon Him the curse denounced against sinners in the law. "Christ sustained the person of a sinner and a thief," he says, "not of one, but of all sinners and thieves." Calvin says, "Christ has satisfied for our sins; He has sustained the punishment due to us; He has appeased God by His obedience." And again he says, "Our sins were transferred to Him by imputation." Zwingli adheres more closely to Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction than do the others. In general it may be said that they all seem to make no distinction between an active and a passive obedience; pushing Anselm's doctrine to an extreme, on the one hand, by adding the idea of divine wrath, and of the punishment of hell; but weakening it, on the other hand, by their doctrine of an active obedience, by which the redeeming work was spread out over the whole life, and only concentrated in His death. For instance, the Heidelberg Catechism says that "all the time He lived on earth, He sustained the wrath of God." And especially in the Reformed Church was there great importance attached to His *mental sufferings*—"He suffered in body and soul."

In proportion, however, as the legal aspects were thus made prominent, by which the sacrifice of Christ became a vicarious penalty, demanded by divine justice, there sprang up a disposition to emphasize its moral aspects—to maintain, in the spirit of Abelard, the reconciliation of man to God, rather than the reconciliation of God to man. Socinus stands forth most prominently in this revolt against the reigning ideas of the age. He denies the church doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ. The principal significance of Christ's death, according to him, is the assurance it gives us that God really intends to pardon sin. Those passages of Scripture which speak of redemption by the blood of Christ he regards as simply metaphorical. Christ died that He might win us from our sins. He denies that the idea of expiation exists in the Old Testament institution of sacrifice.

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service of the church. His voice is a genuine cry "out of the depths" and has all the realness, simplicity and intensity of the publican's prayer, of Peter's on the sea, or those of blind Bartimeus and the Philippian jailor. There is no attempt at grandiloquence. The language and the imagery are borrowed from the Holy Scriptures and no extravagant terms are employed in order to heighten the effect. And just for this reason it still deeply moves the hearts of men and will continue so to do until the arrival of the day of doom itself. It has been called a "dirge" and a "threnody," which it certainly is not, being a fervent prayer for the salvation of a single soul. Although used as a sequence in the burial service of the Roman Church, it contains no trace of lamentation over the dead. It is not at all elegiac.

The poet opens his hymn in the first stanza with the declaration that the whole world shall be reduced to ashes, and fixes his eye on its completed destruction. The agent that produced it is not the chief thing. The sight of these cold ashes is to him more terrible than the conflagration itself. Many of the translators think otherwise and introduce into their versions such words as "burning," "flames," "fiery," "lightnings," and the like, all of which are out of place and mar the beauty of the poem by diverting the mind of the reader from the main thought. One writer goes so far as to glory in the supposed discovery that the true meaning of the word *favilla* has been misapprehended, and accordingly, in his several versions, renders it by the phrases, "hot embers," "fiery dust" and "blazing dust." Going back to classic Latin we find that it denotes what is left of the body after Cremation, and Horace, in his ode to Septimius (Lib. 2: 6), enjoins him to shed a tributary tear on the warm ashes (*favillam calentem*) of his poet friend, whilst conveying them from the pyre to the urn. But the church soon discouraged cremation. Earth-burial gradually supplanted it and hence the word *favilla* came, in the course of time, to signify the cold, earthy remains of a corpse, whether it had been consumed by fire or decomposed by the forces of nature. Such was its meaning in the thirteenth century, as is clear from its use in the eighteenth stanza of the



"*Dies ira*," where it must mean that and nothing else. Sir Walter Scott so interprets it in his line, "When man to judgment wakes from clay." The idea of the dead rising out of "fiery dust" has no warrant in Scripture. The resurrection precedes the judgment; the conflagration succeeds it. Fire and flames do indeed occur in stanzas fourteen and sixteen, but they are those of *Gehenna* and not of a burning world. The author of the hymn seems to have been far less impressed by St. Peter's graphic picture of "the elements melting with fervent heat" (2 Pet. 3: 12) than by the words of St. Paul: "For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done whether it be good or bad. Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men" (2 Cor. 5: 10, 11).

From the brief and simple reference to the completed outcome of the day of wrath in the first, the poet in his second stanza goes back to its beginning, to the coming of the Judge, and does not lose sight of Him for a moment through all the sixteen stanzas that follow. In the third he goes back still further and describes the resurrection of the dead, the assembling of the vast multitude around the throne and the unrolling of the written volumes in which the deeds, good and bad, of every individual man are minutely recorded. He names but one book (*Liber scriptus*), whereas two or more are spoken of in Daniel (7: 18) and the Apocalypse (23: 12). As the art of printing had not yet been invented, books to him were parchment scrolls, volumes in the original sense of the word. Then he sees the Judge ascend the throne with these records spread out before him, a judge, whose all searching glance not the least thing can escape. Overwhelmed by the vision, he trembles and exclaims: "What, poor soul, will become of thee? Where shall I find an advocate to plead thy cause?" And then, instead of turning to any patron-saint of the calendar, he makes a direct appeal to the Judge himself. The remainder of the poem, and the very heart of it, from stanza eight to seventeen inclusive, is a prayer, or rather a succession of prayers, for mercy. The concluding stanzas, eighteen and nine-

teen, were probably added from older sources by compilers of the missals.

There is one hymn, before alluded to, of purely English origin, which in other points, besides that of the meter, bears a strong resemblance to this prayer of the "Dies iræ," and, although not equal to it in grandeur and power, is yet a lyric gem of priceless value. Toplady, when he composed the "Rock of Ages," must have been acquainted with its mediæval prototype and derived inspiration from it, as may be inferred from the close of his last stanza. But, for all that, each is an independent creation. The authors look from different standpoints and represent different theologies, which, however, are complemental and not antagonistic. The Protestant divine makes his appeal to the Saviour on the cross and lays special stress on the present all-cleansing virtue of His atoning blood, whilst the pious monk directs his prayer to the same Saviour on the throne of judgment, risen, exalted, glorified, meting out their final doom to the righteous and to the wicked.

The quiet influence which, emanating from the "Dies iræ" has so deeply moved the minds and hearts of scholars and educated men in Great Britain and America, both in our age and those bygone, can never be fully estimated, but there is little risk in ascribing to it the magnificent sermon of Jeremy Taylor on the "Day of Judgment," a masterpiece in prose, well worthy of a place beside the great hymn itself.

Having now given free expression to my views in regard to the "Dies iræ" and its translation into English, I venture to add below the reprint of a version of it already published in the *Guardian* of October, 1882, and in Dr. Schaff's "Literature and Poetry," 1890, because new light, gained from further study, has rendered certain amendments and alterations desirable. Of course, no claim of superiority or equality to any hitherto produced is assumed on its behalf.

**DIES IRAE.**

**I.**

Dies iræ, dies illa,  
Solvat ævolum in favillâ,  
Teste David cum Sybillâ.

**II.**

Quantus tremor est futurus,  
Quando Judex est venturus,  
Cuncta stricte discussurus !

**III.**

Tuba, mirum spargens sonum  
Per sepulchra regionum,  
Coget omnes ante thronum.

**IV.**

Mors stupebit, et natura,  
Cum resurget creatura,  
Judicanti responsura.

**V.**

Liber scriptus proferetur,  
In quo totum continetur,  
Unde mundus judicetur.

**VI.**

Judex ergo cum sedebit  
Quidquid latet apparebit,  
Nil inultum remanebit.

**VII.**

Quid sum, miser, tunc dicturus,  
Quem patronum rogaturus,  
Cum vix justus sit securus ?

**VIII.**

Rex tremende majestatis,  
Qui salvandos salvas gratis,  
Salva me, fons pietatis !

**IX.**

Recordare, Jesu pie,  
Quod sum causa tuæ viæ ;  
Ne me perdas illâ diē !

**DAY OF WRATH.**

**1.**

Day of wrath ! That final day  
Shall the world in ashes lay,  
David and the Sybil say.

**2.**

Oh, what tremor there will be,  
When the Judge, mankind shall see  
Come from strictest scrutiny !

**3.**

Pealing far the trumpet's tone  
Shall from graves of every zone,  
Gather all before the throne.

**4.**

Death and Nature, in surprise,  
Shall behold the creature rise,  
Summoned to the grand assize.

**5.**

Then the books\* shall be unrolled,  
In whose volumes manifold  
All the deeds of time are told.

**6.**

When his seat the Judge has ta'en,  
Hidden things will hide in vain,  
Naught shall unavenged remain.

**7.**

What, poor soul, wilt thou then say ?  
Who shall plead for thee that day,  
When the righteous feel dismay ?

**8.**

King of dreadful majesty,  
Whose salvation is so free,  
Fount of Pity, save Thou me !

**9.**

Jesu, kind, remember I  
Caused Thy coming down to die ;  
Lest I perish, heed my cry !

\* See Dan. 7 : 10 and Rev. 22 : 12.

## DIES IRÆ.

## X.

Querens me, sedisti lassus,  
Redemisti crucem passus :  
Tantus labor non sit cassus.

## XI.

Iuste Judex ultionis,  
Donum fac remissionis  
Ante diem rationis !

## XII.

Ingemisco tanquam reus,  
Culpâ rubet vultus meus ;  
Supplicanti parce, Deus !

## XIII.

Qui Mariam absolvisti,  
Et latronem exaudisti,  
Mihi quoque spem dedisti.

## XIV.

Preces mee non sunt dignæ,  
Sed Tu bonus fac benigne,  
Ne perenni cremer igne.

## XV.

Inter oves locum præsta,  
Et ab hædis me sequestra,  
Statuens in parte dextra.

## XVI.

Confutatis maledictis.  
Flammis acribus addictis,  
Voca me cum benedictis !

## XVII.

Oro supplex et acclinis,  
Cor contritum quasi cinis :  
Gere curam mei finis !

## XVIII.

Lacrymosa dies illa,  
Quæ resurget ex favillâ,  
Judicandus homo reus,  
Huic ergo parce, Deus !

## XIX.

Jesu pie, Domine,  
Dona eis requie !  
Amen.

## DAY OF WEATH.

## 10.

By Thee weary I was sought,  
By thy bitter passion bought ;  
Can such labor go for naught ?

## 11.

Just Avenger, let me win  
Full remission of my sin,  
Ere the reckoning begin !

## 12.

Like a criminal I groan ;  
Blushing, all my guilt I own :  
Hear, O God, a suppliant's moan !

## 13.

Mary's pardon came from Thee  
And the robber's on the tree,  
Giving also hope for me.

## 14.

Tho my prayers no merit earn,  
Let Thy favor on me turn,  
Lest in quenchless fire I burn.

## 15.

From the goats my lot divide,  
With the sheep a place provide  
On Thy right hand, justified.

## 16.

As the curséd, clothed in shame,  
Pass to fierce, tormenting flame,  
With the blesséd call my name !

## 17.

Broken-hearted, low I bend ;  
From the dust my prayer I send :  
Let Thy mercy crown my end !

## 18.

When, on that most tearful day,  
Man to judgment waked from clay  
Quails at Thine uplifted rod,  
Spare the sinner, gracious God !

## 19.

Jesu, Lord, their trials o'er,  
Grant them rest forevermore !  
Amen.

### III.

## A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT.

BY REV. T. S. LAND.

That Jesus Christ came into the world not only to effect a redemption of man from sin, but also to accomplish a reconciliation between man and God, is a thought very prominent in the New Testament, and held by the church, in one sense or another, in every period of her history. From the very beginning, moreover, has there been the feeling, to a greater or less extent, that the chief element in the atoning work of Christ was to be found in His sufferings and death. But when the question is further asked: How can the sufferings and death of Christ effect a reconciliation between man and God? how can they take away the guilt of the sinner so as to restore man to right relationship to God? then we get different answers. In the ancient church, where Greek thought prevailed, where sin was regarded mainly as ignorance of God and of man's true relation to Him, we would naturally expect to find different views on the atonement from those which prevailed in the mediæval church, where God was regarded as a mighty Overlord, who has an absolute claim on the obedience of His subjects, and whose injured honor requires an awful reparation.

In the short space allotted to us for this paper on the "History of the Doctrine of the Atonement," we can do but little more than touch upon the bare outlines of the subject, as we follow the development of the thought of the church through the ages. Many of the minor modifications of the different opposing views must be passed over in silence or only accorded a mere mention.

In general, it may be said that the subject claimed but little attention at the hands of the writers of the early Greek Church.

During this period the church was concerned mainly about questions of theology and Christology, and the atonement is only referred to incidentally. If we examine the great Catholic creeds, we find that they are silent upon the subject. It is true that the Apostle's Creed confesses its faith in the forgiveness of sins, but it is not in connection with any doctrine of the atonement, but in connection with the church. In the Nicene Creed the remission of sins is joined with the sacrament of baptism. But from the time of Augustine on, in the soteriology of the Latin and mediæval church, the atonement rises to greater prominence, until, in the "*Cur Deus Homo*" of Anselm, we have a statement of the doctrine that has powerfully influenced the whole subsequent thinking of the church upon the subject. It is in the Protestant church, however, that the atonement reaches its greatest prominence. The reformers, Zwingli, Luther and Calvin, attach great importance to it; and many and great controversies have, since the sixteenth century, been waged, and are now waging over it.

The earliest writers of the Greek Church seem to see the atonement in the incarnation. From the darkness in which man lies and from his ignorance about God spring all the evils from which he is seeking deliverance. Christ is the enlightener who drives away the darkness. He discloses to man the true nature of God and man's true relation to God. To know the truth is to be set free, and in this way the world is reconciled to God and God to the world. This, at least, seems to be the thought of Justin Martyr. He says that "Christ, becoming man according to the will of God, taught us these things for the conversion and restoration of the human race." Still the death of Christ is regarded as a sacrifice and a ransom, and from the end of the second century, more and more does the idea find expression that it is a ransom paid to the devil. But, notwithstanding the growing stress that is laid upon the death of Christ as the important factor in the atonement, there is yet no idea of a satisfaction, in the sense in which that term was used later. Tertullian uses the word "satisfaction," but he is not speaking of a vicarious satisfaction, rendered by Christ to divine justice, but of a satisfaction

which the sinner himself makes to the Lord by repentance and confession. Tertullian knows nothing of a transaction with the devil, and it is doubtful whether Irenæus does. But Origen gives forcible expression to the idea, even asserting that the devil had been over-reached in the transaction. In the assertion of this doctrine, he was, doubtless, largely influenced by the contagion of that demonology which sprang from the paganism of Egypt, and which, according to Lecky, exerted such a powerful influence, during the decline of the Roman Empire, in the overthrow of Stoicism by fostering the conviction that the anger of the gods was the explanation of the evils that were afflicting the world. But still, though Origen gives expression to this idea, it is by no means central in his thought. It was subordinated to the idea of the solidarity of the race in Christ. In him as with the Greek teachers in general, the incarnation was the atonement. It may be proper to note in passing that in this great man, to whom so many diverse and conflicting views in theology can be traced, we also find the first expression of what is known as the moral interpretation of Christ's death. Gregory of Nyssa views the atonement in the light of a ransom paid to satan, and holds that he was defrauded by a dishonest exchange.

Gregory of Nazianzum, while holding to some artifice on the part of Christ, claims that it would be a burning shame to think of a ransom paid to satan. The ransom was paid to God. In Athanasius God Himself endures the penalty. He uses the figure of a king who will do what is becoming to defend and protect a city which he had built but which had been overcome by robbers through the negligence of its citizens. This thought, that God Himself endured the penalty for sin, is enlarged by Cyril of Jerusalem and Chrysostom. But, notwithstanding these minor variations, the underlying thought of the church in the first four centuries is that the reconciliation of man to God is effected by the incarnation of God in Christ, and the consciousness, which flows therefrom, of the union of the divine with the human. This theory has sometimes been called the mystical theory. The whole subject, however, is vague and indefinite during this period.



The mind of the church was occupied almost exclusively with other themes, and although we find, in the writings of the Greek fathers, the germs of nearly all the subsequent theories, it was left to the future to develop the great subject of the *mode* of the reconciliation between God and man.

When we pass from the Greek Church of the first four centuries over into the Latin Church of the fourth and subsequent centuries we pass into an entirely different atmosphere. Here the idea of God as reason is replaced by the idea of God as will. Law supplants knowledge as the ruling principle. The incarnation of Christ recedes into the background of Christian thought and the church steps forward into the vacant place. The gospel is now not so much a revelation as it is a new law. Men are not saved by coming to a knowledge of the true nature of God and of their relation to Him, but by obedience to God's law. As Greek Christianity had inherited from Greek paganism a spirit that cultivated intimate and friendly relations with the Deity, so Roman Christianity inherited from Roman paganism a spirit that feared the Deity and kept Him at a distance. The church is no longer a fellowship of Christian disciples with one another and with Christ, no longer a school for disciples whose chief delight is to sit at the feet of Christ and learn of Him, while they themselves are bound together by their love for the Master; it is now an organized, visible society, modelled after the Roman empire, with certain well-defined boundaries, having a visible, earthly head, with subordinate officials, and with stringent methods of enforcing obedience to its laws. Sin is no longer, primarily, ignorance of God, of His nature and character, and of man's relation to Him; sin is now violation of law. Salvation is accordingly deliverance from punishment, rather than deliverance from ignorance and darkness. Consequently the mythical idea of the atonement, which was subordinated in Greek thought, becomes the ruling principle here.

It was Augustine, the greatest teacher of the Latin Church, as Origen was of the Greek Church, who, by his teaching regarding God and His relation to humanity, gradually changed the nature

of the conception of the salvation wrought by Christ. He taught that Adam's sin had condemned the whole race to endless punishment. Only those whom God elects and upon whom He bestows His sovereign grace can be saved. He sees in the atonement a ransom paid to satan. But whereas in the Greek teachers the deliverance effected by the death of Christ was available for the whole human race, Origen even going so far as to include in its provisions the fallen spirits; in Augustine it is available only for the elect. In Augustine, however, the atonement itself is not clearly distinguished from the subjective appropriation of the benefits secured by it, on the part of the elect. God, by an act of sovereign will without any merit of the individual, imparts to him faith and love, and by virtue of this faith and love, the sufferings and death of Christ are available for him. The ethical view, that the death of Christ is of value as a pattern for imitation, also finds a place in the teaching of Augustine. "Christ died," he says, "that no one might be afraid of death, nor even of the most cruel manner of putting persons to death." And still further, "The love of Christ displayed in his death should constrain us to love Him in return."

From the time of Augustine on to that of Anselm in the eleventh century, the mythical notion of a legal transaction with the devil, in which the devil was outwitted, holds full sway. This was the period of the dark ages. It was a time of commotion and confusion. Augustine died in 430 A.D. at the very time that the Vandals were besieging Hippo. And from that time on Vandal, Goth and Hun, Saracen, Dane and Frank, marched and countermarched, fought and pillaged, burned monasteries and devastated fields, until a universal sense of dread and horror pervaded the world. The kingdom of evil was much in the thoughts of men. Men feared the devil, the head of this kingdom, as much as, or more than, they loved God. There was also the feeling that God was angry with men and was making His wrath felt. Under such circumstances men came to feel that they needed deliverance from an angry God, no less than from satan. And it was at this time, therefore, that

Anselm appeared, in answer to the need and the earnest longing of the age, with the clear expression of a theory that was intended to demonstrate the love of God, in spite of the apparent manifold evidences of His consuming wrath. His theory is very briefly as follows: Man owes a perfect obedience to the divine law. No man has rendered, or can render, this perfect obedience. Sin is, therefore, a debt; and as all men are sinners, all men are in debt to God. In their disobedience men fail to pay to God what they owe Him. Now God is infinite. Sin against Him is, therefore, infinite sin, and calls for infinite, that is, everlasting punishment. But God is also good, and if He were to execute this penalty it would thwart the divine goodness, which cannot permit all men to be eternally lost. Divine wisdom has, therefore, devised a plan to satisfy the justice, while it reveals the love of God. Man, who is finite, cannot pay the debt, which is infinite, for only an infinite being can pay an infinite debt. So God becomes man in Christ and, as such, renders full satisfaction to the divine justice. Christ, the God-man, renders a perfect obedience in His death. This obedience is of infinite value, and is more than an equivalent for what the race would have suffered if punished forever. God can, therefore, pardon sinners, because the debt is paid and justice is satisfied. Thus the goodness of God triumphs. Anselm seems to make no provision by which the benefits of Christ's death are made over to the individual. But the whole tendency of the thought of the time was to make the church the dispenser of these benefits.

Brilliant as this theory is, yet it was not accepted by his contemporaries, nor by his immediate successors, without modification. It was opposed especially by Abelard, who advanced a theory known as the moral theory, the germs of which are already observed in Origen. Abelard held that the death of Christ effected reconciliation by kindling love in the breast of man, which blotted out sin and with sin its guilt. Especially repugnant to him was the doctrine that the devil had a claim upon man which it was necessary to satisfy in order that man might be saved. Bernard of Clairvaux denied Anselm's position that there existed in the

being of God an absolute necessity for a satisfaction of the divine justice in order that sin might be pardoned. He also held against Abelard that the devil had a claim upon man. It was not a rightfully *acquired* right, but a wrongfully *usurped* right, which yet God permitted. He also asserts the mystical theory that Christ, the Head, has satisfied for His members. Hugo of St. Victor, the ablest representative of a school which during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, occupied a middle position between the rationalism of Abelard and his opponents, introduced a *quasi penal* element into the atonement. According to him "Christ paid the debt of man to the Father, and, by dying, expiated the guilt of man." Peter Lombard is more in sympathy with Abelard's view than is Hugo, but he takes a decided step in advance of Anselm by saying that Christ took on Himself the punishment for sin. From this time on there is manifest a growing tendency to return more closely to Anselm and to develop his theory more fully. The great Dominican teacher, Thomas Aquinas, made prominent the priestly work of Christ, who, by the offering of Himself upon the cross, propitiated the heart of God. About this time there was much discussion over the question as to whether the death of Christ was simply sufficient to satisfy the divine justice or whether it was more than sufficient. He held that it was not only sufficient satisfaction for the sins of the human race, but that it was a *superabundant* satisfaction. On the other hand, Duns Scotus, the leader of the rival Franciscan order with whom the will of God was paramount above all else, took an extreme opposite position. The sufferings of Christ were not even necessary, for an angel or a man might have suffered quite as well, if God had so willed; God however, was willing to accept the sufferings of Christ as an atonement for the sins of man. From this time on, in the bosom of scholasticism, there are two general opposing views of the atonement. The Anselmic, sometimes called the judicial theory, makes the atoning work of Christ the objective equivalent of the punishment deserved by sin. It embodies itself in the formula that Christ endured the penalty. The second is the Scotist view, which re-

jects the formula above, and whose principal, but not exclusive thought is that the value of Christ's sufferings and death lies in the impression which they are calculated to make of the love of God.

In the meantime, in the mysticism of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there was a line of thought that was preparing the way for the Reformation, which was to make its appeal to the individual conscience, and eventually to discard the authority of the church. With this change of thought there also came a change in the views of men in reference to the atonement. These mystics, of whom Wessel is, perhaps, as good a representative as any, held that Christ was, at the same time, God, priest and sacrifice. He brought about reconciliation at the same time that He was the God who was reconciled. They attached great importance to the principle of love, holding that the Spirit of Christ must be appropriated by a living faith. Sometimes it is said that man is reconciled by taking up his cross and eradicating self. In one of their hymns they sing, "through *God* we shed our blood, on account of which our sins shall be pardoned." There is here an approach to the old Greek idea of the solidarity of the race in Christ.

When we pass over into the Reformation period, we do not at first find any great break with the doctrinal position of the Roman Church. The first effort of the Reformers was to put an end to certain practical abuses. Theologically, however, it soon became a movement back to the position of Augustine on the doctrine of predestination, and to the idea of God as asserted by Anselm. The Reformers all accepted the three great ecumenical creeds. So also on the doctrine of the atonement they held with Anselm that the sufferings of Christ objectively possessed an infinite value. But they differed from Anselm in a very important respect. Anselm taught that, by the gift of his life, Christ paid the *debt* that was due to God. The general view of the Reformers, with some modifications, is that Christ made satisfaction by the *vicarious endurance of the punishment* due to sin. They were for the most part Thomists, and held with Aquinas that Christ

in His humanity has voluntarily endured every variety of suffering, including the pain which springs from sympathy with fallen man. Luther is very emphatic in speaking of Christ as taking upon Him the curse denounced against sinners in the law. "Christ sustained the person of a sinner and a thief," he says, "not of one, but of all sinners and thieves." Calvin says, "Christ has satisfied for our sins; He has sustained the punishment due to us; He has appeased God by His obedience." And again he says, "Our sins were transferred to Him by imputation." Zwingli adheres more closely to Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction than do the others. In general it may be said that they all seem to make no distinction between an active and a passive obedience; pushing Anselm's doctrine to an extreme, on the one hand, by adding the idea of divine wrath, and of the punishment of hell; but weakening it, on the other hand, by their doctrine of an active obedience, by which the redeeming work was spread out over the whole life, and only concentrated in His death. For instance, the Heidelberg Catechism says that "all the time He lived on earth, He sustained the wrath of God." And especially in the Reformed Church was there great importance attached to His *mental sufferings*—"He suffered in body and soul."

In proportion, however, as the legal aspects were thus made prominent, by which the sacrifice of Christ became a vicarious penalty, demanded by divine justice, there sprang up a disposition to emphasize its moral aspects—to maintain, in the spirit of Abelard, the reconciliation of man to God, rather than the reconciliation of God to man. Socinus stands forth most prominently in this revolt against the reigning ideas of the age. He denies the church doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ. The principal significance of Christ's death, according to him, is the assurance it gives us that God really intends to pardon sin. Those passages of Scripture which speak of redemption by the blood of Christ he regards as simply metaphorical. Christ died that He might win us from our sins. He denies that the idea of expiation exists in the Old Testament institution of sacrifice.



The chief element in the priestly office of Christ is His intercession above. He insists that the terms satisfaction and forgiveness contradict each other, for to forgive implies that satisfaction is not demanded. Moreover, not only the human race, but every sinner for himself, deserves *eternal* death. Now Christ only died *one* death, and that a *temporal* death. Hence His death could not atone for man's sin. It was the tendency of this school of thought to minimize the death of Christ into that of a martyr, or to see in it nothing more than the fulfillment of the divine promises, or a necessary step in the transition to His resurrection and ascension.

Between the Socinians and the advocates of the reigning orthodoxy the Armenians endeavored to find a mediating position. They taught a universal atonement, in the sense that it is provided for all, though not actually efficient for all. In a work against Socinianism, Grotius advocated what has since been known as the governmental theory. Instead of the relation of God to man being that of a creditor to a debtor, as Anselm held; or that of a judge to a criminal, the prevailing view in his time; he held that the relation was that of a ruler to a subject. A ruler has the right to remit the penalty, provided the end sought to be attained by the punishment can be secured in some other way. The death of Christ secures the end sought by God, which is the prevention of future transgression, by showing what sin deserves, and thereby deterring men from it. This theory satisfied neither party, and had but little influence at the time, but later came to new life and influence in the New England theology.

Here, however, it may be well to pause to notice another eddy in the stream of church history which had some effect on the doctrine of the atonement. Just as the reaction against the scholasticism of the mediæval church gave rise to the mysticism of the fifteenth century, so the reaction against the hard stiff orthodoxy of the formal Protestantism of the seventeenth century gave rise to a movement known as Pietism. Arndt and Böhme and Spener in Germany, the Quietists in France, the Quakers in England, all agreed in holding that the death of Christ had secured redemp-



tion from sin, but connected it with the idea of a second internal redemption, and made the inner communion of the soul with God to be the essential reconciliation between man and God. Zinzendorf, in the eighteenth century, was the father of a movement in which the essence of Christianity was made to consist in the internal connection of the objective atonement with the Christian life. The Moravians, as his followers were called, made great account of the imagination and dwelt much upon the wounds and blood of Christ, and the scourge and nails and other instruments of torture, as a means of quickening the imagination, and thus bringing the individual into fellowship with the sufferings and death of Christ. Wesley, in England, was greatly influenced by Zinzendorf, but in his view the atonement is simply a provision of the government of God.

In the meantime a system of thought that became known as New England theology was developing in the bosom of Calvinism in America. It sought, while holding fast to the sovereignty of God, the underlying principle of Calvinism, at the same time to wrest from Arminianism its weapons, by presenting the claims of Christianity in such a form that the unrepentant sinner might be without excuse. It is, therefore, of some importance in a review of the history of the doctrine of the atonement. The leader of the movement was Jonathan Edwards. He holds that where there is sin some compensation must be made, either punishment or repentance. Now no repentance answerable to the guilt is possible for man, because the guilt is infinite, while man is finite. But Christ becomes our intercessor. His sympathy with both God and man, which qualifies Him to be the mediator between them, was perfected by His death. He became a substitute for man. This substitution was, primarily, in His own heart, but was completed in the final act of self-surrender on the cross. Edwards seeks to find the moral and spiritual elements in the atonement. He does not regard Christ as the object of God's wrath. The younger Edwards goes further. He denies the Anselmic theory that the atonement is the payment of a debt. It is the means by which the general justice of God is satisfied. He adopts the

view of Grotius, that the end of punishment is the restraining of others from sin. The atonement does this because it shows God's hatred of sin and His determination to punish it. From this time on, this has been the prevailing characteristic of New England orthodoxy.

This view, however, was not allowed to dominate New England thinking unchallenged. Horace Bushnell, with decided leanings toward Sabellianism, who had come somewhat under the influence of German thought, as represented in Schleiermacher, protested against it. His ruling idea seems to be that the incarnation and death of Christ are the result of a law of self-sacrifice that is of universal obligation. In many respects his theory is not radically different from that of Abelard.

At the same time that the New England view was opposed by Bushnell and New England unitarianism, on the one side, it also met with steady opposition from Princeton, on the orthodox side, which held fast to the Anselmic view of the atonement, as modified by Calvin and other reformers. "The atonement was a substitution, judicial in its nature and effects, and thus avails necessarily for the salvation of all for whom it was intended."

When we come down to the closing years of the present century we notice a tendency in all directions to break away from the old Anselmic and Reformation doctrine of the atonement. This tendency is largely due to the influence of Schleiermacher. In the closing years of the eighteenth century he appeared among the German people as the advocate of personal religion. In theology he led the way back to the principles of the early Greek teachers. With him religion consists in the consciousness of a personal relation to Christ. The believer and Christ are vitally united, and in this vital union, not in the single fact of the death of Christ, is found the redeeming and atoning principle. God who is immanent in the world manifested Himself in Christ in order that He might communicate to men His own undisturbed blessedness. The sufferings of Christ, therefore, are not essential to His work as a Saviour. Sin is only a lower stage of human development, and so not strictly ab-

normal. The work of Christ is intended, consequently, not to rescue, but to elevate mankind. There is no room here for the idea of guilt. Hence there is no need of an expiation. The work of Christ, and His death, which is, after all, only a part of His work, deliver from sin and deliver from punishment; but it does so in the way of cause and effect; for when the cause, sin, is removed, punishment, the effect, is removed also. In all his thinking the *person* of Christ is central.

He was the founder of what is known in Germany as the Mediating School of Theology. To this school belong Nitzsch, Rothe, and Dorner, who, however, do not hold all the views of their master without modification. Especially is this the case with Rothe, who can only in a very qualified sense be said to belong to that school. Space forbids our attempting, even in the most general way, to show in what respects they differ from one another in their views of the atonement. In general they all agree in making the removal of the punishment of sin dependent on the removal of sin itself, which is effected by means of a life-union with Christ—a view very much like that of the early Greek fathers.

Ritschl and Kaftan, who seem to occupy a position by themselves as an offshoot from the school of Schleiermacher, also deny that the death of Christ was the punishment for sin, or that by His death He made expiation for the sin of man. According to Ritschl His absolute fidelity and His divine calling were perfected and evinced in His death. According to Kaftan "the death and resurrection of Christ are the symbol and the power of the death to sin, and the resurrection to life in fellowship with the risen Lord."

While this development of thought has been going on in Germany, in Scotland John McLeod Campbell has brought forth a theory that deserves notice. According to him, the death of Christ was necessary, in order that he might realize man's need and God's feeling. Starting with the alternative of Edwards, that sin must be followed by punishment or by an adequate repentance, he discards the idea of Edwards that the bearing of

the penalty constitutes the atonement, but accepts the alternative, and makes the atonement consist in the rendering by Christ of an adequate repentance for human sinfulness. "His confession of sin is a perfect amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man."

At the same time, in the Broad Church party of the English Church, Frederick D. Maurice, followed by Robertson and others, took a new departure by making the fatherhood of God the central and controlling idea in all their thought on the atonement. Fisher, in his *"History of Christian Doctrine,"* quotes from and sums up Maurice's views on the atonement as follows: "Christ satisfied the Father, by presenting the image of His own holiness and love." "In His sacrifice, this holiness and love came forth completely." "He bore the sins of the world in the sense that He felt them with that anguish with which only a perfectly pure and holy being, who is also a perfectly sympathizing and gracious being, can feel the sins of others." There is no "artificial substitution," Christ being the "sinless root of humanity," the source of all light in them, "the root of righteousness in each man."

But we must hasten to conclude. As a result of this brief review of the *"History of the Doctrine of the Atonement,"* the conclusion is forced upon us that there has as yet been enunciated no doctrine of the atonement that has been able to demand for itself such a degree of acceptance on the part of the church as to give those who hold it the right to claim that it ought to be accepted as the only orthodox doctrine. Certain denominations may have embodied certain theories in their confessional systems, or certain schools of thought may be in practical agreement among themselves on the subject, but, certainly, no one theory has been so generally accepted by the whole church, or so persistently upheld by her through all her history, as to be entitled to be called catholic. Meanwhile, it seems the controversy must go on, until some prophet arise (if there ever is to be such), with spiritual vision so keen that God may reveal to him the secrets of this great mystery, and with power sufficient to impress the

truth which he has discovered upon the church. Until that time shall come it would seem to be the part of Christian faith to rest unshaken in the firm conviction that the great transaction on calvary, not apart from, but in connection with the life of Christ, has effected reconciliation between man and God, and has wrought salvation for the world. In the midst of the many and conflicting theories of the atonement, men can still turn to the sacrament of the altar, and as they, in that holy transaction, eat the crucified body and drink the shed blood of Christ, their hearts can find rest and peace in the comforting assurance that "they have a full pardon of all sin by the only sacrifice of Jesus Christ, which He Himself has once accomplished."

#### IV.

### RELIGION AND POLITICS.

BY JOHN W. APPEL, ESQ.

Religion and Politics are the two most important interests of mankind. They have inspired the profoundest thought and the noblest achievements of man ; and they mark the radiating centers of all human history. They are vital interests because they determine man's happiness and well-being. Without religion and politics men would lapse into barbarism, and lead godless and lawless lives. No man can afford to be indifferent to these interests, or to shirk the responsibilities they place upon him.

#### RELIGION.

The deepest element in man's life is, no doubt, the religious. We scarcely emerge from childhood before we learn that the human heart longs for communion with God before all else, and can find no rest apart from Him. Death haunts us from the cradle to the grave.

"Sooner or later, all must to the urn."

And men try in vain to rob it of its terrors. The Egyptians, in the height of their mirth and feasting, were wont to bring the dried skeleton of a man into the room for a memento to their guests. But there is no soothing balm for the sting of death and the ravages of sin apart from religion. Religion is the great reconciler in the distractions of life. It calms the tempests of the soul, and brings peace to the warring factions of the mind. It gives men something to live for and to die for. Pardon, hope and joy are the heavenly messages it brings to the guilty, the oppressed and the sorrowing. It turns to bitterness the life poised on self, and glorifies that centered in charity and self sacrifice. The world has, at times, ignored the religious interest and gone in pursuit of the vain things of earth ; but only to return, after

bitter experience, to acknowledge that, after all, the only true life is the religious life; and apart from God there is only misery and woe. Religion is an essential element of our nature. It is not something to be put on or off at will, to be accepted or rejected as men may prefer. It is not a delusion, nor an artificial thing—the outgrowth of ignorance and superstition; but a divinely implanted idea, or life-principle, working its way out through the ages in the progress of the race. It is a revelation from God to man. Plutarch says: “We have met with towns unfortified, illiterate and without the convenience of habitations; but a people wholly without religion no traveller hath yet seen.” Dr. Schaff says: “Ancient history furnishes no example of a state without religion and forms of worship.”

The lesson of the ages is summed up in the pregnant question, what doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul.

#### POLITICS.

Next after the religious, man's most vital interest is the social and political. This interest is represented by the state or human government in general. Politics as a science has to do with the structure or mechanism of the state. As an art, it is concerned with the exercise of the functions of the state with reference to the solution of given questions as they arise in the body-politic. As men grouped in society have never been found without possessing a religion, so they have not been found without a government however rudimentary in form. The operations of government touch our lives at almost every point. The bread we eat, the clothes we wear, the houses we live in, the soil we till, the labor we perform, the rights and liberties we enjoy, are all matters more or less affected by the laws and government under which we live. The political policy of a nation always determines the well-being and happiness of its people for better or worse. Hence, politics is a matter of most vital concern for every citizen in the state. Men have always realized this; and have ever been ready to fight and if need be, die for the state. The flag is the emblem of the state; and the deeds of heroism



and patriotism which it has inspired emblazon the pages of history. Every country has its altars upon which human sacrifices have been offered up in the interest of purer laws and purer government. The lesson of the ages in regard to the state is summed up in the pregnant question, of what avail is the life of man if we have no rights that society is bound to respect. The rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness may be declared to be unalienable; but if there is no government or law to enforce them they become meaningless terms. The state is not a mere pact grounded on expediency. Sovereignty and obedience are inherent in our nature. The state has a divine sanction, and is grounded in the moral nature of man. Its function is not only to protect man in his material interests, but to secure him in his freedom and moral development as well. To use the language of another: "It has for its end the fulfillment of the divine end in history."

What now has religion to do with politics—and what has politics to do with religion? The question is an old one, and yet it is ever new, because religion and politics are both progressive in their nature; and the relation which they sustain to each other differs from time to time, just as the political and religious problems with which they respectively have to deal assume different forms from one age to another.

It is sometimes supposed that our forefathers settled the question once for all when they adopted the principle of the separation of church and state; and we are told that religion and politics have nothing whatever to do with each other. But the question, we submit, is not so easily disposed of. The formal separation of church and state may be final, and it may not be. But even if it should be, there is still an internal, reciprocal relation between the two which legislation cannot annul, and which theologian and statesman cannot ignore. This is being felt particularly at the present time in the re-adjustments that are being made in science and religion. A new theology and a new sociology are being written; and while the tendency in some quarters is to break away from the old moorings and to minimize the force of

religion in its effect upon civilization in general and the body-politic in particular, there is a strong protest on the part of many eminent writers and thinkers, who claim to be progressive, too, who insist that religion is the great saving power in the world and without its influence the state is doomed to shipwreck and failure.

### I.

On the general question we suggest, in the first place, that the spheres of religion and politics are separate and distinct, while at the same time they are closely and intimately related to each other. While Christ recognizes the distinction between the two spheres when he says: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's"; St. Paul shows their kinship when he says: "The powers that be are ordained of God." The religious idea is a different thing from the political idea. As religion has a mission and a work to perform peculiar to itself, so has politics. They also differ in their authority, that of the one being referable to the direct command of God, that of the other to the command of man. Christ told His disciples that His kingdom was not of this world. He gave them to understand that the usual modes of government do not obtain in His kingdom. "Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant." Religion is primarily interested in man's spiritual welfare. It looks to man's well-being and happiness in a life beyond the grave. It does indeed teach morality in its highest sense, but as a part of the religious scheme. Christ did not teach science as such, or art, or political economy, or law, or government.

On the other hand, politics looks primarily to man's temporal welfare. It has to do with the regulation of the laws of trade and commerce and finance, with the administration of government, the protection of life and property, the adjustment of international relations, and with kindred matters pertaining to the body-politic. Politicians and statesmen study the sciences that pertain to law and government and man's social relations, while the theologian studies theology or the science of man's relation to God.

Lord Macaulay, speaking of the distinctive spheres of religion and government, says: "Now here are two great objects: One is the protection of the persons and estates of citizens from injury; the other is the propagation of religious truth. No two objects more entirely distinct can well be imagined. The former belongs wholly to the visible and tangible world in which we live; the latter belongs to that higher world which is beyond the reach of sense. The former belongs to this life, the latter to that which is to come."

Adam Smith, speaking of institutions for religious instruction, says: "The object is not so much to render the people good citizens in this life, as to prepare them for another and better world in a life to come."

While these sentiments may not be considered the best theology in this age, for religion is being more and more considered a matter for this life, here and now; they, nevertheless, present a pregnant truth, namely, that church and state have different aims, and operate in different spheres.

It took long years of historical experiment to demonstrate this proposition. In the old Jewish theocracy there was a union of religious and political interests. God was the great lawgiver and fountain-source of government. Mohammedanism was a politico-religious movement. And among Christian nations, even to modern times, temporal and spiritual powers were united in one form or another. It was only after bitter trial and experience that the world came to realize that church and state should be separated and should exercise their respective functions in separate and distinct organizations. The tendency now is, on the part of the state, not to intermeddle in the affairs of religion; and the policy of the church is to let the state work out its own salvation through its own separate organization and laws.

An eminent member of the British Parliament, at the Alliance of the Reformed Churches at Washington, a year ago, stated that disestablishment in England was only a question of time; and he put the pertinent inquiry, how we would enjoy having the affairs of our churches regulated by our politicians in Congress.

Not only in theory, but in practice also, is it coming to be recognized that church and state occupy separate and distinct spheres, and each has a distinct mission in the world peculiar to itself.

But while these spheres are distinct, they are closely and intimately related. They operate largely upon the same individuals, and the work of the one when properly performed is a constant aid to the work of the other. There is no such thing as an isolated fact in life. Everything stands in relation to something else. Humanity is an organism, and man's interests are all closely related to each other. The interests of the church and state are closely united, and in idea are by no means antagonistic. The two institutions owe reciprocal duties and obligations to each other. The relation is somewhat similar to that which holds between religion and morality. A distinction may be made between religion and morality; and yet they are not independent. Gibbon and Hume both sneer at religion as a power for good in the world; but have they made out their case? If there is one thing that history proves it is that men's morals have always been affected by their religion; and religion is the only true basis or foundation of all true sound morality. We cannot assent to Lord Macaulay's proposition, previously quoted, that government belongs wholly to this life, while religion belongs wholly to the life which is to come; except to the extent that both hold in separate and distinct spheres. The fact is the so-called natural religions are little more than ethical systems. The moral precepts of the Christian religion are gems of the highest order, and no system of natural ethics has ever produced their equal. The Christian virtues are the highest and best ethical virtues. The poet has well said:

"The Christian is the highest style of man."

While Christianity primarily teaches man's duty to God, it at the same time teaches man's duty to man. The teachings of Scripture, at every point, insist upon the proper regulation of our lives in this world. It gives us the true view of life here, and lays down the

norm of all true human happiness in the divine precept, "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." It goes without saying that the best morality of the world has been inspired by the revelations of the Christian religion. The church has inspired the noblest achievements of the state. The state recognizes this, and, even in this country where the two institutions are separated in external form, it assumes a receptive attitude towards the influence of the church in all its operations. It asks the prayers of the church; it frames its laws on Christian principles; it protects the church in its worship and property; it enforces the observance of the Sabbath; it recognizes Christianity as a part of the common law of the land.

The effect of an improper conception of the intimate relation between the secular and religious is apparent in many of the schools of modern thought. The science of government and political economy is constructed without reference to religious principles. It is based entirely upon what are termed natural laws, which, it is held, are sufficient of themselves for the proper evolution of the state and the social order; just as the physical laws are sufficient of and in themselves to uphold the universe in its appointed order and course. Adam Smith had no room in his system for the consideration of moral and ethical principles, or of religion. Let every man enjoy the fruits of his own labor, was the law which he regarded sufficient of itself in the regulation of commerce and trade. In the same way Ricardo and Malthus and others have constructed theories pertaining to man's economic relations regardless of his religious needs, aspirations and hopes.

Modern politics is suffering from a disregard of the influence of religion upon its work and operations. Thus while an undue severance of the realms of religion and politics begets a cold and lifeless theology, it at the same time breeds a false and spurious sociology.

While, then, a coalescence of the two spheres must always prove detrimental, as is evident from the history of the past, it is apparent that their too wide severance or separation will be fraught with equal, if not greater, injury.

## II.

In the second place, we advance a step further and venture the opinion that religion is not merely influential for good in the realm of politics ; but that it is a necessary factor in the perfection of the state. That is, without the divine guidance of religion the state can not realize the fulfillment of its high mission in the world. We believe this is the only position we can take that will be found to be consistent with the claims, principles and teachings of our holy religion.

Sin and evil are in the world. They are disintegrating factors in the individual life, in the social order, and in the body-politic. These forces must be vanquished, and there is no mere earthly force that can do it. The purification must come from above. This purification is needed nowhere more than in politics.

Political corruption has become proverbial. In our own country, especially, politics has become so corrupt that men almost despair of its purification. Elections are a farce. Bribery is so common that it is scarcely considered a crime. Justice has become a commodity of barter and sale. The fountains of political power are tainted with fraud. The whole body-politic seems to be diseased to the very core, and the daily exposure of vice and debauchery in politics are sickening in their details. And yet, it may be true that political corruption is no worse than corruption in other spheres of life. Dishonesty, fraud and crime are not strangers in social, business and professional life. The whole social organism is corrupt to a greater or less degree. It is the moral obliquity in life generally that makes political knavery possible. We sometimes think political corruption is unduly exaggerated in comparison with evil in other spheres ; and men in high places are often not as black as painted. But, however that may be, it will be conceded generally that corruption in politics is so grave that it threatens the destruction of the state.

It is not only corrupt officials that mar the operations of the state. A greater evil is false political principles and ideals. Corrupt men may be displaced, they die and pass from the arena of life ; but false ideas live on through the ages. These false prin-

ciples and ideals must be rooted out if the state is to become purified and perform its proper mission in the world. The natural man is selfish, and the ordinary operations of the world are carried forward on selfish principles. Even the so-called scientific principles of politics and economics rest upon this false foundation. We are told that man is a fighting animal; that might makes right; the end justifies the means; success is the true criterion of right; there is no standard of right and wrong except custom; the motive of the moral act has no other sanction than that of pleasure and pain; nations owe no other obligations to each other than those which they have agreed upon or contracted for, and international law rests simply upon custom and not upon right; industrialism has nothing to do with morals; man, to use Mr. Ruskin's phraseology, is a mere "covetous machine," etc. Political systems based on principles like these are godless and cruel in their conception and application. They rest upon principles that might apply to animal and savage life, but not to rational, sentient, civilized, religious beings. The wars of the past, and of the present too for that matter, are largely referable to the operation of false social and political principles. It took centuries of struggle to eliminate from our political creeds the doctrine that justified human slavery. It may take years of struggle in the future to wipe out the legalized industrial slavery that now threatens the happiness of the people. Great political blunders, the result of false political and economic principles, have caused the downfall of prosperous nations, and retarded the civilization of the world.

But a more serious difficulty confronts us than the corrupt politician or the false political principle. These two difficulties may be overcome, and we may still be far from realizing the perfect state. Men may see and know the right and still the wrong pursue. There seems to be something lacking in the natural human will. Men may apprehend the right intellectually, and yet not do the right; they may know the moral law, and yet not keep it.

Some inspiration, some divine energy, is required to enable men to do what they know to be right. The spiritual and emotional



nature needs to be quickened. A love for the true and the good must be enkindled in men's hearts in order that they may actualize in their lives what they acknowledge to be right. Ideals are of small account unless we have the ability to put them into practice. President Hadley, of Yale College, says, mere training in sociology and politics and civics and finance and all manner of studies intended to inform the young American concerning the mechanism of the political world in which he lives will not be sufficient to remedy the political evils of the nation.

How then, is the state to be purified? How are we to get rid of the corrupt official, how are we to discover and apply the true political principle, how are we to infuse into the state that divine energy which will enable it to perform its true function in the history of the world? There can only be one answer to the question. The true religion is the only power that can save the state.

Human nature cannot regenerate itself. The natural man cannot evolve the spiritual man, except as the divine truths of our religion become a factor in the process. History proves this and the claims of our religion sanction it. If this be not true, then we might as well dispense with religion, and close our churches and theological seminaries, and establish mere ethical schools in their stead. There are those who would have us do this. They argue that religion has retarded civilization, and hold that human nature can regenerate itself apart from religion.

Herbert Spencer contends that humanity may be moulded into an ideal form, to use his own language, by the continual discipline of peaceful coöperation without the aid of the Christian religion. He huris bitterest sarcasm at the theologians who, he says, hold the doctrine that man, intrinsically bad, can be made good only by promises of heaven and threats of hell; and he ridicules the attitude of Christianity in "a state of the world in which naked barbarians and barbarians in skins are being overrun by barbarians in broadcloth." Is his position tenable? Are his reflections upon Christianity merited? Are they just? We believe Mr. Spencer goes too far here in his claims for science.

Science is a good thing in its place; *but it can never become*

*the savior of the world.* Darwinism has, no doubt, given a new impulse to scientific investigation. Whatever else may be said of it, it marks a new epoch in scientific methods and research. But may not the system be extended too far? It has passed beyond the realm of biology, and is being applied to sociology and ethics. The age is wrestling with its application in these spheres. The sum of 30,000 marks has been given to Professors Haeckel, Conrad and Fraas of Berlin to be awarded by them for the best essays submitted to, December, 1902, on the application of the Darwinian theory to international political development and legislation.

We believe it is an error to apply the laws of the kingdom of nature to the ethical sphere. Professor Paulsen of Berlin says: "The kingdom of nature is governed by physical-mechanical laws, the kingdom of grace, by teleological-ethical laws. The motive in men's actions is not pleasure but life; a man exerts himself to satisfy an ideal which he has formed, not to secure pleasure. The eternal life which is to come, and is close at hand, overshadows the temporal life. Civilization is, and always has been, largely founded on the Greek, rather than the Christian ideal. The modern world is now trying to embrace the two in a great synthesis, though in many respects the pagan ideal is still uppermost. We must endeavor to extract from both the Greek and Christian conceptions the elements most nourishing to our life."

We believe that the most precious fruits of modern civilization are traceable to the influence of the Christian religion. While Christianity does not define the functions of the state, or regulate by force the outward conduct of men and nations, it touches the heart and conscience, and teaches the foundation principles of human conduct, and creates a Christian consciousness, which becomes a potent factor in every sphere of life. The altruistic sentiment is a product of the Christian religion. Civil liberty is the outgrowth of religious liberty. It was Christian sentiment that built up the civilization founded on Plymouth Rock. It was Christian sentiment that emancipated the slave, that removed the blot of Mormonism from our national life, and that is mould-

ing the destiny of our country to-day. Our laws are said to be Christian laws, because they reflect the Christian sentiment. They get their inspiration and quickening power from the divine teaching of the lowly Nazarine.

It is the characteristic of the Christian religion that it furnishes the life principle and the quickening power necessary for the regeneration of the world.

According to Noah Porter: "The Christian ethics are not only a system of rules, they are also an aggregate of motives. Christianity does not simply give wise and ample directions of what we are to do; but it furnishes us the moving power. It does not merely command and forbid, but it enkindles inspiration. Hence is it that Christianity is a life."

Cooley says: "The moral sense is largely regulated and controlled by the religious belief."

Story says: "Religion is indispensable to the administration of civil justice."

Duncan, J., says: "Waiving all questions of the hereafter, Christianity is the purest system of morality, the firmest auxiliary, and the only stable support of all human laws."

Washington says: "Reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of the religious principle."

Schaff says: "The object of the church is to transfuse the world—art, government, social life, etc.—with the purifying power of her own divine life, and thus bring it at last to its true and proper perfection."

"Bancroft says: "As we trace the progress of commercial ambition through events which shook the globe from the wilds beyond the Alleghenies to the ancient abodes of civilization in Hindostan, we shall still see that the selfishness of evil defeats itself, and God rules in the affairs of men."

John Jay Chapman, in an admirable little work just fresh from the press, entitled, "Practical Agitation," says: "The short lesson that comes out of long experience in political agitation is something like this: All the motive power in all of these

movements is the instinct of religious feeling. All the obstruction comes from attempting to rely on anything else."

### III.

In the third place, by way of practical application to one phase of the subject, we suggest that the attitude of the church and the clergy towards politics must be determined in the light of the two foregoing propositions.

The church makes a mistake when it departs from its legitimate sphere and enters the realm of politics. Whenever it has intruded in the affairs of the state the result has been disastrous. The preacher, we believe, should keep within his proper sphere as a teacher of religion. He should not preach politics any more than he should preach farming, or banking, or engineering, or law. Not that a minister may not enter the arena of politics and economics; but if he does so, he should do it as a writer or teacher in these branches of learning and not as a minister of the gospel. As a citizen he should vote and lend his influence to the solution of political questions; but not as a preacher from the pulpit. As a rule it may be said, that when the statesman, the lawyer and man of business, step out of their spheres and undertake to teach theology, they make a sorry failure of it. In like manner, when the preacher as such steps out of his sphere to teach political economy, he demonstrates, as a rule, that he is wandering from his calling. A course of study in politics and economics will, of course, be of inestimable value to the preacher; but only in the sense that a course of study in literature and art and science generally will be of value to him. It will equip him better for his work, and make him all the stronger in his calling. But he must beware lest in the exercise of his ministerial functions in the pulpit as a minister of the gospel he yields to the temptation of delivering a mere lecture in civics or sociology. The temptation in such cases is always to strain the true import of the gospel to fit some political theory, thus mixing the sacred and profane in a manner derogatory to both. Texts of scripture are in this way often perverted and used as mere political maxims.

We have heard of sermons preached on, "16 to 1," and on the modern battle-ship, and similar subjects, based on texts of scripture. This degradation of holy things to secular uses cannot be too strongly condemned. There may be exceptional times when great moral questions are at issue in politics when the minister may be justified in taking strong ground in upholding the right from the pulpit; but even then great nicety and discrimination will be required in treating the subject. Religion, of course, has to do with secular affairs; but its mission here is to proclaim general fundamental principles rather than to enter the arena of political strife and conflict. Party politics, especially, are unseemly in the pulpit. There have been times when it may not have been improper for the minister to preach politics; as in the days of Savonarola, and Knox, and Luther, when church and state were more or less united and the church was a semi-political institution. There was a time in this country when it seemed necessary for the minister to be active in politics. It was in the formative period of our history.

Bancroft says: "In the settlement of New England the temple, or, as it was called, the meeting-house, was the center round which the people gathered. As the church had successfully assumed the exclusive possession of civil franchises, the ambition of the ministers had been both excited and gratified. They were not only the counsellors by an unwritten law; they were also the authors of state papers, often employed as embassies, and, at home, speakers at elections and in town meetings. 'New England,' says Cotton Mather, 'being a country whose interests are remarkably inwrapped in ecclesiastical circumstances, ministers ought to concern themselves in politics.'"

The historian shows how, the political mission being accomplished, the preacher gradually lost his prestige as a politician. The position of the minister in social influence has altered very much in the last fifty years. "Then," the *New York Nation* says, "he was expected to bring to the solution of political or economic problems his wealth of knowledge, judgment and experience. To-day his counsel is rarely sought, his sermons on

political subjects make little impression, the reforms he suggests are apt to be visionary and impracticable. If there be a particularly specious political or economic fad rampant in the community, he is very likely to get entangled in it."

This change in the political influence of the pulpit is due not to defects of clerical education, as the London *Spectator* suggests, nor to degeneracy of talent; but rather to the growing feeling that the politician is out of place in the pulpit. The people do not want the money changers and the political manipulators to defile the temple of the living God.

The preacher will serve politics best by preaching religion pure and simple. Let him inspire his people with true religious principles and ideals and the leavening power of the gospel will through them find its way into the affairs of the state and nation.

We do not believe that the clergy should aspire to political place and emolument; there is something incongruous about a preacher running for Congress. Church members, we believe, should be aggressively active in politics. They are the salt of the earth. As a rule they stand too much aloof from politics. The religious life does not demand separation from the world; the closer it touches the current of life the better both for it and for the world. We have very little faith in the adoption of resolutions on political subjects by religious bodies. We, however, believe it to be a mistaken religious zeal that makes men non-resistants and non-participants in the affairs of the state.

The story of the trees is as pertinent to-day as it was when Jonathan went and stood in the top of Mount Gerizim, and lifted up his voice and cried, and said unto them, "Hearken unto me, ye men of Shechem, that God may hearken unto you."

"The trees went forth on a time to anoint a king over them; and they said unto the olive tree, Reign thou over us. But the olive tree said unto them, Should I leave my fatness wherewith by me they honor God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees? And the trees said to the fig tree, Come thou and reign over us. But the fig tree said unto them, Should I forsake my

sweetness, and my good fruit, and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said the trees unto the vine, Come thou, and reign over us. And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my wine, which cheereth God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou, and reign over us. And the bramble said unto the trees, if in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon."

The question we are considering has been agitated somewhat during the past year by the clergymen of Philadelphia, some of whom have expressed their views as follows:

Rev. Dr. S. W. Dana says: "I doubt if it would be wise for members of the clergy, as such, to take an active part in politics. I do not believe that is a function of the pulpit."

Rev. George S. Fullerton says: "The clergyman appears to exceed his functions when he becomes a politician, and it is not likely that he will increase his influence for good by so doing."

Rev. Dr. Henry G. McCook says: "It is not within the clergyman's province to take part as a clergyman in political affairs. The church, as a church, would soon be no church if it went into active politics."

#### IV.

In the fourth place, if the foregoing propositions be true, then it follows that the state will never absorb the church, nor the church the state, but the internal and spiritual relation between the two will become closer and more harmonious; and furthermore, men's political relations will become more and more purified as they are brought under the influence of the holy religion. While there is room in the world for both church and state, they cannot be and will not be divorced. Just what the relation between them will ultimately be, we do not presume to forecast. We do not believe their true relation has yet been reached; but it will be in the fullness of time.

The world, as we have seen, is wrestling to-day with one phase of the question. It is trying to reconcile progressive theology



and progressive sociology with each other. The age is an age of sociology and political economy. Science and religion are grappling with the problems affecting these interests. The great problem, as David S. Cairns tersely puts it in a recent number of the *Contemporary Review*, is: "To reconcile the scientific conception of the world as a reign of law, and the Christian conception of it as a realm of Divine Providence." This is the battle-field on which the conflicts between religion and politics must be settled. In the struggle, concessions must be made on both sides. The science of politics is too prone to reject the higher laws of religion; while religion, or rather theology, is too often too unscientific and hide-bound to the traditional doctrines of the past.

In the solution of the problem, we believe the relations between religion and politics will be adjusted somewhat along the lines we have hereinabove imperfectly indicated.

We have faith in the ultimate outcome. We see bright promise for both church and state on the horizon of history. With all that is false and corrupt in our political relations, the Christian religion is making substantial progress in purifying and Christianizing the body-politic. The state is becoming more humane and philanthropic. Notwithstanding the wars that mar the closing years of the century, the nations are gradually passing from a state of hostility to a state of amity; and political beneficence is on the increase the world over. The deeper currents are moving in the right direction.

The ship of state, we know, is heavily laden, and is sailing a dark and troublous sea; but the gospel of the Christ is ever at hand, as a bright beacon, to light its pathway. May we not hope, as we round the century mark, that this light of the world shall be found burning with new lustre; and that we shall hear from the "lookout" the welcome words:

"Out of the shadow of night  
The world moves into light;  
It is day-break every-where."

## V.

### HOW WIDE IS AN INCH?

BY REV. A. ZIMMERMAN, A.M.

#### I. INTRODUCTION.

Some questions seem more silly than they really are. This question has been asked over and over again, and still it is a pertinent one deserving treatment. We need to know things not only in a general way, but our knowledge should be definite. Here is the difference between hazy thinking and exact thought. The one leads to narrowness and confusion, the other to intelligence and liberality. But clear thinking is impossible when we are in the habit of taking things for granted just because "it was said by them of old," and do not make a personal investigation. New questions need be stated and new answers given. Old questions need be reasked so that new phases will receive proper attention.

So, too, we should never allow ourselves to be led to accept every new interpretation and theory that is set forth, because the new is as liable to be out of shape with the "four corners of the world" as older ones. Many have disappeared because they were not fit to live. Science and philosophy have restated their questions and reformulated their answers. The new superseded the old only to be superseded by something more new. Then there is an occasional swing back to that which had already been rejected. In theology the same questions have been put times without number, and as often a different reply has been given. To-day theological thought is settled on very few questions. Different minds think along different lines and view things differently; the result is that there has been comparatively little uniformity of thought. The same is true in regard to philosophy. There are not two philosophers to-day who can be termed independent thinkers

who agree throughout on half a dozen fundamental propositions. In science men of eminence draw different conclusions from the same data. Thus arise different scientific theories. Men who hold fundamentally the same position are soon found to diverge as they develop their theses. Thus we find a great diversity of thought in all departments of learning.

This is no doubt greatly owing to the fact that man has not attained to that which is perfect, nor has pursued his investigations along any line of study to such an extent that he can state all the data that enter into the solution of the problem, and draw all the correct inferences therefrom and nothing but correct inferences. But suppose such a thing were possible, what then? Would not the very object for which the mind exists be thwarted? Would not the mind become as a stagnant pool, giving forth that only which is pestiferous instead of that which is health and thought-provoking? As far as we are acquainted with the human mind it can only exist in soundness and expand when it is active. Lethargy results in dwarfed minds. But to be active it must constantly inquire after the unknown, and must constantly readjust its relations with the world as the result of better knowledge. This can only increase when the mind theorizes and philosophizes, whether in the realm of science, arts, philosophy or theology. Thus the keleidoscope of life is constantly changing. While old relations may be as valid as ever they will bear both a new message and a new meaning, and hence will demand new interpretations. Old relations may pass away and be succeeded by new ones.

At this point the question suggests itself, to what extent may we go? That is only another form of the question, how wide is an inch? As most other questions have a greater or less bearing on theological thought, this department has been busy discussing heresies and other questions of a controversial character. Here battles have been hot and contests severe. The outcome in many respects is by no means beyond dispute. In the meantime it is necessary that investigations continue, though it is not necessary that the battle wax hotter. In fact it might still cool off a little. It

is not good to risk the temper too much. But thought must go on. There must be further investigations. The whole realm of truth has not yet been brought into full view. Hence it is necessary to "go forward" so that more truth may be brought within the grasp of man. Superstition has not altogether vanished from the mind of man. Is it not possible that much of the speculation called "scientific" or "philosophical" is more the result of superstition than we are willing to admit? And on the other hand is not much of the same sort of speculation to be attributed to fantasy and imagination rather than to a deduction from facts? Further, are not many of the so-called "data" and "facts" creations of the mind rather than discoveries in the outer world? In theology the great contests have been waged in regard to speculative points, where there was often an appeal to "facts" of human creation. On the one hand there has constantly been a tendency to take matters for granted as they have been delivered by "those of old," and in connection with this, baseless deductions without number were made. On the other hand we find a manifold creation of new facts and data, and just as erroneous conclusions. We also find that there was a tendency ever present in accordance with which the foundations of belief were carefully inspected and where defects were discovered new material was inserted after the old had been rejected. Because of erroneous conclusions man was often forced to undertake a reinvestigation in order to make a stronger defense. Thus man has been going on for generations, ever contradicting others and seldom, if ever, thoroughly consistent, with himself. Is not all this confusion and turmoil? So it may appear to some. But was not this the only way out of the darkness of the past into the present light? What other course should our fathers have pursued? Advance thought prevented the stagnation of the conservatives. These in their turn checked the flightiness of the progressives. The advancing conservatives marched steadily forward. What other course are we to follow now? Is not this the way out of the present into the brighter light of the future, where we may see God's face more distinctly, hear his message more plainly, and understand His purpose more

thoroughly, while we admit all along that we are not allwise. But how far dare the other man go? How far dare that man yonder go? How far dare that man yonder stay back? How wide is an inch?

## II. NECESSITY OF UNIFORM STANDARDS IN THE BUSINESS WORLD?

In the business world man has established uniform standards of value and measurements. While crude at first, they served a useful purpose. Commerce was carried on with foreign countries and bargains were made at home. The business of the day was transacted to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. The inch in the business life was variable. In fact this was the case to such an extent that as trade increased and civilization strided forward the necessity of new standards was clearly seen, and new standards were adopted. As governments became more thoroughly organized these standards were made more uniform. If to-day each person were to try to do business according to a standard of their own make, how much confusion would there not be brought about where there is uniformity now? Wheat can be measured. But it can be measured with a small or a large measure. It can also be weighed, and the standard may be expressed by one name or by another, or it may contain much or little. Cloth is easily measured. The standard may be long or short. Call it what you will. But business could not prosper if arbitrary standards were used, besides causing a great deal of inconvenience. The same practical standard might be called by different names, or the same name might express different quantities. Or, both these conditions might exist. This would only lead to confusion. For this reason each civilized country has established standards of its own which are the only ones legally recognized. These are used in the business world.

The government says that a certain distance in space is a yard. This is divided into three feet, which is again divided into twelve inches. The inch has definite value, so has the pound. There are standards which are used in constructing all instruments of

measurement and weight. If we enter a store in Maine or in California the dollar is a dollar, the yard is a yard. In this way uniformity is secured. Trade is not hampered. Nor is it full of uncertainties.

In international commerce any one of the national standards can be expressed in terms of the other. United States money can be expressed in terms of English, German, French, or any other governmental value. Weights are reduced from one to the other. This brings about a good degree of world-wide uniformity for commercial purposes. Everyone sees the necessity for such uniform standards of value. In this way the question concerning the width of an inch is obviated. There is no room for philosophizing and theorizing. Speculation is out of place. The inch is a human standard for human purposes in business relations. It is not established by speculation. Argument and philosophy have their influence as they well should, for no question is settled where their voices are not heard and where they have no vote. In spite of all this the standards are of a very arbitrary character. They might be heavier or lighter, longer or shorter. But once established, people learn to adjust themselves to these standards and use them. The same reasons that call for the existence of these standards also demand stability, and are the ground of opposition to changes proposed unless a larger good is established by the change.

### III. NO PARALLEL IN THE THEOLOGICAL WORLD.

On the basis of such premises as the foregoing it has already been argued that we need strict uniform standards of doctrine. If the argument is valid, why should we need standards rather than a standard? Why not carry the demand to the unit? Some do, but to their own, of course. If it is argued that any number of persons have the right to unite in adopting any standard of belief that appeals to their judgment as expressing their common thought and thus to form a common bond of union, though the right cannot be denied, yet on the basis of the analogy nothing is gained, for no standard of belief thus established

can be expressed in terms of another. How would you express the Episcopal standard in terms of the Heidelberg Catechism? Or how would you phrase the standard of the Lutheran Church in terms of Presbyterianism? Besides this no strict uniformity can be secured in an age of high educational standards. While we grant the right in question, we deny the analogy, and even as far as the right is concerned it has its limitation. These circumstances in the business world have no parallel in the theological world. The conditions are by no means similar.

Belief is the result of the thought-process, whatever other elements may enter. The more active this is, the more divergence will there be noticed. But the difference between ideas formulated into a belief and the usual articles of merchandise defies comparison. Thought cannot be put on the scales and weighed as we sack wheat and weigh it, nor can we apply a foot-rule and measure it, nor can we barter in thought as in muslin, or sugar or bonds. We cannot say the inch in dogma is so wide or the yard so long. Nor is the inch at one time in a man's life necessarily the same at all other times. We may state the thoughts of others as we perceive them, but behold the blunders made in this way. While the thought-process follows certain laws, this does not argue for identical results. In fact we know that results vary. Thus we deal with things fundamentally different in the realm of thought from those dealt with in the realm of trade, that necessity on one hand does not argue for necessity on the other. We must refrain from pressing analogies further than they really hold. A forced analogy invalidates the argument. We must differentiate things dissimilar.

The thinking world examines arguments from this point of view. Arguments based on deductions from one set of facts should not form the foundation for arguments in another set unless there is a real similarity. Very many of the fallacies in argumentation arise from this source. Matter is so different from mind, standards of commerce so different from standards of thought and belief that an argument valid for the establishing of uniformity of practice in business is no argument for establishing uniformity of thinking in doctrine.



#### IV. THE DESIRABILITY OF BROAD STANDARDS.

Since it is useless to argue for a broad standard, we desire at least to plead for broad standards. It is self-evident that thought is active along fundamental lines. And it is more easy for a body of men to agree on fundamental principles than in detail. When mutual sympathy lies along the same line of thought there is a tendency towards unity. Men agree to unite on certain particulars and differ from others in these same particulars, and because they have affinities for that phase of a doctrine they unite to formulate a creed that is mutually satisfactory. They subscribe to the creed. This does not better matters much, for different interpretations will cause trouble in the camp, and the tyranny that was so nauseating in their former relations is now again practiced. The lesson of liberality which they then desired to press upon others is lost on themselves. While no fundamental idea was rejected, it was nevertheless a pet idea. Tameness often goes farther than reason. Thus the new creed did not better matters much after all. If there had been more charity exercised, a broader basis of interpretation used, more liberty of thought allowed, this endless division would not have occurred. But since this state of affairs now exists, why can we not recognize the elements common and allow liberty of thought in our theology rather than go on in diversity when there is often no difference worth noting, and even if there is why not exercise charity?

A broad doctrinal basis recognizes man's imperfections. The idea that man is so sinful that he cannot do a good deed as the result of his volition does not harmonize with the practice that man centuries ago could formulate a doctrinal standard so perfect in all respects that future generations cannot restate it in better terms for their own days. If the fathers of the Reformed Church were able to express the doctrinal standard for that body for all future ages so perfectly that those at the dawn of the twentieth century cannot formulate their ideas more adequately in view of the advance made in science, philosophy and theology, a degree of perfection is clearly implied which is altogether inconsistent with

the teaching of the Heidelberg Catechism. If the framers of the Westminster Confession were able to express the doctrinal standard for the Presbyterian Church for future ages so that the General Assembly of the year 1900 could not be able to formulate it more adequately for the twentieth century, a degree of human perfection is implied which is clearly contradicted by that Confession. If these implications are not clear we are compelled to admit the assumption that these men were infallibly inspired. If Protestantism is willing to admit such an assumption, it might as well return to the doctrine of "papal infallibility." If we deny this doctrine, why try to set one up no better by claiming infallibility for our man-made standards of faith? If man is imperfect, all his works must necessarily show imperfections, is a statement containing as much logical force as the argument from design usually employed in works of evidences and natural theology, where it is intended to prove the existence of God. And yet why is it that we place side by side such contradictory statements as the imperfections of man and the claim that the framers of our creed produced a result so perfect that it is such a horrible thing to talk about revision? And if we admit the imperfections of men why not admit that each age can best express its own conception of the truth regarding God and salvation, or are we driven to the pessimistic idea that since the days of the Reformation we have been going steadily backwards and that our theologians have less clear conceptions of the truth than the reformers had? Who can accept this conclusion? Man is imperfect and produces imperfect productions.

Again, if the perfection of the creeds is insisted on and the imperfections of the framers are admitted they were either inspired to be infallible for the time being, or we are given to bestow a reverence to the letter of the creed which is again inconsistent with the teaching of the document. So we have not only here another inconsistency but an act of irreverence toward our God. To adhere to a set of phrases as if they were the only set of English words which properly express a doctrine, when, in the mean time, knowledge in all other departments has been restating

its conclusions, and when, furthermore, a great body of adherents are doing violence to the language to get it to say what they mean, we have arrived at a point where it is certainly timely to call attention to the irrelevancies and to call for a consistent carrying out of the doctrine of human imperfection. To refuse to recognize human imperfection in connection with our creeds implies a narrowness inconsistent with our pretensions, an adherence to the letter rather than to the spirit which is contrary to the word of God, a tendency to incrustate and to narrow thought and thus to attempt to thwart the very purpose for which our intellects were given us; whereas a broad doctrinal standard, a wide inch, giving room for free investigation and a frank statement of firm and true convictions, not only recognizes man's imperfections but also implies a desire for progress, that these limitations may be removed as far as possible.

Revelation has ever been progressive. Thought has been constantly advancing. True, there have been times of retrogression, but in spite of this there has been a constant forward movement. From the first revelation of which we have any record to the close of the canon we see a great forward movement. Since the days of the apostles, theological thought has been swinging pendulum-like backward and forward, but the backward swing was never altogether to the old position, while the forward swing has always been considerable to the advance of any position theretofore occupied. The careful student will observe some evidence of progress even in the darkest period of the Dark Ages. The advance was made by men who had attained new heights and saw new or clearer visions, while they refused to be held strictly to a creed dominated by narrowness and a sanctimonious reverence for the letter. The broad creeds invite investigation, because it is seen that the life of the church depends on activity in the field of doctrinal investigation. We fail to see why we should be in such a theological condition to-day, because of creeds formed centuries ago, or tendencies inaugurated in ages past, that it should be heresy to talk of advancing. The oyster doesn't, why should man?

Advancement does not mean to overthrow the old standards,

but it may mean the privilege to state in our own words what we of this age and generation hold to be true just as our fathers in their day stated the truth as they perceived it. To restate our conception of doctrine at the opening of the twentieth century is no more criminal than it was for the fathers of the Lutheran, Reformed, Presbyterian, or other churches, to break loose from the then existing order of things and restate their beliefs as they were led by a careful study of the word of God. Or, even if no creeds are restated, they can be reinterpreted. In this case, however, we are occasionally in the ridiculous position of believing one thing while we say something else. "He descended into hell (hades)" is a good example. It is simply a matter of fact that many believe no such thing, more are in doubt whether they shall or shall not. The biblical basis is so slight, if there is any at all, that this should have no place in a creed for the universal church. Why not expunge it? Have we not as good a right to strike it out as others had to insert it? Since we view this matter differently from former generations why not say what we mean and leave that out which we do not believe? At any rate there is ample opportunity to allow sufficient latitude for interpretation.

But most difficulties arise not so much from directly interpreting the creed as from an expression of opinion concerning some doctrine, or, it may be, from some interpretation of a passage of scripture. Yet in either case the creed is more or less called into question. Where a narrow standard is adhered to, or it is narrowly interpreted, the question of heresy is forthwith raised. A broad standard gives a man an opportunity to give to the world the results of his investigations without being stigmatized a heretic. And it seems strange that men who are doing most to popularize bible study are thus branded. If we would learn to be broad and liberal we should not be so sensitive. While defending our views we should be slow about charging others with dishonesty, for they may be as honest as we ourselves are. They may be as sincere and as devoted to the cause of God and to their mission as they are led to conceive it as we are who think differently.

Another thing should not be forgotten in this connection. The canon itself is of human origin. Men selected the books they regarded inspired and collected them. But these collections varied for a considerable time. The authenticity and canonicity of the various books was not a matter of direct revelation. There was no little amount of discussion, and a great divergence of opinion was manifested. While we do not reject the canon as it is, and while we confidently believe later generations would not have done better under similar conditions and limitations, we cannot overlook the fact that *man closed the canon but God continued to speak*. And this is the main point of our contention. Can any one assign a sufficient reason why God should have spoken to so many generations, then revealed Himself in His Son in terms of humanity, continued to manifest Himself to the apostles, and then cease all manifestations and revelations and speaking to mortal man, as if no more could or needed to be revealed, and all this in spite of the fact that Jesus said, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world"? Would that not be a strange presence that would not lead to comprehend the former revelations better and understand God's will more thoroughly? Is that the present Christ and the present abiding Spirit that we should expect from the presentation of the gospels? Can there be a present Christ and a present Spirit and man not be helped in fighting his battles with sin and error? But if God does speak to-day to whom does he speak? To the conservative alone? Is not that a pharisaical presumption? To the liberals alone? Is not that a sacrilegious pretention? To whom then does He speak? Can we not be broad enough to establish creeds of sufficient width which admit that He speaks to both the conservatives and the liberals? To the one He gives a message as they are able to see it and to the other as they can comprehend it; and among both He makes allowance for human error and human imperfections. God's plan is broad, and why should man's creeds be narrow? Why should not man say, "There are certain fundamental ideas on which we agree, so let us walk together," rather than, "Let us separate because of the minor disagreements among us"?

Life everywhere manifests itself variously, and why should the religious life be onerously uniform? Everywhere else thought appears multifariously, and why should there be perfect monotony in theology? Evidently the creed of the apostles consisted substantially in this, "Do you believe in the Lord Jesus Christ?" If this was sufficient for men who wrote the word of God, why do we need to go to such great length to define details and insist on our definitions, saying to those who cannot accept them, "Go to yourselves and establish your own hut"? These are incongruities arising out of narrowness. A broader outlook would develop broader ideas and more mutual sympathy.

#### V. THE INCH OF DOCTRINAL BELIEF.

When we come to investigate the various standards of doctrine and are led to inquire into a common standard, the inch of doctrinal belief, we must ask what it is, how wide is it? When we inquire into the standard of doctrine of any denomination the width of the inch is often of very great uncertainty. When we ask who made it, the question assumes a humorous aspect in view of the many discussions and dogmatic statements. Who made it decides to a very great extent what it is; and what it is determines largely if not altogether its width.

This inch is a human affair. It is as thoroughly human as anything can well be. And who can help crack a smile when we are told that man is unable to do any good thing and yet he has made creeds which are invested with all the authority of the Almighty, and everyone is measured by the standard thus established? A creed was no more inspired than a good gospel sermon preached by a thoroughly consecrated man of God. Why Luther should be less inspired when he rose from his knees after having had communion with the Lord Jesus and the heavenly Father and entered the pulpit to preach the message of redemption given by that Lord and God for him to deliver to a sin-sick race than when, in the heat of the controversy and with no more prayerful spirit he formulated dogma as he understood it by writing the Lutheran Catechism, is indeed beyond comprehension. Nor is it clear why



the authors of the Heidelberg Catechism were more inspired when they wrote it than they were when they lectured to students or proclaimed the gospel from the pulpit. The substance was essentially the same. Their systems of theology have been revised and modified by later theologians. Why a catechism or a creed should belong to the same category as the law of the Medes and Persians "which changeth not" is "past finding out." The authority of standards will be discussed later on. Now we only wish to draw attention to the human origin of these documents. They are the result of deliberation. The same mind acted in their production that acted when the message was presented from the pulpit, and the thought-process was identical in both cases. Who has the right to expunge the presence of God from either of them? Let us then remember that the doctrinal inches are preëminently human. They bear the stamp of imperfect man, whether he is viewed in his greatness or in his frailty.

In its modern use we have in the standard an article supposed to be used to measure the thoughts and in this way test orthodoxy or heterodoxy. If orthodox, the extent of its purity; if heterodox, the degree of its impurity. A sort of doctrinal milk-tester. And woe to the man who does not stand the test! It is supposed to fence in the field in which it is legitimate for theologians of that grain to ramble and investigate. Beyond is forbidden ground. Game on the other side of the fence they must not catch, and if they do occasionally shoot a hare they had better be quiet about it or an inspector-general, and the number is not small, will come round and report him to the judge, who in turn will try to consign him to the prison of "public contempt." In their estimation he is a sort of small-pox patient, but without any to wait on him except as someone else finds himself in the same predicament and reported to be afflicted with the same disease. In so far the inch may have a definite value.

When you ask for the inch of the Reformed Church you will be pointed to the Heidelberg Catechism. In so far all agree without even one dissenting vote. Should inquiry be made whether we accept the Theo- or the Christocentric position in



theology, answers will differ. Should the inquiry be concerning Calvinism and Arminianism, as many inches will be discovered as theologians are consulted. The last decade has demonstrated that the inch of Presbyterianism is a variable quantity. The same is true in other denominations. But how are we to measure with a variable quantity? Who is judge as to the correctness of the interpretations of the interpretation? For, while the standard is supposed to interpret on the one hand the denominational conception of doctrines, and express on the other hand the consensus of opinion in that denomination, yet this interpretation is variously interpreted and the expression is variously expressed.

In view of these things it would be interesting to know how wide these various inches are. How wide the inch of Protestantism may be. How far dare I go without being endangered by the Scylla of heresy, or how far dare I stay behind without running against the Charybdis of Old Fogyism? The question before us is not where should I be to be right in the sight of God, but where can I escape the hoots of men? The former phase deserves quite a different treatment from the latter. But to-day the advanced column of the advanced wing of advanced thought hoots at the man in the center and claims that he is altogether behind the time, besides being in danger of losing himself among the thickets of superstition, while he disdains to look at the man in one of the rear columns. The conservative of conservatism raise their hands and open their mouths moved by holy horror, if there is such a thing, and claim that the advancing columns will surely swamp the church in the mire of atheism and infidelity. Each has an inch of his own. So we must conclude that the theological inch is a very variable quantity, at widest as wide as God's mercy, and at narrowest as narrow as the narrowest human narrowness. As God is liberal with the children of men it is no doubt a good plan to follow His policy, for we verily believe that He has as good reasons for His course as the heresy-hunting or the critico-self-assertive tribes of mankind for their course, and probably a little better reason, since we come to think the matter over carefully.

## VI. GROUND OF AUTHORITY.

Another question concerning the doctrinal inch deals with the ground of authority on which these beliefs rest or are supposed to rest and in accordance with which the measurements are made. This is a controverted question. Many have already expressed themselves on some phase of the problem or other, and a number have been called to give an account of themselves for their utterances. For this reason the question should be considered in this connection. There is need of clear thinking on this subject, and thinking that is not influenced by preconception nor by dogmatism. For this reason we will first state the problem in this way: What is the authority for the doctrinal inch as we find it existing to-day? On what basis does this authority rest?

On inquiry we find the authority to be two-fold. Either it is made to rest on biblical grounds or on reason, or it may be that both these elements are allowed to enter into consideration, but one or the other must predominate. In considering the biblical basis we are surprised to see so many doctrines deduced from the same account that we are led to ask, in the first place, Is the biblical account so unclear that it may be made to say most anything? then, Is the work of men so unreliable that their deductions are untrustworthy? and further, Is the whole a system of reading doctrines into the Bible rather than finding them there? In view of the variableness of the inch of doctrine, there must be something wrong. Now the fact is simply this: There are no philosophers nor logicians who are thoroughly logical throughout and avoid sophistry altogether. The most logical mind is still unlogical enough to reason in a circle. The most philosophical mind will at times introduce matter irrelevant to the subject, and is thus led to draw wrong conclusions. This accounts for the great variety of doctrines based on the Bible. Some are illogical in some respects and others in others. If they avoid one cliff they are apt to run on to a shoal somewhere else.

It cannot be denied that man is given to the habit of reading into the Bible the doctrine which he desires to see there. The Calvinist goes to the Bible with his eyes so full of Calvinism and

his heart so saturated with the decrees of God that he sees evidences of these things everywhere. He sees everything through Calvinistic glasses, and of course he will build up a Calvinistic system. The believer in immersion looks for proof-texts, and the believer in infant baptism imagines that every household consisted largely of children, and these were all baptized where any references are made to this matter. Thus both sides misinterpret passages because of the view in the head, which must find a place in the Bible too. The same is true in matters of detail as well as in matters of importance.

Now the question is certainly pertinent: Is there any biblical basis for doctrines as they are often or usually handled? That may depend on what we may mean by basis. If it is supposed to mean that there is sufficient ground for the doctrine in its developed form, the answer must be negative. If it is meant that there is good foundation for the germ of the doctrine, then a positive answer may be given, for it even then depends upon what the doctrine is. Thus we see that the claims for a biblical basis is both true and false. For this reason the pretension to rest on revelation has very little meaning because it is as variable a quantity as the doctrinal inch itself. The thought is unclear until properly defined. And only then will such a claim have any definite value.

But there is another source of confusion in this connection. The inference must be distinguished from the fact. We assume, as we think we have a right to assume, that the Bible is a source of authority and contains revealed truth. The Bible contains poetry, and figurative language abounds. Here we find all sorts of rhetorical figures. If we use these as literal prose and reduce them to matter-of-fact statements, they come to convey what they never were intended to convey. While they stand for something definite they are neither historical nor dogmatic facts. The statements of Elihu and Bildad as found in Job are not always a good guide for a doctrine, because they rest on a false philosophy of life and God's dealing with man, and hence they cannot be put on the same level as the prologue to John's gospel.

Or, the statements of Satan in Job should not have the same treatment as the sermon on the Mount. The pessimistic utterances of the Preacher are pious and thoughtful as well as instructive reflections, but the philosophy is unsound. The Book has a divine message to all generations, but we must learn to distinguish fact from inference and prose from poetry.

The same is true in regard to the inferences of modern theologians. Many take their inferences to be as valid as revealed truth, and that in spite of the fact that they are full of inconsistencies. The inferences may be correct, but it is wise to regard them merely as inferences. It must be admitted that systems of theology contain more inferences based on revealed truth than elucidation of revealed truth. After inferences are assumed to be true, they are often bolstered up by other inferences and elucidated by speculation. The right to construct such systems is not denied, for they serve a useful purpose if properly understood and properly treated. Yet we contend that more care should be exercised in proper discrimination, but we protest against giving such a system of theology the authority to dictate to others what they should think and to what extent they may be permitted to carry their investigations.

Thus when we consider the facts we discover that the claim to the authority of God is not as important as it is often made out to be. The cry that we must adhere to the simple teaching of the Bible is as indefinite as the cry "back to Christ." The one may mean that the whole world is to abide by that conception of the Bible and adopt those inferences accepted by a certain school of thought, or even of an individual. The other may mean that all systems of theology should reconstruct the life and work of Christ as well as the resulting doctrine of the atonement so as to accord with the views of those who make the demand. This is what these things generally mean. Or, the one may mean that we should take the Bible in our hands and lay all preconceived notions aside as far as possible and study the Bible to discover the facts and be sure of the real facts and all of the facts, then put these facts together and construct a system in harmony

with them. This involves a constant asking, Is this true? It involves a constant verifying of the facts discovered so that their real significance may appear. To inquire into the truth of the statements made does not imply scepticism, but it does imply a desire to be sure of the truth and to conceive of it aright. Then the plea for a biblical basis will be definite. The other may mean that we remove the excrescences that have accumulated and study the life of Christ with a view of finding the Son of God and not a creature of man's imagination. Study the life of Jesus so that the divinely natural element will be more apparent and the mechanical and artistic less. We may well imagine that Jesus would have been much at sea how to act had he been surrounded by the rules and restrictions of modern theology.

But what about reason? Is the appeal authoritative for the inch of doctrine that may have been established? Possibly it is. But it may not be. May it not be necessary to make some inquiry into the matter? May it not be necessary to inquire concerning the material which the reasoning powers had at their disposal when the problem was under consideration? This we consider quite an important element. If, in the construction of a doctrine, material has been rejected that should have been used, then the reason of man is not a court of final appeal, simply because some valid evidence has been ruled out. Or it may be necessary to inquire whether material has not been used which should have been rejected. In that case the result is no more satisfactory, because the evidence has not been properly taken in so far as testimony that should have been rejected has been heard and given a due place as valid evidence. Or, it may be of importance to know whether we are sure that we have not been reasoning in a circle or been guilty of some other blunder in the reasoning process. Have we perhaps been taking that for granted which we should have proved? Have we not been making assumptions and then using them to prop up other assumptions? All these things are to be considered. They have a bearing on the validity of the argument concerning the propriety of the appeal to reason as an authority.

It may be further asked what we understand by reason and what inferences connected therewith are implied. Do we use it as a universal term and imagine that which we reason out will appeal as strongly to others as it does to us, or do we mean that, since the conclusions arrived at by a process of reasoning is all the guide we have and therefore authoritative for us, therefore it is an authority for others as well? In either case we err. The particular and the universal are different things and must not be confused. In the other case, while reason is an authority for the individual, because through the reason we receive all the light we have, it must not be overlooked that this is true in others as well. Reason is thus an authority for the individual, but he has no right to apply his measure arbitrarily to others, nor should he allow his own reason to be dwarfed or perverted or biased by others. It is first necessary to be sure that we fully comprehend the thought of others before a conclusion is reached, and even then the conclusions of others are as sacred and as authoritative to them as ours are to us.

Is the revealed reasonable or unreasonable? To say that it may be beyond reason in order to avoid admitting its unreasonableness is speaking in unclear language. For it is either reasonable or unreasonable. There is no middle term. What our reason cannot grasp may be as reasonable as if we could see it clearly. By reasonableness is not meant, as is often implied, that which we have reasoned out, but that which can be reasoned out by one who has the necessary information and ability and capacity. Even those who believe in the reasonableness of religion and religion of reasonableness often make the fatal blunder of supposing that those who appeal to reason necessarily reject revelation. This, however, does not follow unless it is so stated; thus they use an unjust inch and press their own ideas by trying to foist them upon others. The same is true concerning the other side. But it must be remembered that revelation can only appeal to man through his understanding and his reasoning powers. What other avenue is there by which the soul can be reached? What other way is there of influencing the soul?



We know of no other, and the difficulty is not solved by supposing that there may be other avenues of which we know nothing and then proceed as if that part of the question were settled. While we can easily conceive a revelation not yet within the grasp of the human mind, we can also easily conceive that mind expanding until it can readily comprehend the truth involved. And until we comprehend a revelation it is of no practical value for us. At best it can only stimulate thought and encourage research so that the mind may be put in a position to solve the problem, and in this way let the light of revelation stream into the soul. Reason and revelation must necessarily go hand in hand and both enter as factors in the foundation of belief.

But this is only a ground for the individual to whom revelation appeals, and it must be a personal matter altogether. This is yet no reason for making the inch of belief a court of final appeal for all other cases. When a man is accused of heresy and brought up for trial the question naturally suggests itself by what authority a man or a body of men set themselves as judges in a matter that pertains to the individual, when he is thoroughly convinced that his own position accords with truth as he comprehends it. It is also true that there are some doctrines which the church cannot allow to be set at naught. Only an unbeliever would attempt to do this. It is also true that we need to inquire into foundation truth as constantly as any others, so that our superstructure may be built more sure. The main question is to what extent an adopted creed is binding on each individual who subscribes to it, and to what extent each one may be at liberty to pursue independent investigations and express his convictions. The answer depends somewhat on the object for which that body exists. Does a denomination exist for its own sake or for the advancement of truth? If for its own sake and solely for the purpose of propagating its own peculiarities, the propriety of its existence may well be questioned. If for the sake of the furtherance of the truth and the salvation of man, why is not new light welcomed from any source whatsoever, and why may not any one even if of a different opinion on some points of doctrine abide



among them? Let proposed truth be tested whether it can stand the storm of time. Let the new proposition be investigated calmly and coolly, and if genuine it can be preserved, for it will survive even if men try to crush it.

Taking for granted that the different denominations exist for the sole purpose of defending and advancing the truth, the saving truth, the question still remains why a particular phase of doctrine is still binding when it is demonstrated that there is reason to doubt it. Certainly there is a voluntary subscription to the creed, but what does this mean? Is the creed the final authority in all cases even where it is antiquated? Has it superseded the Bible on which it is supposed to base its own existence? What sort of reasoning is this that deduces a creed from the Bible and then declares it so rigid an article and so inflexible a guide that its authority is greater than its own foundation? But if the appeal is to be made to the Bible why may not a man appeal to it in support of his belief that the Lord's Supper was not originally instituted as a memorial of the death of Christ when it is shown that probably the words "do this in remembrance of me" are a later insertion? The majority may not agree with the few. But truth is not always with the majority. These words may not be an insertion. They may be. There is evidence for both positions. Now it matters little whether they were originally there or were put there later as far as the practical life of the Christian is concerned. This question is to be decided on literary and not on theological grounds, even if it does effect a doctrine. The Sacrament is as dear to me whether I believe He said these words or whether Jesus merely instituted the Supper and left the church to develop its full meaning later when it would be in a position to grasp the idea more fully. So much is true that the apostles did not enter into hairsplitting differences in regard to the Supper. They merely celebrated it. And in doing so they could not help reflecting on the death of Christ, and hence it must become in a sense commemorative. Must such things be an occasion for enforcing rigidity in creeds? By what authority? An assumed one or is it real?

It is admitted on all hands that some liberty of interpretation must be allowed. How much? Either the creed is binding on all alike, or all have liberty of expression. This raises the question of devotion to the denomination and creed. Is that the only sort of loyalty permissible when one is to be confronted on all sides by the existence of the creed? We contend not. We believe there is a loyalty that begets life because it sees in the creed a guide to future generations and a help for further study rather than a limitation within which thought is to remain. (See this REVIEW, Vol. IV., No. 2, pp. 153-163.) But the concession of the necessity of liberty is the basis for the demand for the free exercise of that liberty. For the question may be put in this way: Have I not the same right for private interpretation that you claim for yourself? We are supposing that arbitrariness is out of the question. These generally are matters of conviction. For instance: A class of writers in the Reformed Church hold to the Christocentric position in theology. The Heidelberg Catechism is clearly Theocentric. What right have these men to say that a theology not Christocentric is fundamentally wrong? What right have we to forbid them? What about the catechism? That will take care of itself. It may be that some of us, after further study, will fall in line with them. What of the catechism then? Is not the catechism more honored by exercising liberty than by trying to force thought into a narrow, human-made channel, and then lauding the divinity of the procedure? Would not that exhibit more gall than grace? The foundation for the inch of my brother may be just as good as mine, or that of one man as good as that of a whole denomination, but because we differ is no reason why we should quarrel. Why cannot a Calvinist and an Arminian live in the same community and live at peace? They do in the Moravian Church, where are found both the Lutheran and Reformed types of doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper. The bones of contention are philosophical rather than theological, at any rate. Cannot a man tell whether he is out of harmony with his denomination as soon as others? Do others need to tell him what he thinks?

We see that much of the ecclesiastical authority is assumed rather than a real fact.

## VII. CONCLUSION.

It seems to be frequently supposed that the cause of the heresy and kindred troubles lay mainly with the conservatives. The fault then would seem to be that they refuse to keep time with the advancing column. No doubt this is true to a great extent. Some are entirely too fast, so that many of us cannot keep up. Man is also prone to hold fast to that which he considers sacred with a tenacity that borders on superstition and stubbornness. But when he gets the notion that he can fly there seems to be no power to hold him back. Thus there is a reason for conservatism, as well as for liberalism. The fact is that we find narrowness in the literature of both sides. The man who denies the authenticity of the Pentateuch and divides it up into an almost innumerable number of fragments, so that one might almost as well begin to count the stars as these, is not necessarily more liberal than the man who defends the Mosaic authorship. On the contrary, he may be the narrowest of the two. Liberality is not to be judged by what one asserts or denies, but from his relation to others.

Questions of philosophy, philology, literature, criticism must be investigated in their own realm and decided regardless of the theological position held. Their theological bearing is to be duly considered. Neither can science settle questions of theology. But just so must theologians learn to bear with one another that they may be of mutual service in the interests of truth even amid disagreements. There is need of more charity among the different denominations, and more leniency towards men of different opinions in the same denomination. In this way can truth make more progress and righteousness be furthered.

## VI.

### THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES ON THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE AGE.

(FIRST PAPER.)

BY RICHARD C. SCHIEDT, PH.D.

The new science building on the historic campus of old Franklin and Marshall is gradually approaching completion. Its erection has been watched with mingled feelings. Those who are strongly wedded to the old order of things look upon it as an anomaly not befitting such sacred classic ground; others consider it a necessary concession to competition, and few, very few indeed, greet it with intelligent enthusiasm. These conditions undoubtedly furnish some of the reasons for the very slow influx of contributions. Unquestionably this new building, when once thoroughly equipped, will mean a new epoch in our educational history, it will help to inaugurate a greatly modified curriculum, but it will under no circumstances destroy the essential features of the old one. The sentiment expressed by the President of the Board of Trustees at the laying of the cornerstone contains a sufficient guarantee against any such fearful apprehension. On the contrary, the new features, which already have found entrance into our curriculum, will greatly enrich and stimulate the forces which have shaped our educational policy during the past century. The men who created that policy were predominantly philosophical in their thinking and teaching, they stood for sound principles governing the development of the whole man. Our present tendencies in no wise deviate from those principles. We are not unmindful of our precious heritage. One of the chief characteristics of our great leaders, however, was the peculiar ability to discern with keen foresight the new factors moulding and transforming the thought of an age and pointing to a higher

development. Their prophetic utterances with regard to the great historical and religious movements sufficiently testify to the truth of this statement. In a modest way we are following their footsteps in our claims for the natural sciences. They too must be philosophically discerned, in order to be appreciated in their importance for the intellectual life of the age as it predominates in our educational institutions. The following discussion is to show this in some measure at least.

Philosophy, in the metaphysical sense, deals primarily with theories of knowledge. More than a century ago Kant discussed the question: "How is pure mathematics possible," and thereby aroused intense interest, because every philosopher knew at least something of the fundamental principles of geometry. But, when he later on introduced the question: "How is pure nature science possible," he waited in vain for replies, because but few were thoroughly trained in that department. And yet the second problem is by far more fruitful for metaphysical research. Mathematics start with the laws of logic within us, natural science with the laws of nature without us. The former has primarily no relation to the visible world, it is essentially a formal science, and lacks the wealth of contents which belong to the science of nature. The latter is not only under the constant and watchful supervision of the laws of logic but must also comply with the conclusions of experience. Pure thinking essentially lacks the criterion of value which in such a high degree belongs to external realities. Ordinarily, law is equivalent to commandment; it regulates our actions towards our fellow men. But the freedom of our will does not necessarily include harmony between our actions and the commandments, a conflict may arise for which we are responsible. A law of nature, in the specific sense, however, is the natural limitation of our will. He who desires to act freely in the widest and highest sense of the word must be familiar with the immutability of natural law, in order to arrange his decisions and actions in accordance with the unchangeable order of things. A knowledge of law in this sense leads philosophically to highly important concepts and ideas, and with them to an enlargement of

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character. Such concepts include the distinctions between rules and laws, between hypotheses and laws, between subjective judgments and objective facts. The so-called Kepler's laws are only rules which permit of exceptions, *e. g.*, the rule that the planets describe ellipses around the sun; Newton's law of gravity is a law; it shows exactly when the path of a planet is an hyperbola or parabola or when it is an ellipse. This law has no exception, just as little as the law of the conservation of energy. The difference between rule and law implies a difference in the progress of the knowledge of nature, a difference of generations and of centuries. The process begins deductively and ends in fruitful inductions. There is, therefore, philosophically considered, no science which represents the relation between facts and ideas so clearly and lucidly as the science of nature. Liebig says in one of his chemical letters: "We esteem facts because they are imperishable, and because they furnish the soil for ideas; but a fact becomes only valuable through the idea which is developed from it." What a thoroughgoing change we observe in this respect in the developmental history of the natural sciences, especially in analogy and language! The science of antiquity took its figures of speech and terminology in general from the circumstances of everyday life. At present scientific views mould and regulate the relations of human life. In the degree in which the natural sciences were emancipated from the traditional views of human history and developed independently, in that degree phenomena of fundamental importance were discovered and became the ruling analogies for less known spheres.

This brief discussion indicates what I mean by a philosophical definition of the study of the natural sciences. It guards against superficial one-sidedness, which is the source of all prejudice. Unfortunately most men are accustomed to judge things and persons from only one point of view. This explains the bitterness with which our whole educational warfare is waged. One man looks upon nature as the great realm of æsthetic enjoyment, of recreation, of travel, of poetic inspiration; another thinks of it purely as a means of earning a livelihood, as the source of great

inventions and material prosperity; still another considers nature only as a necessary evil, the subjugated slave of man. The scientist, however, differs from all these; he cares comparatively little for the technical purposes or the useful applications drawn from the natural realm; he sees in it, largely, the inexhaustible source of investigation, an opportunity to study the natural course of things, the laws, forces and transformations predominant in God's great universe. If he is an educator at the same time—and the true scientist always is—he finds in the study of the interrelations between facts and ideas, between phenomena and laws the supreme source of the highest intellectual and moral culture. A careful and unprejudiced survey of our modern intellectual life will bear out my claims.

What are the elements of our modern intellectual life? The answer to this question must be based upon historical data. History is a safer guide than *à priori* speculations. For our purpose, it suffices to take two epochs in history for comparison, viz., the intellectual life of classic antiquity and that of the first half of this century.

The total knowledge of antiquity was in comparison with present conditions rather insignificant. It was, therefore, an easy matter to find for it what is classically called its harmonious expression. Resting largely upon æsthetic ideals the culture of that age developed to a remarkable degree the intrinsically human factors; in the best sense of the word, this, however, could only be accomplished on account of a very primitive knowledge of nature. The problem of general culture was as easily solved as it was propounded. Aristotle, who actually embraced within himself the total knowledge of Greek culture, is frequently looked upon as the representative type of a universal culture for all times. But this dictum I can only conditionally admit. It is only true for the conditions under which the classic nations lived; in modern times no man would dare to lay claim to a mastery of all our intellectual culture. The problem has changed and with it its solution. Classic antiquity can at best be only a model to show us the method towards the solution of our problem. This model

has in certain quarters been magnified into the living solution of the problem itself. The chief interest of educators was for a long time centered in the study of the classic languages to the great detriment of the intellectual contents of classic life, an undertaking which has absolutely no analogy in the much praised harmonious educational system of either Athens or Rome. Others go still further. They claim that our age is an age of barbarianism and decay, an age without any ability of solving serious problems, an age in which intellectual interests are of only subordinate importance. I cannot agree with such pessimistic judgments. It is true that we pass through a transitional stage in which there is much confusion of problems, but it is likewise true that problems exist, important, far-reaching problems. And what is more there never was a time when the zeal and energy of mental activity, spent in the propounding and solving of problems, was so intense as at present, which after all means the unfolding of moral force, and as long as this is the case there is nothing to fear. To find an harmonious expression for the totality of its intellectual life is the problem of every age. The progressive development of the various sciences constantly adds new ideas to the cultural elements of the past, and calls for new problems under ever changing conditions. Old factors pass away or become subordinate, and new factors take their places in this never-ending struggle. The desire to live under former conditions would be impracticable, while the effort to belittle the past would be arrogant, but the attempt to bring the really helpful tendencies of the present to light is always instructive. It is only when we foresee and work towards the logical resultants of present phenomena that we find joy and pleasure in living. From this point of view I would look upon our age, which has been called the age of the physical sciences. Its beginnings date back to those fundamental discoveries of seventy-five and more years ago, which brought new life into scientific research and opened up new paths, and the fruits of which we are just beginning to reap.

In those days a philosophy arose and took supreme command, which utterly discarded all serious study of the concrete, and of

experience, and assumed to accomplish by *à priori* constructions all the difficult work performed to-day by the heroic disciples of modern science. It is true, the philosophy especially connected with the name of Hegel rendered invaluable service to the historico-philological sciences; they are more congenial to the human mind and therefore more easily acquired than the natural sciences. Experiment and observation was looked upon as unworthy of an intelligent, cultured man; the hardships and self-denying labors of the naturalists counted for nothing. But in course of time the *à priori* claims of the philosophers were flatly contradicted by the experiments and observations of the scientists and through the enormous progress in technique and practical devices the general public became thoroughly conversant with the new facts as well as theories. The result was on the one hand the abandonment of philosophical speculations and a return to Kant; on the other hand, a complete victory for the natural sciences and their methods; while the historico-philological sciences, which owed so much to Hegelian philosophy, stood at first isolated, but finally entered the struggle with a strong protest against the cultural claims of the victors. The struggle between these two forces still constitutes the foremost educational problem of to-day; their reconciliation and harmonious coöperation is of the utmost importance for the irenic progress of the race—our future welfare depends upon it. The conflict is felt in the faculties of all institutions of learning; it is either treated with mutual silence or with mutual contempt. But such conduct does not solve the problem; it is deplorable, to say the least.

I am inclined to think that the whole conflict had its source in a misunderstanding. The historico-philological sciences never were and are not now the moving forces in the struggle. They may become such in times of decline when ideals are wanting, and men are beginning to search the past for such ideals, as was the case during the period of the revival of Humanism and of the Renaissance. At present they are by nature of their contents *reproductive* sciences as over against the natural or *productive* sciences. If the misunderstanding is to be explained, the expla-

nation must come from the natural sciences. We often hear the natural sciences contrasted with the mental sciences. In the philosophical sense there is, however, no contrast between the two. The natural sciences of the present are as much an intellectual product of humanity as the historico-philological. They both deal to a certain degree with the same material. We only need to recall Aristotle and Plinius, who were both naturalists; in a thousand years hence the works of our eminent physicists may likewise be studied as historico-philological science. There is, therefore, no intrinsic difference between the two sciences. But the so-called natural sciences are undoubtedly the moving forces of our age. To what degree are they mental sciences? What are the specific elements which they have added to our intellectual life? Hitherto they have certainly not universally been acknowledged as integral parts of general culture. The brilliant development of the new ideas and their far-reaching influence dazzled the minds interested in them; they found neither time nor inclination to reflect upon their methods and to make the attempt to incorporate them as new forces in the system of general culture. Even within their own sphere we can trace first a period of opposition, led by the old school men; then a period of cool admiration, finally real interest and enthusiastic acceptance. No wonder that the outsider, viz., the philosopher and the layman, has only reached the stage of cool admiration; it is still a long distance to the stage of intelligent appreciation. One reason for this must be sought in the fact that the profoundest principles of any science cannot be popularized. They have more astonished than instructed, more scattered than gathered. Those who insist that the only rational study of humanity is man, were dissatisfied; they saw only the practical side of the question, and, therefore, considered the whole study of nature as a mere aid, an inferior element, in the educational scheme. This disagreement produced serious frictions between the two parties and led to an over-estimation of results on the part of many physicists and to hasty conclusions in general principles. Instead of bridging the chasm they widened it; they aimed at nothing less than complete annihilation of the old views.

Another reason which for many years barred the natural sciences from influencing our general culture was the want of historical prestige. A young man conscious of his growing strength imagines that he does not need the advice of mature experience; he talks frequently and glibly of experience, but his life has as yet been too short to warrant the right to such boasting. It is just this experience of mature age which in science must find its analogon in historical prestige. The historico-philological sciences have decidedly the advantage in this respect. And yet the natural sciences, although the younger sister, have made more history during the last one hundred years than the others in one thousand, and the study of this history does not find its equal anywhere in point of interest and intensity. Moreover, it contains the prerequisites for the proper criterion on the basis of which a true comparison with the other cultural elements of our age is possible. Here lies the chief significance of the study of the natural sciences which makes them the mental sciences par excellence. The multitude of the most common facts by which these sciences have enriched human culture and thought offers a unique contemplation. By culture I do not mean knowledge merely, but rather the ability to inspire the dead matter of knowledge with the forces and forms of life; it is not something visible, some polish or codex of manners, but something invisible, a power effectual and effective in the correct grasp of the forceful elements that lie at the base of all the situations of life.

After having thus briefly discussed the conflicting tendencies in our modern intellectual life, I pass on to the inquiry into the changes which the new scientific thinking is bringing about in the accepted ideas of general culture. We hear and read a great deal about overspecialization and its dissipating consequences. Natural science is charged with being the cause of it, and its educational value for general culture is, therefore, by many counted naught. However, the study of the minute is the fundamental prerequisite for physical investigations. Should we then not try to make this factor valuable for general culture? How? Detail-research offers, upon a lower plane, the constant



stimulus not only to fortify and to deepen already existing views, but also to change and to improve them; it presents to the realm of general culture the possibility of even larger problems and further mental advances. For purposes of education or in cases of mental inferiority the stimulus of authority is necessary, but on the highest plane of human development motives and incentives should rise in their natural order from below upward, from the imperfect to the perfect; this process is absolutely necessary for the progressive growth of general culture in the life of the individual, otherwise the conditions requisite for self-discipline and self-education are seriously weakened.

Some time ago the disciples of the old idea of general culture were greatly delighted over the appearance of a book, "*Rembrandt als Erzieher*," which aroused intense interest in the educational world on both sides of the Atlantic, and therefore had an enormous sale and was translated into several languages. Its author emphasizes the sphere of art as the greatest educator over against the sciences. However, his position was, in the course of time, felt to be untenable. Truly artistic ability is very rare among men, while intellectual training leaves its impress even upon very mediocre minds; art generalized would produce a frightful increase of quacks. Scientific thinking, on the other hand, shows us life as well as knowledge from many points of view. Analytical and synthetic thinking permit to judge every phenomenon from a different point of view; it is characteristic of such thinking to observe with different eyes, to see the different sides of one and the same thing simultaneously; how important, then, to make use of this ability for purposes of general culture! It is of the utmost importance to learn to observe everything from various standpoints, for none has an absolutely permanent value; each is only important for a definite purpose. Newton differed from Goethe in his interpretation of colors. He proceeded from a physical, Goethe from a psychological, point of view. Both were correct, but Goethe's attack on Newton was a mistake, because he did not possess the ability to judge the correctness of the other side. It is, therefore, incongruous to strive



after a system of general culture in the sense of universality. "We only know in part," and every part has its value; an old ruin is of more importance than a completely equipped air castle.

But just as fallacious as the intellectual estimate placed upon the value of the complete, i. e., the whole, is the estimate of unity. Science teaches that every objective existence is the simultaneous result of several factors and that inquiry must be confined to one factor at a time. A unifying principle of culture may be valuable for purposes of external education, but it limits one's horizon, it impedes all further development when this education has reached its termination and self-education begins in all its intensity in the mature years of a man's life. Only the moral side of the mind exhibits absolute unity but not the intellectual, the latter only shows tendencies towards such unity. Religion by virtue of its moral unifying power becomes the guiding star and firm trust of man whenever he becomes conscious of his moral helplessness, when knowledge and its power fail. Haeckel's "Monism" is therefore an absurdity; he tries to establish a bond between religion and science by making a purely intellectual factor the unifying principle of two different spheres. We make the same mistake when we confound these same two factors in our interpretation of general culture. There is indeed a mutual interrelation between the two, but it is the chief mistake of our whole past educational history to force them into one and the same channel. The more the church tried to control the intellectual development, the greater became the detriment to the moral forces of the church on account of the ever-increasing deceptions which naturally arose from this forced relation. The cure lay in the admission that the progressive development of the intellect must be granted its influence upon the moral forces of the church. But, *vice versa*, intellectual inquiry is not possible without will power or moral force,—even general culture must rest upon it. The recognition of this mutual relation largely belongs to the influence of two factors so highly developed by modern scientific methods, viz., that of analysis and synthesis or isolation and superposition. The process of isolation constitutes the concentration of

one's attention upon one property of an object at a time, the idea of superposition considers the individual influences of different forces upon an object in the light of their common effect; both processes are illustrated by the theorem of the "parallelogram of forces." Our life is too short to permit investigations based upon the latter principle, the division of labor with all its one-sidedness forms, however, a welcome substitute. Every honest worker concentrates his efforts upon the specialty which constitutes his life work. He interprets life from his point of view. Here lies the passion of his heart. This is especially true of the scientific investigator. The heart often tries to anticipate the result of the investigation, but when these results do not come up to the expectations, the heart submits to the dictates of truth. The history of our great discoveries is largely a history of heart-training, a process of purification, which after endless experiments and tests ends in the glorification of truth and brings with it a gradual moulding of character, for it demands the oft-repeated surrender of cherished desires and expectations, it gradually eliminates that rigid intolerance which only trusts its own development and experience and despises every foreign interference, which is always ready to contradict but never to acknowledge an error. The application of this principle of superposition to the intellectual life of the age is still a desideratum in modern culture, otherwise we would not witness the deplorable spectacle of so much hatred and persecution in various quarters. But the dawn of a better day is not far distant.

I have raised these formal questions because they are so closely allied to our traditional thinking at Franklin and Marshall College. The great scientific deeds and discoveries dazzle the beholder; many bow to them as to a higher power, which is incomprehensible to them. But more valuable than the loud voice of victory and of discovery is to the thinking layman the quiet unpretentious road which led to it. The knowledge of this road, or at least an insight into it, seems especially adapted to bridge over the chasm yawning so wide between the contending parties in our modern intellectual life. With this expectation we hope to open wide the doors of our new Science Building.

## VII.

### EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

#### EXEGESIS AND PREACHING.

Hyperius, the founder of Reformed homiletics, defines a sermon as a popular interpretation of the sacred Scriptures. This definition is valuable, as it subordinates the sermon distinctly to the authority of Scripture, in opposition to the practice of the Catholic Church, especially during the middle ages, in which preaching scarcely had any relation to Scripture. But it is after all not a satisfactory definition ; for interpretation, in the ordinary sense, is not the proper business of the preacher, but of the exegete or commentator. The business of the preacher is to apply the truth of Scripture to the various intellectual, moral, and spiritual wants of the people to whom he is speaking. After having ascertained the original meaning of any passage of Scripture, the task of the preacher is to show the meaning which it has for the particular congregation whom he is now addressing. To this end the preacher must understand, not only the meaning which Scripture had for its original writers and readers, but also the moral and spiritual condition of those to whom he is preaching ; and he must be able to make the application of that meaning to the present condition of the men before him in order to their spiritual instruction and edification. *To do this is preaching.*

The interpretation of any passage of Scripture, on the other hand, or the ascertainment of its original sense, that is, the sense which it had for the writer and his original readers, is the task of the exegete. In the interest of Christian theology, and of correct homiletical practice too, it must be assumed that any passage of Scripture can have but *one true sense*, and that this is the literal or philological sense, the sense intended by the writer and accepted by his original readers. It has been said that, be-

cause Scripture is in some sense the product of the infinite Spirit of God, therefore it must have, not merely one meaning, or two meanings, but an *infinite fulness* of meaning. But this, in fact, is to say that it has no meaning at all. A combination of words that should be capable of having an indefinite number of meanings, would manifestly have no meaning at all for any particular person, except such as he might himself read into it. If the Bible were a composition of this kind, it would contain no revelation for us. This is the Swedenborgian theory of the Bible. Under its verbal statements the Bible, according to this theory, hides an infinitude of spiritual meanings, which only they can understand who are themselves spiritual, and have the key to the mind of the Spirit. That the right understanding of Scripture is conditioned by the possession of a spiritual frame of mind, as the right understanding of a poem is conditioned by the possession of a poetical frame of mind, must of course be admitted; but even such spiritual frame of mind could discover no definite meaning in Scripture, if such meaning were not there. In such case there would be no occupation for the scientific exegete; as there would be no meaning to be ascertained by philological methods, but only to be *guessed*.

Even the more modest claim of the old allegorists must be rejected. They were content to assume a four-fold sense, namely, the *literal*, the *moral*, the *spiritual*, and the *mystical* or *anagogical*. The following example may serve for illustration: Of the sentence, "When Israel went out of Egypt," Ps. 114: 1, the *literal* sense may be said to be the actual deliverance of Israel from Egyptian bondage; the *spiritual* sense, the redemption of the world through Christ; the *moral* sense, deliverance of the sinner from the bondage of sin; and the *anagogical* sense, the passage of soul and body from the life of earth to the life of heaven. The precedent of treating Scripture in this way was set partly by the later Greek philosophers who, by this means, got rid of the immoral stories of their ancient mythology and literature, and partly by Philo and the Alexandrian Jews, who thus spiritualized the whole of the Old Testament, and made it teach

the philosophical and moral ideas of the Greeks. From these sources this method of treating sacred Scripture was borrowed first by the Alexandrian theologians, Clemens, and especially Origen, and their successors, and by them transmitted to the church in later times. It was employed generally during the middle ages, and continued to be used even long after the Reformation, probably because by means of it any man can get out of the Bible whatever he wants to get. Studied in this way the Bible indeed comes to be open to the reproach contained in the following verses :

"Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque,  
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua."

In recent times it has come to be a somewhat favorite method to distinguish in Scripture a two-fold sense, an *external* and an *internal*, or a *natural* and a *spiritual* sense. The ascertainment of the external or natural sense may then be said to be the aim of scientific exegesis, while the discovery of the internal or spiritual sense may be regarded as the aim of what has been called *practical exegesis*. This distinction may be regarded as valid, if by external sense there be understood simply the historical meaning of a passage, or its original meaning, and by internal sense the religious and moral truth which it may involve for particular times and persons. Strictly speaking, however, the latter truth is not a *sense* of Scripture distinct from the literal sense, but rather an *application* of the literal sense ; and the discovery and discussion of it is not interpretation, but *preaching*. Take, in the way of illustration, the account of the calming of the tempest on the sea of Galilee, Matt. 8 : 23-27. In its historical or literal sense that means that Jesus, after a day of unwonted activity, late in the evening, embarked in a boat with His disciples to sail to the other side of the sea ; that, as they were rowing, and while Jesus, being weary, was lying asleep in a certain part of the boat, there suddenly came down upon the sea one of those furious tempests which are common in that locality, being caused by the close proximity of strata of hot and cold air, whose equilibrium is dis-

turbed by slight changes of temperature ; that the disciples were greatly alarmed for their safety, being ignorant or forgetful of the security which the presence of Jesus in the ship afforded ; that, being aroused from His slumber, and having first calmed the storm of fear in the bosoms of the disciples, Jesus, by an exertion of His wonderful power, calmed the tempest of the sea ; and that this made a very profound impression upon those who were in the ship, notably strengthening their faith in the Messiahship of Jesus. This is the literal sense of the story which the evangelist relates. Now what is the spiritual or practical sense of this relation ? Generally, that Christ is in His church and with His people in all times of trial and adversity, and will safely bring them out of every danger, if they will steadfastly believe and trust in Him. If I am in physical danger, then this narrative of Scripture means for me that Jesus, who calmed the storm on the Sea of Galilee, can and will deliver me safely from every peril. If I am in spiritual danger, in temptation of any sort, or in doubt as to my salvation, then it means for me that, if I am faithful to Him and continue in His fellowship, Jesus will surely accomplish my salvation, and bring me to the haven of eternal life. This practical explanation and application of Scripture, however, is not the business of scientific exegesis, but of *preaching* ; while, on the other hand, preaching has nothing to do with grammatical and philological discussions of the text, or with the determination of questions concerning the origin of the storm, or the source of Jesus' power over it. Some dogmatic inferences may indeed be drawn from the events of this gospel. For instance, the fact that Jesus was weary and lay in the ship asleep, may be regarded as a proof of His real humanity, while His command over the elements of nature may be considered a proof of His divinity. But strictly speaking the formulating and systematizing of such inferences is neither the work of preaching nor of exegesis, but of Biblical theology ; although these functions can perhaps not always be thus strictly separated.

For scientific exegesis, and for the establishment of doctrine, Scripture has and can have but one sense, namely, the literal,



historical or philological. This, however, does not mean that every word and every sentence in Scripture is used in its simple, plain, or literal sense. In point of fact such is far from being the case. The language of the Bible is often highly figurative; and it is the business of exegesis to show where it is figurative and where it is literal. The Hebrew mind—and all the writers of Scripture were Hebrews in mind, whatever may have been the training which they had received, or the language in which they wrote—the Hebrew mind is highly imaginative and emotional. The Hebrew mind thinks not in abstract terms or formulas, but in concrete images. The Hebrew language, indeed, is not adapted to the expression of abstract thought, but of concrete conceptions and feelings. It is not calm, cold reflection, nicely distinguishing between fine shades of thought, but warm, emotional and poetical feeling that characterizes the Hebrew mind. Hence the Hebrew writer, even when writing in a foreign tongue, loves to express himself in bold figures and poetical imagery; and his language must, therefore, be interpreted with poetic freedom, not with the cold precision with which one would interpret a legal document. The language of Scripture abounds in figurative expressions of every sort. We have simile, metaphor, parable, allegory, fable, and probably legend and myth. One peculiarity of Hebrew thought and speech, which has not generally received the attention which it deserves, consists in what may be called *hyperbole*—exaggeration, or straining of language beyond the intended idea. It is the extension of expression beyond the intention of thought. We have illustrations of this use of language in our own daily life. For example, a student in a moment of despondency may say, "I know nothing at all," when he only means to say that he knows but little; and a professor, in a fit of petulance, may say to a student, "you have no brains," which he certainly does not wish to be understood in a literal sense. So we may say that a person's manners are "perfectly charming," when we only mean to say that they are very agreeable. It has been said that using such language is "lying without deceiving." In fact, in ordinary life nobody is deceived thereby. And the



more emotional people are, the more they will be inclined to such abusive or hyperbolic use of words. As examples of this peculiarity of Scripture the following quotations may be given: "Jacob I loved, but Esau I *hated* (Mal. 1: 3, quoted Rom. 9: 18); "If any man will come after me and *hate* not his father and mother, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14: 26); "Who-soever is born of God does not commit sin, because his seed abideth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is begotten of God" (I. John 3: 9); "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (I. John 1: 8); "That which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God" (Luke 16: 15). These and similar passages have been the dread of commentators simply because they took literally and as sober matter of fact what is to be taken hyperbolically and poetically. It should be observed, however, that in such cases the tropical or figurative sense is really the philological sense, because it is the sense intended by the writer. Many a writer of Scripture would doubtless be greatly astonished if he could see how his emotional and impassioned utterances have been made into cold and chilling dogmas.

The scientific or philological interpretation of Scripture, then, consists in ascertaining the true original meaning of the sacred writers, and in formulating the doctrine and ethical truth involved in that meaning. The method which it follows is *grammatical, historical and psychological*. By the aid of grammar, history, and psychology the exegete studies the language of the sacred writers, and unfolds the doctrinal and ethical truths which those writers intend to express. Further than this exegesis does not go. It is not its business to compare these truths and combine them in a systematic whole. This is the business of Biblical theology. Nor is it the business of exegesis to point out the practical applications of the truth which has been discovered in the text of Scripture. That is the business of preaching. Nor, finally, is it the business of exegesis to justify the views or ideas of the sacred writers in the forum of absolute truth. It would be a mistake, for instance, for a commentator to undertake to justify

the statements concerning the creation in the first chapter of Genesis by comparing them with the conclusions of modern geological science; for in order to bring out any sort of "harmony," he would have to misrepresent and falsify the meaning of the Biblical account. Again, in the stories of demoniacal possessions, which occur so frequently in the New Testament, the scientific exegete has nothing to do with the question how an evil spirit can take possession of a human soul and dwell therein as in a house. His business is simply with the opinion of the sacred writers. The explanation of the phenomenon, whether caused by the actual indwelling of an evil spirit, or by nervous disease, is the business of psychology, aided by a scientific knowledge of history. In short, the business of scientific exegesis is simply to explain the sacred Scriptures as a body of literature.

But, now, this body of literature is the record of a divine revelation. This revelation is a manifestation of God and a communication of His mind and will to men for their salvation, as for their religious and moral education. The religious and moral ideas conveyed in the language of the sacred writers are, in consequence of the inspiration of these writers, eternal, living, divine truths. And these truths are communicated in order that they may serve as means for the spiritual edification and development of men. To this end, however, they need to be understood and applied to the varying moral and spiritual conditions of men in different times and places. And to effect such understanding and application of Scripture is the business of homiletical or practical interpretation, or *preaching*. It consists in the apprehension of the eternal ethical and religious principles and ideals contained in Scripture, and in the application of them to men's present ethical and religious needs. These principles and ideals, however, are not dead notions or formulas of doctrine that can be drawn from Scripture, as water may be drawn from a vessel, and given out in an unchanged, unmodified form. They are living energies affecting the Christian mind and calling forth in it the same religious and moral states which were in the minds of the sacred writers, of prophets and apostles, and ena-

bling men now, like these, to see and understand present things in the light of eternal, divine truth. And to see present things in the light of eternal truth, and make others see them in the same light, is the office of the preacher. The true preacher, then, needs to be an *inspired* man, as really as prophets and apostles needed to be inspired men. But such inspiration comes to the preacher now by means of the study of sacred Scripture, as inspiration once came to Elisha the prophet by the playing of the minstrel's harp.

Practical interpretation of Scripture or preaching, then, presupposes scientific or grammatico-historical exegesis. The former cannot begin until the latter is ended. Scientific exegesis must have settled the original signification of a text before the work of the homilist or preacher can properly begin. The preacher, indeed, must be a scientific interpreter before he can be a practical interpreter of Scripture; but the place for the former function is the study, while the pulpit is the place for the latter only. Within the limits fixed by scientific exegesis, it is the business of the homilist to ascertain what a text of Scripture signifies for the life of Christians in general, and for the life of our own age in particular. Practical interpretation, then, means, in the language of Achelis, "not only to set forth a universally valid religious and ethical truth in the particular form in which some text of Scripture presents it, or to cause the light of Christ to shine forth from the text upon the congregation; but it means, further, to anticipate and interpret the thoughts which the truth of the text is adapted to excite in the *children of the age*, and from the truth of the text to draw the consequences necessary for the edification of the congregation now present." From this it will follow that the homiletic interpretation of Scripture which is true for one age and one place cannot be wholly true for another age and another place. It will follow also that so-called *practical commentaries*, like those of Matthew Henry, for instance, must lose much of their value when regarded under the conditions of times and places other than those in which they originated. They may be valuable as helps to homiletic discipline, but as direct

aids to homiletic practice their value cannot be estimated very highly. The preacher who should get his themes and the arrangement of his sermons habitually from such sources would probably not be a successful preacher. The only homiletic commentary that can be really useful to the preacher and his audience is a mind well saturated with the truths of the Bible and in constant vital communion with the mind of the Lord.

The appropriateness and usefulness of homiletic interpretation of Scripture will depend, on the one hand, upon a proper sense for the eternal thoughts of God contained in Scripture, and on the other upon a determination on the part of the homilist to find these thoughts only where they are really expressed or implied. The work of practical interpretation, like that of scientific interpretation, must really be *exposition*, not *imposition*. The preacher may not, any more than the scientific exegete, import his own thoughts into Scripture. Homiletic interpretation, equally with grammatico-historical exegesis, seeks to understand a given text in its immediate connection. But it also goes beyond the immediate connection, and apprehends the teaching of a particular text as *an integral part of the whole organism of divine truth*. As an illustration of the necessity of such an organic view of a text, in order to its usefulness for present Christian teaching, reference may be made to I. Cor. 7 : 21 : "Wast thou called being a slave? care not for it: nay even if thou canst be made free, use it (bondage) rather." Regarding this text merely as it stands, in its immediate connection, as expressing the opinion of St. Paul, at the time when he wrote it, and in relation to the conditions of that time, it means that a slave should not seek liberty even if he has it in his power to do so, and that slavery is neither a misfortune nor a moral wrong. This is what St. Paul says to the Corinthians, and what they doubtless understood him to say. Grammatico-historical exegesis can come to no other conclusion. But this conception contradicts the whole ethical view of man, which is peculiar to Christianity. St. Paul's conception was probably influenced by his view of the nearness of the second advent of Christ and the end of the present world, and his view of the duties of Christians

in the peculiar circumstances of the time. Any agitation for liberty on the part of Christian slaves might have been construed as involving peril to the social order, and might therefore have hindered the spread of Christianity. And, besides, as the end of the world is so near at hand, what is the difference whether men are bond or free? But, now, in the application to the conditions of the present time of such a text as that here under consideration, its temporary and local relations must be stripped off. Single texts of Scripture must be viewed in the light of the whole body of Christian truth, before they can become available as homiletic material. This thought is expressed by St. Paul himself in Rom. 12: 6: "If we have gift of prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of the faith." *The faith*, the sum of the doctrinal and ethical teaching of Christianity, is the touchstone by which the preacher, as well as the theologian must test his interpretation of the Bible. But for *the faith* we may put *Christ Himself*; and then we may say that *it is the business of the preacher to interpret the Bible according to Christ*. Any view, or any interpretation, of the Bible that contradicts Christ—the idea of Christ and the mind of Christ—cannot serve the edification of the church, no matter how scientific may be the method by which it was obtained. In fact no amount of exegetical and theological Bible study can make an efficient preacher of one in whom sympathy with the mind of Christ is wanting; and such sympathy with the mind of Christ may often go far to make up any lack of exegetical skill and theological learning. One may be a good preacher without being a great exegete. And we presume that it is something like this that St. Paul means when he says, II. Cor. 3: 6: "Our sufficiency is of God; who also made us sufficient as ministers of a new covenant; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." To stick to the letter, when the letter is in opposition to the spirit, or mind of Christ, is not life, but death; nor is it fidelity to the Bible. The letter of the Bible may be used in such way as to kill the spirit of it; and this is not fidelity to the Bible, but the very opposite. But, after all, one must have a reasonable

knowledge of the letter of Scripture, such as results from real exegetical study, in order to be able to avoid this very rock of literalism. And profound critical study of the Bible according to the best hermeneutical rules, is surely a more favorable condition for obtaining that inspiration which the true preacher needs, than is ignorance of exegetical methods and results.

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#### THE WANE OF INTOLERANCE IN PROTESTANTISM.

*Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis.* Times change, and we change with the times. The world is moving onward. Things do not always remain as they have been from of old. The old order is evermore giving way to a new order. This is true of customs, manners, fashions and institutions; of systems of education, of philosophies, of theologies, and even of religious faiths, and practices, and of churches. In spite of the claims of infallibility and immutability, which some of the churches put forward in their own behalf, it is nevertheless true that churches, too, are subject to the same laws of change and development which pertain to all sublunary things. And in consequence of these laws even churches are not now just what they were in the past.

We have been led to this course of reflection by the reading of an article in *The Ram's Horn*, for Oct. 27, 1900, on the subject of *What is a Lutheran*, by Dr. Sylvanus Stall, editor of the *Lutheran Observer*. *The Ram's Horn* is a weekly periodical published in Chicago in the interest of various practical Christian causes like the union of Christendom, social purity, equal suffrage, temperance and the like. It is at present engaged in publishing a series of articles on "the great churches of Christendom," written it is said, "by their several leaders, showing what is required of their communicants in faith and duty." Possibly this feature of the publication, of permitting the leaders of the various Christian communions to speak for themselves, may have suggested the peculiar name of it—*The Ram's Horn*. Of course it alludes to an event in sacred history. But it may be regarded also as a hint to the leaders of the "great churches" to do justice to the bodies which they represent. This idea,



however, is in some respects a good idea, as it gives the different denominations of the country an opportunity of presenting themselves in the light in which they would now like to be seen, although this may not always be the light in which history presents them. We can easily see how welcome such an opportunity would be, for instance, to the leaders of Roman Catholicism in America. But there are probably things in the history of all religious communions, as in the lives of all individuals, which they would be glad to forget, and there are other things which they would like to change. And this is not unreasonable; for the life and spirit of such communions have themselves imperceptibly changed, and are not now what they once were; and what more natural, then, than that they should wish to be judged by others in the light of what they now are, and not in the light of what they have been?

This principle, we think, is exemplified in Dr. Stall's article referred to above. Dr. Stall says that "in doctrine the Lutheran Church differs from her neighbors"; which is, of course, quite true, and which is the only thing that gives her the right of independent existence. Dr. Stall then proceeds in part to define this difference by saying that "first and foremost she places the Bible. Its teachings are accepted as the infallible rule of faith and practice." Now we do not dispute that the Lutheran Church gives, or *means* to give, such an exalted position to the Bible, notwithstanding its nine or ten symbolical books, which must make such reverence for the Bible somewhat difficult. But we are quite sure that other men writing in behalf of other denominations will make the very same claim in behalf of their own communions. They all follow the Bible with the same kind of loyalty. But, then, what becomes of this claim of distinction for the Lutheran Church? We are, however, mainly interested in what is here said of the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper. This doctrine is stated as follows, though in quotation marks, the meaning of which we do not understand: "Christ is really and truly present in the Lord's Supper, though not by means of transubstantiation (a change of substance), or consubstantiation (a change into one substance), or impanation (Christ in the bread and wine), or subpanation (Christ under the bread and



wine); but in a sacramental manner that is not understood by us." To this statement Dr. Stall adds: "We do not profess to understand, or foolishly attempt to explain the mode of this presence of Him who said, 'This is my body,' and, 'This is my blood.'" We confess that when we read this for the first time we could scarcely believe our eyes. It puts to confusion all our ideas of the historical doctrine of the Lord's Supper in the Lutheran Church. But then it occurred to us that what is here given, is probably not meant to represent the historical doctrine of the Lutheran Church, but the doctrine of that Church as it now is, or ought to be; and that we have here a case of imperceptible historical development and change.

We believe, of course, that it is historically correct to say that the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper is not the doctrine of *transubstantiation*, or the doctrine of the conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the substance of the body and blood of Christ; although according to Luther's own interpretation of *Hoc est corpus meum*, that is perhaps what the Lutheran doctrine ought to be. We are aware, too, that Lutheran theologians have always protested against the application to their doctrine of the terms *consubstantiation*, *impanation*, and *subpanation*. But, then, we have never been able to see with what right they could do this in view of the statements of their own symbolical books. What does consubstantiation mean? Certainly not *change into one substance*, as Dr. Stall, in the quotation given above, says it does. Consubstantiation means a *union* of substances—the substance of the body and blood of Christ and the substance of bread and wine—in the same compass. Impanation means the existence of the body and blood of Christ *in* the bread and wine; and subpanation, the existence of them *under* (the form of) bread and wine. Now, what do the Lutheran symbols teach? Do they teach what is denoted by these terms? Let us see. In the *Small Catechism* Luther says: "The Sacrament of the Altar is the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ *under* the bread and wine, given unto us Christians to eat and to drink." The 10th article of the Augsburg Confession (1530) reads: "Of the Supper of the Lord they teach that the true

body and blood of Christ are truly present *under the form of bread and wine*, and are there communicated to those that eat in the Lord's Supper, and received." In the altered edition of 1540 the phrase, *under the form of bread and wine*, is changed into the phrase, *with bread and wine*. But this change cost Melancthon, its author, his peace and happiness during the declining years of his life; and those who accepted it were driven out of the Lutheran Church under the names of *Philippists* and *Crypto-Calvinists*—a circumstance which throws some light on the nature of Lutheran tolerance. We think the language of the unaltered confession as well as of Luther's Catechism looks very much like consubstantiation, or subpanation. In the Formula of Concord, Article VII., which is influenced in its teaching on this subject by the later Lutheran doctrine concerning the ubiquity of Christ's body, it is said: "We believe, teach, and confess that the body and blood of Christ are taken with the bread and wine not only though faith, but also by the mouth, nevertheless not Capernaitically, but often a spiritual and heavenly manner, by reason of the sacramental union." These quotations, we believe, justify the usual statement, that the Lutheran doctrine teaches the presence of the body and blood of Christ *in, with, and under (in, cum, et sub)* the bread and wine; and that, we submit, means *consubstantiation, impanation, and subpanation*, if words mean anything.

But we are told now, and we are glad to know it, that this is not the doctrine of the Lutheran Church. "Christ," we are told, "is really and truly in the Lord's Supper," not *in, with, and under* the bread and wine, "but in a sacramental manner that is not understood by us." We do not know whether all Lutherans would agree to this; though we believe that they ought to do so, not, indeed, because of the past teaching of their church, but because of the substantial correctness of the statement. In case they do agree with it, however, the fact is clear evidence of a change of theological position, and a change of which we believe that Calvin, and Calvinists generally, would approve, but which Luther, if he could reappear now holding the same views which he once held, would probably denounce with all the thunders of his

eloquence as an "accursed Calvinistic heresy." But in spite of Luther, the Lutheran Church has a right to change her theology and her confession. All other churches have changed within the last three hundred and fifty years, not even excepting the Roman Catholic. And why should not the Lutheran Church change likewise? There is as much in her past theology, a great part of which she took over unchanged from the Scholastics, that needs modification and amendment, as there is in the theology of any other church; and she has as much right, under the constant guidance of God's Word and Spirit, to make changes as any other church has. Surely Luther was not the only man that enjoyed the illumination of the Holy Spirit in the Lutheran Church; and she is, therefore, not forever bound to the precise form of his teaching. But if such a change has taken place in the teaching of the Lutheran Church as is implied in the statement of Dr. Stall, then we would like to know how her present teaching differs from that of the Heidelberg Catechism, for instance, or from that of the first Helvetic confession, according to which, "in the Holy Supper the Lord really offers His body and blood, that is, *Himself*, to His own, to the end that He may more and more live in them and they in Him; not that the body and blood of the Lord are naturally united with the bread and wine, or locally included therein, or that any carnal presence is effected." If the Lutheran Church has really come over to this position, should she not say so? We are glad to see that Dr. Stall has said what in fact amounts to such a confession.

But there is another statement contained in Dr. Stall's article, that is, on first view, as surprising as that concerning the Lord's Supper. It is found in the following paragraph: "The Lutheran believer is not characterized by fear but by faith. While the Lutheran glories in the clear apprehension of the Christ of God, yet he is very *tolerant* of others; consequently *the Lutheran Church has never been a persecuting church.*" The italics in the last sentence are ours. And it is the statement contained in this sentence that causes surprise. Any one who knows anything of church history can hardly help suspecting that the author of

this sentence unconsciously confounds the present temper of the Lutheran Church with its temper in the past. He seems to forget that things have changed ; and as the Lutheran Church is not a particularly persecuting church *now*, he seems to conclude that it has *never been* such. But surely that is not a valid conclusion. We quite agree with the proposition implied in the first sentence quoted above, to the effect that intolerance and a disposition to persecute are in inverse proportion to the strength of faith. Men of assured faith will, as a rule, be serenely calm in the presence of contradiction and opposition. They feel sure that the truth will prevail without any help of force or violence. But as it is said that men who are afraid in the dark sometimes whistle to keep their courage up, so doubtless men of weak faith frequently resort to persecution in favor of doctrines which they but half believe themselves. Whenever a man gets nervous over some new doctrine or belief, he shows thereby that he is afraid that the old, to which it is opposed, has not in itself truth enough to maintain itself in the minds of men. Of this principle church history offers abundant illustrations ; and for examples we need not go farther than the Lutheran Church in the sixteenth century. Luther himself certainly was not tolerant of opinions contrary to his own. His bearing towards Zwingli and the Sacramentarians, as he called them, is certainly not an evidence of a tolerant spirit. Everybody remembers how at Marburg he rejected the offered hand of brotherly fellowship because the Zwinglians "had a different spirit from himself and his followers." And the careful reader of church history will notice, too, that Luther is far more fanatically and savagely intolerant towards the Zwinglians and Calvinists, than he is towards the Papists themselves. He could, of course, and often did, say and write harsh things about the Papists ; but when he had to deal with Zwinglians and Calvinists his polemical wrath knew no bounds. In a letter written to a friend, late in his life, he parodies the first Psalm in the following manner : "Blessed is he that walketh not in the counsel of the Sectarians, nor standeth in the way of the Zwinglians, nor sitteth in the seat of the Zurichers." And on a certain occasion not long before his death, he writes of Calvinists, in language that is untranslat-

able, as *eingeteufelte, durchteufelte, überteufelte, vermaledeite Ketzer*. How shall we explain this difference of temper as displayed towards Papist and Protestant opponents? Is not the explanation contained largely in what has just been said? Luther was altogether certain on the points in regard to which he differed with the Papists. As to his position on the subject of indulgences, as to justification by faith, and as to matters of Christian faith generally, he was as sure as he was in regard to his own existence. But he was not so sure in regard to those points on which he differed with the Calvinists, the chief of which was the question as to the manner of Christ's presence in the Sacrament of the Eucharist; and therefore he hated the Calvinists far more cordially than the Papists.

And Luther's example was long followed by Lutheran theologians and princes and people. The course of events did not always run smoothly in the Lutheran Church itself, and the presence of the hated Calvinists on the outside, and often within, kept it in perpetual commotion and turmoil, and aroused the deepest passions, and often the most ferocious cruelty. Who does not remember the names of Flacius and Hesshuss and Mörlin among the theologians, and of the Elector Augustus of Saxony and his truculent spouse, "Mother Anna," among the princes? Augustus is reported once to have said that "if he had but one Calvinistic vein in his body, he wished the devil would tear it out for him." His physician in ordinary was Caspar Peucer, son-in-law of Philip Melancthon. He was a skillful physician and a learned, gentle, pious man. But, like his illustrious father-in-law, he was suspected of Calvinistic tendencies; and for this crime he was kept in prison for twelve years, deprived of all comforts, denied all books, even the Bible itself, and subjected to the most outrageous and inhuman cruelties. Still more painfully tragic was the fate of Nicolas Crell, chancellor of Saxony. This man, too, had betrayed Calvinistic tendencies, in consequence of which he was imprisoned for a number of years, and, after having suffered unspeakable indignities and tortures, he was at length brought to Dresden, and there, in the presence of a great concourse, beheaded by the public executioner, who, after

having struck off the head, held it up to the people and exclaimed: "That was a real Calvinistic stroke; his devil-companions may look out for themselves, for here they will receive no mercy." No incident could better illustrate the state of the Lutheran Church in Saxony in the latter part of the sixteenth century than that. The case of Crell is more than a parallel to the case of Servetus, which has left an eternal stain of infamy upon the name of Calvin. In brutal cruelty it far surpasses it. Whether Luther, if he had been alive, would have approved of such violence is, however, more than doubtful, for, with all his intemperate language and blustering, he never counselled the shedding of blood in the interest of "orthodoxy." But how Lutheran rulers and theologians generally felt towards Calvinists may be illustrated further by the following incident: A company of French and Dutch Protestants, having been driven from their native land by Catholic violence, had found refuge in England under Edward VI. But during the subsequent reign of Mary the Bloody they were expelled from England, and 175 of them, including women and children, sailed with John à Lasco at their head towards the coast of Denmark, where they expected to find at least a temporary refuge. But scarcely had they touched land, in the midst of winter, when they were commanded by the Lutheran authorities to move on and, on pain of death, never, in any circumstances, to allow themselves to be seen in that country again. Arrived in Germany, they met with the same reception at Wismar, Postock, Lübeck, Hamburg and other places; and this merely because they were "Calvinists," "sacramentarians" and "heretics." These are some of the things that one might now wish to forget. But surely after this it will not do to claim for the Lutheran Church that she was *never* an intolerant or a persecuting church. The best that may be said of her in this regard is that she has been no worse than other churches, and no better.

But the Lutheran Church, it may be said, is not a persecuting church *now*. That is something else, however; and in a certain sense the same thing may be said of other churches. In the old sense no church now is a persecuting church. Times have



changed, and men and churches have changed, too. The events of the thirty years war in Germany, and the events of modern history, in France, England, and America, have pretty well stamped out the truculent spirit of religious and theological intolerance. Besides, the adoption of the scientific method in all processes of thought, and the advancement of knowledge in modern times have so enlarged and liberalized the human mind, that religious persecution has now become almost impossible. The freedom of the human mind has been recognized in all other departments of thought; and why, then, should it not be recognized also in the department of theological thought? What right has one man to lord it over the minds of his fellow-men, in religion any more than in anything else? Hence toleration is the law which now generally prevails in the modern Christian world. There are those, indeed, who can not easily reconcile themselves to this new order of things. One of these is the pope of Rome. He laments that he has not now the power to stamp out Protestantism in Rome, and in Italy; and he doubtless regrets that he is compelled to see it flourish in the United States, or anywhere else. If he had the power he would put it down. What prevents him from burning heretics is not the want of will, but the want of power. And there are Protestant popes who dislike freedom of theological thought—except for themselves—as much as does the man of the Vatican; and by means of misrepresentation, denunciation, vituperation, and, where it is possible, by the use of the machinery of “ecclesiastical discipline,” they do all in their power to crush and destroy those who differ with them in opinion. But their power is not now very great, and it is constantly waning. The spirit of liberalism is the spirit of the age; and though hated still by a few such dark souls as that of John Henry Newman, it has taken possession of the reigning mind in all the churches; so that to say now that any church is not a persecuting church, is not to say much in its favor, as the same thing is practically true of all churches, even including the Roman Catholic, in spite of the contrary *wish* of its priesthood. It is extremely doubtful now whether the Catholic population of any country in the world, excepting perhaps that



of Spain, would sanction any wholesale persecution of Protestant dissenters. In fine, the spirit of intolerance is not now a popular spirit; and even heresy trials, the issue of which can be nothing more serious than the driving of the supposed heretic from one denomination into another, are not regarded with favor. The scenes which were enacted in the Lutheran Church in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not be enacted now. Even the "Galesburg rules" have already sunk into desuetude.

We look back upon those scenes now, and upon similar scenes in other churches, with feelings of horror not unminged with contempt for the miserable fanatics who played their wretched parts therein. Dr. Hagenbach, in his *Lectures on the History of the Christian Church*, has noted the fact that we regard Catholic and Protestant persecutions and persecutors with somewhat different feelings. We shudder at the remembrance of the fiendish cruelties of Catholic persecutors. The Catholic inquisitor is to the modern mind an object of unminged horror. The Protestant inquisitor and would-be manipulator of ecclesiastical thunder and lightning is not regarded with quite the same feeling. We abhor him too, of course, but we also despise him. The Catholic persecutor is sublime in his wickedness; the Protestant is ridiculous, contemptible. What is the cause of this difference of impressions? Dr. Hagenbach finds it in two circumstances: First, in the circumstance that the matters at issue between Papists and Protestants were of incomparably greater significance than those at issue between Protestants and Protestants; and, secondly, in the circumstance that the Catholic persecutor is self-consistent in his crime, while the Protestant is not.

The matters at issue between Catholics and Protestants were far-reaching and radical. They were matters of life and death. To be or not to be, was the question. And this gave the antagonists on both sides a certain appearance of greatness. The greatness of their cause attaches in some sense to the men who represent it, and enlarges their personality. Not so with the matters at issue between the Protestants. These are only matters of secondary importance, like the mode of Christ's presence in the sacrament, which, by the common confession of all, no one

understands. In the main issues they were agreed. But this gives to their quarrels a certain appearance of trifling, that cannot but belittle the actors themselves in the sober judgment of mankind. Few intelligent men now, who care to maintain a reputation for sanity, would be willing to say with a theologian of the generation just passed away, that Luther, at Marburg, saved Protestantism by rejecting the offered hand of Zwingli." The matter of difference between them was not sufficiently great to justify such an act. But a second cause of the feelings of contempt with which we regard a Protestant persecutor, is found in the circumstance that he is inconsistent with himself and his principles. The Catholic inquisitor leading his victim to the stake is consistent with himself. He knows nothing of freedom of conscience, of personal responsibility, personal freedom and conviction. He knows but one thing, and that is the authority of the church and of the pope. That authority is his God; and to maintain it is his one motive and aim, in fact his whole religion. Such monstrous superstition combined with equally monstrous cruelty gives us an impression of superhuman wickedness, that can at least not be laughed at. It is the sublimity of badness. Not so with the Protestant persecutor. He knows what freedom is, and is ready to claim it for himself. He has a conscience and feels bound to obey it. He may stand before the assembled princes of an empire, and in obedience to his own conscience exclaim, "Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise; God help me." And there he is sublime. But then, when the same person rails and raves like a madman at his fellow Christians for claiming the same right to the free exercise of reason and conscience, calling them "accused heretics and devils," he is no longer sublime, but has sunk to the level of the farcical. And a man who consigns another to the flames for exercising the same freedom of thought which he himself has exercised, and for the exercising of which the authority which he has defied would burn him, if it could get him into its hands—that man appears to us not merely as a very wicked, but as a very foolish man. In an æsthetic point of view his character presents a mixture of sublimity and of absurdity; and in a moral point of

view we are bound to abhor and despise him. And this is the judgment which must in the end be pronounced upon all Protestant intolerance.

Protestantism stands for freedom of thought and of conscience. In the exercise of such freedom it had its origin. And when it denies the right of such freedom within its own communion, it becomes untrue and unfaithful to itself, and, in fact, labors to destroy the foundation on which it itself stands. We know what may be said in reply to this. It will be said that there must be order and law and obedience to authority. Protestantism must exercise authority over the faith of its members, and must be able to free itself from heresy. In one sense this is true. Religion cannot exist without authority. But the only authority to which religious faith and reason can bow is the authority of the *truth*. When this authority is placed in an outward association and enforced by violence, then we are on the ground of Romanism, and the cause of Protestantism is betrayed into the hands of its enemies. How freedom of religious thought may be reconciled with peace and order and mutual forbearance in a religious community is a question which we do not propose here to discuss. We content ourselves merely with saying that the problem is not solved by putting faith and thought and conscience under the control of an external power, and securing uniformity by the exercise of either physical or spiritual violence. Protestantism has often done this in the past, but in doing so it has always been inconsistent with itself. All Protestant communions have been guilty, more or less, of this inconsistency. But, thank God! such inconsistencies do not now occur frequently. And it is devoutly to be hoped that the sense of the wrong of them and of the shame of them may ere long prevail to abolish them altogether. A Protestant "assembly," posing as a "court of Jesus Christ" and, after the manner of a conclave of Roman inquisitors, sitting in judgment on the faith of one of its members, and convicting him of heresy, while in the same breath disclaiming any pretense to infallibility, is such an absurdity that it may be hoped that the good sense of mankind may soon laugh the thing out of countenance as well as out of existence.

## VIII.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[Any books noticed in this REVIEW will be furnished, at the lowest prices, by the Reformed Church Publication Board, 1306 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.]

**FOREIGN MISSIONS OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES.** By Stephen L. Baldwin, D.D. Pages 272. Price \$1.00. Eaton & Mains, New York, 1900.

"The object of this work," as stated in the preface, "is to present some of the principles which underlie the missionary work of Protestantism, to discriminate between conceptions of missions and missionary work that are true and those that are false, to consider the call and the qualifications of missionaries, briefly to treat of some of the methods by which the missionary work of the churches is managed from the home side and some that are employed in the work of the various fields, and to give brief outline summaries of the work of the numerous societies engaged in it." The first six chapters accordingly treat in order of the following subjects: *Nature and Scope of Christian Missions; False and True Conceptions of Missions and Missionary Work; The Call and Qualifications of Missionaries; Home Organizations and Methods; Methods and Administration in the Foreign Field; and Origin and Growth of Foreign Missions.* The subjects of the remaining chapters are: *Formation of British Missionary Societies; Continental Missionary Societies; American Missionary Societies; Women's Missionary Societies; Mission Fields of the World; Progress at Home and Abroad; The Outlook; Statistics.*

From this outline of subjects treated the reader will be able to get some idea of the variety and interest belonging to the contents of this book. The subject of missions is always an interesting one, and has never been more so than at the present moment. The nineteenth century has been in a preëminent sense the century of missions. Never since the close of the Apostolic age has there been so much interest manifested in missions as during the past century. Has the result corresponded with the degree of interest displayed and the amount of money expended? The reading of a volume like the one before us may put one in a position, to some extent at least, to answer that question; although it should be remembered that the results of this century of missionary work are not yet fully apparent. Much of this work was only preparatory. It was the sowing of seed; but the harvest has not yet come. Doubtless other centuries will have to pass before the work commenced during the present will have borne its full fruit. And those who expect the whole world to be Christianized during the twentieth century, and grow nervous over the possibility of this expectation not being realized, seem to forget that God

takes ages for the accomplishment of his purposes. We believe that the reading of a book like the present, or any other of the many excellent works on the subject, will have a sobering as well as a stimulating effect. It will show us that the necessity for earnest and persistent work will probably continue to exist for ages to come. It will also show that no prophecies as to the future can safely be indulged. Such prophecies may all be brought to naught in a very brief moment. The following sentences of the book under consideration are curious reading in view of the events of the last few months: "In China the haughty exclusion of everything foreign with which the century began first gave place to the opening of treaty ports, and the privilege of travel within thirty miles of them. From this condition of things to the recent proclamation of the Emperor that Christianity is good, teaching men to do to others as they would others should do to them, and declaring toleration for it and protection for its professors throughout the Empire, is a long step in the way of progress," p. 249.

What is the proper motive for missionary activity? The Apostle Paul seems to have made it to consist in the love of Christ. "The love of Christ constraineth us," he says, 2 Cor. 5: 14. According to Dr. Baldwin, however, the true motive is the command of Christ. This reminds us of the answer which the Duke of Wellington is said once to have given to the question whether Christians should engage in missions: What are the orders of your Captain? That answer is doubtless true; but after all it is not the whole truth, and is not quite satisfactory. Why does Christ give that command to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature? There must be a reason for that, for Christ does nothing without good reasons. That reason used to be found in the fact that all men who do not get the gospel in this world perish everlastingly. This view our author is not prepared to adopt. "But we are asked," he writes, p. 21, "Does not the Master say, 'He that believeth shall be saved; and he that believeth not shall be damned'? Yes; but nobody construes this language to imply that literally everyone who does not believe personally on Christ must be eternally lost." The author, then, would not urge missionary effort on the ground that in every second of time a soul drops into hell because the church has failed to bring the gospel to it. But he has no other theory than that it is the will of Christ that the gospel should be preached. As to the field within which missionary work should be done he makes a remark, whose full bearing perhaps he does not perceive, but which is somewhat uncomplimentary at least to some of our fellow Christians. In defending foreign missionary work against objections, he says: "We are told, 'This is the great gathering place of all nations; here are Swedes and Germans and Italians and Chinese and Japanese, let us stay here and evangelize our own country; we can convert Germans and Scandinavians and Chinese faster here than we can in their native lands.'" It is true this is a quotation from

a supposed opponent of missions in foreign fields; but the author objects to it, not on the ground that Germans and Scandinavians, all good Lutherans, are already Christians, and need no conversion, but rather on the ground that we can better convert them in their own country than here. What will Lutherans say to that?

But while there are a few defects of that kind in the volume before us, it will prove a valuable help to any minister in the study of the subject of missions, a subject which is in special need of careful and intelligent study at the present time. Pastors who want to deliver missionary addresses to their people, and ministers who are requested to deliver addresses at missionary conventions or Synodical and Classical assemblies, would do well to get this volume as a help to their preparation. The chapters treating of the history of missionary societies, and the organization of missionary movements will be found to be of special interest.

**HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.** By John Fletcher Hurst, D.D., LL.D. Volume II. Pages, xxvi + 957. Price, \$5.00. Eaton and Main, New York; Jennings and Pye, Cincinnati, 1900.

The first volume of this History of the Christian Church was published some time ago. The present volume, embracing the history of the modern church, from the Reformation down to the present time, completes the work of which it forms a part. This work is published as a part of the *Library of Biblical and Theological Literature*, edited by George R. Crooks, D.D., and John F. Hurst, D.D. Of this library, we are told, in the Publishers' announcement, that the design of the Publishers and Editors "was declared, before either volume of the series had appeared, to be the furnishing of ministers and laymen with a series of works which should constitute a compendious apparatus for advanced study on the great fundamental themes of Christian Theology. While the doctrinal spirit of the separate works was pledged to be in harmony with the accepted standards of the Methodist Episcopal Church, it was promised that the aim should be to make the entire Library acceptable to Christians of all Evangelical Churches." This pledge and this promise have been well kept in the several works of the series which have thus far been issued. They are scholarly productions, without any sectarian bias, such as can be commended to clergymen and theological students of all denominations.

Dr. Hurst has long been known to the theological public of this country as an historical scholar and writer of more than common ability. His work on the *History of Rationalism*, published thirty-five years ago, served to establish his reputation as a Church historian, and perhaps also helped to advance him to a seat on the Episcopal bench of the Methodist Church. In the two volumes on the *History of the Christian Church* which he has now given to the public, he has fulfilled the expectations which his friends doubtless entertained in regard to him, and has put under obliga-



tion all students of Church history. The volume now before us treats of the Modern Church. It is divided into four general *Parts*. The first Part, in eleven sections, extending over 125 pages, treats of the preparation for the Reformation, or of the "Heralds of the Better Church." Here we have accounts of such men as William of Accam, John Wyclif, John Hus, Savanarola, John Wessel, Reuchlin, Erasmus, and others, whose work and suffering served to prepare the way for Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin and their coworkers in various parts of Christendom. The second part treats of the Reformation, first on the Continent, and secondly, in the British Isles. The third part contains the History of the Intermediate Period, from the establishment of Protestantism to the beginning of the present century. The fourth part, finally contains the history of the recent period, first on the continent, secondly in Great Britain, and thirdly in America.

One of the merits of this general history of the Christian Church consists in its moderate dimensions coupled with a comparative fullness of details. It is intermediate between the extended histories of many volumes, which few busy ministers and scarcely any laymen have time to read, and the brief manuals which contain little more than dry catalogues of names and dates, which nobody wants to read. In a work of two large volumes, like those of Dr. Hurst, it is possible to present persons and events with some definiteness and fullness of outline, to present *pictures* that shall impress the imagination, and so make the study of history a pleasure instead of an irksome task. Of course no historian, in such limits, will do equal justice to all events and persons which he may have occasion to portray. We notice something of this inequality in the work before us. Luther and Wesley, for instance, are treated at a length and with a fullness that could not be accorded to many other characters, of whom one would naturally like to know more. Of course this is inevitable. And yet, generally, Dr. Hurst discriminates well and proportions his material fairly according to the merits of the subjects treated. If Luther gets more attention than Zwingli, it must be remembered that he filled an incomparably larger place in the actual history of the world. Much as we admire Zwingli and believe that his merits, especially in a theological point of view, have never yet been fully appreciated, we are yet bound to agree with Dr. Hurst when he says that, without Luther, Zwingli would have been impossible. Naturally Dr. Hurst devotes more space to English and American history than we are accustomed to in works of European, especially German, origin; but this is a feature which the American student must view with approbation rather than otherwise.

Agreeably to his plan and the limits of his work Dr. Hurst does not follow the method of classifying and dividing the historical material to which we are accustomed in larger works. He does not devote separate sections or "books" to the history of



missions, of doctrines, of worship, of charity, of Christian life, but presents all these interests in concrete pictures. Such a method avoids much repetition and makes history more life-like, though for scientific analysis and study it may be less convenient. No doubt, however, this method is more difficult than the other. It is certainly more difficult to paint life-pictures than to draw vague and indefinite outlines. We think that Dr. Hurst has, in a large measure, succeeded in drawing life-pictures. His constant tendency is to describe persons, their motives and actions, rather than abstract principles. And he is generally successful in making persons live before the imagination of the reader—an effect which gives evidence of real historic ability in a writer. A writer who can, with a few bold strokes of the pen, present a life-like picture of a historical character, possesses one of the essential qualifications of an historian. As an evidence of Dr. Hurst's degree of success in this regard, we quote a few sentences on the personality of Luther: "He was conscious of being the organ of an almighty strength because he championed the truth of Almighty God. None but a great personality could have sustained the expansive force of such a conviction. Such a personality Luther was. Gigantic in intellect, of accessible yet steadfast and unfathomed sensibilities, he was of pliant but irresistible will. Gentle among his friends, in anger he was terrific. In the vast caverns of Luther's robust Teutonic soul there abode, in perfect harmony, the tenderness of woman, the simplicity of childhood and the fierce and untamable spirit of the lion. His character is so great that what would appear as contradictory in others in him excites no astonishment. He was great even in his faults."

A valuable feature of the volume before us is a series of maps, presenting views of Europe and of North and South America with special reference to the religious condition of different countries in different periods of their history. The religious changes taking place in different periods are thus often shown more plainly than would be possible by means of pages of description. Another feature of the volume is that complete lists of *Literature* on the different periods and subjects of the history treated are given at the head of every chapter, which add much to the value of the book. While there is but little display of *Sources* in the narrative, and while references to footnotes, though abundant enough, are not as numerous as in works of larger dimensions, yet the tables of Literature which are given will enable the student to pursue his work to any extent that he may desire. The work in this way may become a guide to the study of Church History on a much larger scale, and will doubtless serve to stimulate such study. And if it accomplishes this end, it will not have been written in vain.

Church History is not merely an interesting but a profitable study for the modern minister and preacher. Though it has to do mainly with the *past* of Christianity, yet it has a value for the

*present*, which could not easily be over-estimated. For the present is the product of the past; and the present could, therefore, not be what it is, if the past had not been what it was. Hence whoever would understand the present must study the past. This is nowhere more true than in religion and theology. The best criticism of a doctrine, it has been said, is its history. Doctrines have passed for revealed and divinely sanctioned dogmas, until the history of their origin came to be known; and then their glamor vanished, and they appeared in their true character as things of very human production. The same is true of customs, rites, and ceremonies. Now the modern theological mind wants to penetrate to the truth in regard to all these matters. And hence the call for the Church historian. His occupation is not an unprofitable one. And the works which he produces, if they are the product of conscientious diligence, deserve to be received with pleasure. We thus welcome this work of Dr. Hurst's. We believe it to be an honest book. The professional historian will doubtless discover imperfections and errors. We believe ourself that the author is in error when he says, on page 904, of Dr. J. W. Nevins that "he labored with prodigious industry to blend a modified Catholicism with the Reformed theology." Like many others, both friends and foes, he has probably failed to understand Dr. Nevins. Others will no doubt discover similar errors in his work. But for these he can readily be pardoned, and they do not seriously detract from the value of his contribution to the science of Church History; the study of which will benefit all who earnestly undertake it, not only in his own denomination, for which it is more immediately intended, but in all the denominations of the country. And the study of it will not be found to be a hard task. The student will find it to be delightfully written in a clear style that attracts and fascinates the attention.

**A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF TRINITARIANISM AND ITS OUTCOME IN THE NEW CHRISTOLOGY.** By Levi Leonard Paine, Waldo Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Bangor Theological Seminary. Pages, xii + 387. Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston and New York, 1900.

In this volume Professor Paine has made a contribution to American theological literature that is bound to attract attention, and that will be received with various emotions by different classes of readers. The conservative theologian who believes that religion is identical with a creed or a traditional system of theology, will peruse it with feelings of pain, and regard it as an enemy of Christianity; while the liberal will hail it as a friend, with whom, however, he cannot always agree. The subject of the book certainly is a most interesting one, and one in regard to which theologians of all schools should desire all the information that may be attainable. The doctrines of the divinity of Christ and the Holy Trinity are the most fundamental doctrines of Christianity. And in some form these doctrines are necessary in order to the sub-

sistence of the Christian faith. All *traditional forms* of these doctrines may, in the light of historical and critical thought be found to be untenable; but the facts which they presuppose must be accepted by every Christian believer in order to the perpetuity of his faith. They belong to the great fundamental verities of religion, which are always deeper and more precious than any form of statement which they may yet have received. This we understand to be the view of the author of this volume, who says in the preface, "As this book itself will show, religious faith is a very different thing from theological dogma, and I can frankly declare that while my studies in the history of Christian doctrine have led me more and more strongly away from *a priori* dogmatic positions, my religious faith has been able to rest itself more and more securely on the great fundamental verities of religion."

The title of the book will serve to give us a general idea of its fundamental tendency and spirit. It is the "Evolution of Trinitarianism." That implies, of course, that the doctrine of the Christian Trinity is not a divinely revealed dogma, either formally expressed in Scripture or laid down in the depository of the church. It is a doctrine that has been gradually evolved under varied historical conditions, and that has undergone many and great changes. "It must be distinctly recognized at the outset," says our author, "that this doctrine is no exception to the universal law of historical evolution." Accordingly, in the first three chapters he traces the history of the doctrine from its first beginnings in the New Testament to its present issues in New England theology. He finds no foundation of the doctrine in the Old Testament. "The idea that a trinity is to be found there," he says, "or even in any way shadowed forth, is an assumption that has long held sway in theology, but is utterly without foundation." The Old Testament is strictly and sternly monotheistic. And the New Testament is not less so. Whatever intimations of Trinitarian doctrine may be found therein must be held in strict subordination to the fundamental principle of monotheism.

The Trinitarian teaching of the New Testament revolves around the conception of the person of Christ; and of this teaching, our author contends, there are four distinct strata, which may be considered in the following order: There is, first, the teaching of the Acts of the Apostles and of the Synoptic Gospels, with the exception of the first chapters of Matthew and Luke. In this earliest Christological teaching of the Christian church Jesus is simply the Messiah, the "Son of Man" of Jewish hope and expectation. He is a man of God, mighty in word and deed, sent of God to declare His Gospel and exhort men to repent and prepare for the Kingdom of Heaven which is at hand. When He is called the *Son of God*, this term is used only in the sense of *Messiahship*, and implies no peculiar metaphysical relationship to God. The second stratum of Christological doctrine in the New Testament

we find deposited in the first and second chapters of the Gospel of Matthew, and in the first and second chapters of the Gospel of Luke. These are not original parts of the Synoptical tradition. These chapters present Jesus, not indeed as an eternally preëxistent divine personality, but as a human being miraculously created as to soul and body in the womb of the Virgin Mary. According to this teaching, Jesus is a miraculous man, who may be said, in a certain sense, to be divine, but could not be declared to be God. The third stratum of Christological thought, according to Professor Paine, is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews and in the epistles of St. Paul. Paul was acquainted with Greek philosophy, especially in the form that was given to it by Jewish speculation in the great city of Alexandria. And it was the Platonic-Philonic doctrine of a *μεσίτης* or *mediator* between God and the world that formed the basis of St. Paul's doctrine of the person of Christ, which lies at the foundation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. "It was Paul," says our author, "who, with his Greek Philonic theory of a metaphysical superhuman mediator, gave an entirely new shaping to the Messianic doctrine, and he may be truly called the real originator of the trinitarian conception, which finally issued in the Nicene creed." Before this took place, however, another stratum of Christological thought was formed and deposited in the New Testament, namely, that which turns upon the Logos doctrine of the fourth Gospel. The Logos of this Gospel is not essentially different from the *mesites* of St. Paul. Only the conception of the former is more fully developed. The Logos is a personal, preëxistent being standing in a relation of metaphysical union with God. This is the final phase of Christological thought in the New Testament. It should be mentioned, however, that, according to Professor Paine, this is by no means an *apostolic* phase of thought; for he contends that the fourth Gospel dates from the middle of the second century. In a somewhat lengthy and exceedingly interesting appendix he endeavors to show that the fourth Gospel is never quoted, and, consequently, may be supposed not to have been known previous to the time of Theophilus of Antioch and Irenaeus. Justin Martyr, indeed, in the middle of the second century, is familiar with the doctrine of the Logos, and in one place seems to quote from the fourth Gospel; but Professor Paine contends, with apparently good reason, that, instead of being dependent upon the fourth Gospel, both he and the Gospel are dependent upon a form of Christian thought, which by this time had become current throughout the Church. The apparent quotation concerning the new birth Professor Paine believes to be not from the Gospel, but from a collection of traditional sayings of Jesus, different from the Gospel. This brief examination of the trinitarian doctrine in the New Testament will show the propriety of applying to it the conception of *evolution*.

According to Professor Paine, the personal factors of Nicene

Trinitarianism are Paul, Justin Martyr, Origen and Athanasius. Paul furnished the idea of a preëxistent, superhuman mediator between God and the world; Justin developed the idea of the Logos in His metaphysical relation to God; Origen contributed the idea of eternal generation; and Athanasius the idea of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. The Athanasian doctrine was developed under the pressure of antagonism and contradiction. The two main forms of opposition were Sabellianism and Arianism the former denying the difference of persons, the latter the unity of substance. According to Sabellius, "Father, Son and Holy Spirit are but three modes or forms of action of the one divine substance; according to Arius they are created essences, and therefore not of the same substance with the Father. According to Athanasius they are consubstantial with the Father, the Son being eternally begotten by the Father, and the Holy Spirit eternally proceeding from Him. But while thus consubstantial with the Father, they are yet subordinate to the Father, the latter alone being God in the absolute and full sense. This is Nicene Trinitarianism. But according to Professor Paine this doctrine suffered a complete subversion at the hands of Augustine, and in the later Pseudo-Athanasian Creed, which in fact proceeded from the school of Augustine. Augustine did not understand Athanasius. He was a Neo-Platonist in philosophy. Professor Paine controverts the view of Prof. A. V. G. Allen that Augustine was a transcendentalist in theology, in contradistinction to Athanasius and the Greek theologians who emphasized the divine immanence. This is an interesting question, and we suppose that in due time Professor Allen will give it his attention. We do not believe, however, that Professor Paine's main contention as to Augustine's trinitarianism is vitally affected by the decision of this question. He maintains that Augustine understood the phrase *unity of essence* in a radically different sense from that in which it was used by Athanasius. Athanasius by the term *homousios* meant generic unity—such unity of essence as that which exists between parent and child, or between human persons, like Peter, James, and John; while Augustine on the other hand meant *numeric* unity—the essence of the Son being numerically the same as that of the Father. This theory might be characterized as *monousianism* rather than *homousianism*. The essence of the Godhead is complete and whole in each person? But, how, then, is it possible to maintain the difference of persons? Professor Paine, holds that it is not possible, and that in fact Augustine was a Sabellian and not an Athanasian, and that in this the whole Western church down to the present time has followed him. Augustine, for instance, refused to call Father, Son, and Holy Spirit three distinct persons, but would rather designate them as *three somewhat*; as also did Anselm, who used the expression *I know not what* in regard to the three divine subsistences. Thus, by changing the

Athanasian *homoousianism* from *generic* to *numeric* unity of essence, Professor Paine contends, the theology of the whole Western church became Sabellian and Unitarian; and in this form it has come down to the churches in modern times, but is now suffering decay and going to pieces.

The age of the Reformation contributed nothing new on the subject of the Trinity. It only gave fixed creedal form to the dogmas previously existing in the Church. But the time came when the creeds themselves began to be questioned and to need interpretation. This was the case especially in New England theology; which is the only theology in this country possessing an inward impulse and tendency towards independent development. And even in New England the really influential names are not very many. Jonathan Edwards and Samuel Hopkins adhered in the main to the Augustinian Sabellianism of the medieval church. Emmons and Moses Stuart modified it somewhat. Emmons declared the doctrine of eternal generation to be "eternal nonsense," and suggested that the names *Son* and *Word* had no existence previous to the incarnation; while Stuart and Bushnell hold that God is not *eternally* tripersonal, but unipersonal, and that the Trinity becomes fully developed only after the incarnation. This again is only another form of Sabellianism. Professor Paine quotes the following sentence from Dörner, which he thinks summarizes most of the New England orthodox thought on the subject of the Trinity: "The eternal result of the trinitarian process is the eternal presence of the divine personality in different modes of being," and says that this is "Modalism, Sabellianism, and pantheism in one conglomerate." But this "conglomerate" is professed by such theologians as Joseph Cook, Dr. Lyman Abbott, Dr. A. H. Bradford, and Drs. H. B. Smith and W. G. T. Shedd. According to these theologians God is "one absolute personality in three personal modes of being"; or as Dr. Shedd put it, "God is both unipersonal and tripersonal." This, according to Professor Paine, is saving monotheism at the expense of trinitarianism.

A fourth and final phase of New England Trinitarianism is the "doctrine of the essential divineness of humanity and preeminently of Christ, the unique representative of mankind, who was in this sense, a true incarnation of Deity." This doctrine of the essential consubstantiality of humanity with deity is represented by such thinkers as Drs. Phillips Brooks, J. M. Whiton, George A. Gordon, and others. "In this theory," says Professor Paine, "there lurks a metaphysical monistic strain that reminds us of Plotinus and the Stoics." Professor Paine concludes his historical survey of the doctrine of Trinitarianism by two general remarks. The first is that theological thinking as evinced in the history of the doctrine is still *thoroughly dogmatic in character*. The historical and critical spirit which has so deeply penetrated our age in other directions, has as yet made but little impression upon orthodox theologians. They still continue to spin systems out of general principles by deductive reasoning, unconscious



of the fact that this method has broken down in all other departments of thought. The second remark our author makes is that *theological thought is still cast largely in the old Catholic moulds*. Many good Protestants are "unconscious Catholics."

The subject of the fourth chapter of the book under notice is the *Trinitarian Outlook*, in which we have a discussion of the characteristics of the New England Trinitarianism of to-day; and that of the fifth chapter *The Trinitarian Result*, which according to the author, is that Trinitarianism has been unitarianized, and Unitarianism has been trinitarianized. The subject of the next chapter is *The New Historical Evolution*, which will demand a satisfaction of the *historical spirit*, of the *religious spirit*, and of the *intellectual spirit*, and these three topics form the subjects of chapters seven, eight, and nine. *The New Theological Method*, *The Materials of the New Theology*, *The Construction of the New Theology*, *The New Christology*, *The New Christian Atonement*, and *The Leading Features and Benefits of the New Theology*, are the respective subjects of the remaining chapters. We can not follow, even in outline, our author's course of thought in these chapters. Suffice it to say that his conclusions are not "orthodox." Indeed his book seems to have been written for the express purpose of showing that the orthodox systems which have held sway in the past, are gradually disintegrating. He emphasizes the fact that modern Trinitarianism is not Nicene Trinitarianism; and in this we believe that he is right. But, then, if we understand him correctly, he has not any more favor for Nicene Trinitarianism than he has for any phase of modern Trinitarianism. The Nicene doctrine has its difficulties for thought as well as any modern doctrine. For, not to speak of anything else, there is the difficulty of conceiving the union of a preëxistent divine personality with human nature in such way as to get a genuine human being. In our opinion the view of a consubstantiality of the divine and human natures deserves more favorable consideration than it receives from Professor Paine. In fact Professor Paine has no theory of his own, or at least he does not put any forward. We suspect that if he did, it would be Unitarianism pure and simple. But he thinks the time has not yet come for presenting a new doctrine. To the demand for constructive work in theology rather than destructive, he replies that there are times when the only thing possible is destruction, and that ours is such a time. Old and defective systems must be overthrown before men will be willing to listen to anything new. In the way of illustration of this point Professor Paine refers to the old doctrine of atonement. As long as men can believe the doctrine of an appeasement of the divine wrath by means of substitutionary suffering for sin, they will not desire nor be able to comprehend any better or more spiritual theory.

In conclusion we earnestly commend this book to our readers. In style it is all that could be desired. Though dealing with profound questions, it is never obscure or heavy. The author's



meaning is always plain, and one does not tire in the reading of it. In this regard it may be compared to Allen's *Continuity of Christian Thought*. The book, moreover, deals with a subject that is bound to receive attention at no distant day. Theologians and preachers will have to reckon with the new theories which are making their appearance in our time. It will no longer do simply to repeat the Nicene Creed. What we need to do is to try once more to *understand* it. But after we have done that, the probability is that we will no longer be quite satisfied with it. The Christian world will want a new creed, and the time for making it will come. But it will only come after much study and thought; and as a help to such thought the book before us will be useful. Only in the use of it one should bear in mind the author's caution, expressed in the preface, that religious faith is a different thing from theological dogma, and that one may change while the other remains the same.

A **DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE**, *Dealing with its Language, Literature and Contents, Including the Biblical Theology*. Edited by James Hastings, M.A., D.D., with the assistance of John A. Selbie, A. B. Davidson, D.D., LL.D., S. R. Driver, D.D., H. B. Swete, D.D. Volume III. Ki-Psiades. Pages, 896. Price, \$6.00. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1900.

The first two volumes of this *Dictionary* were noticed in the last July number of this *REVIEW*. For a general account of the plan and character of the work we refer to that notice. The present volume fully sustains the character then given of it. This is without question the most complete, the most thorough and the most reliable Bible Dictionary now extant in the English language. It is the first English Bible Dictionary that embraces the results of the most modern Biblical scholarship. Of course in a work on which so many different writers are employed—probably more than one hundred and twenty-five—one expects to meet with some inequalities. All the writers do not occupy the same standpoint. As a general thing we do not think that articles relating to the New Testament are written with the same degree of freedom as those relating to the Old Testament. Perhaps rightly, theologians writing on New Testament themes are more conservative than those who deal with the old. But upon the whole all the articles contained in this dictionary, whether relating to the New Testament or to the Old, show evidence of having been affected by the results of Modern Biblical scholarship. The articles are not borrowed from the older works of the same kind, but are fresh productions breathing more or less the modern spirit of free inquiry in theological science.

It is well known that within the last quarter of a century Biblical Science in all departments has been revolutionized. The dogmatic method which once prevailed universally in the study of the Bible, has generally given way to the critical and historical method; and the result has been an abandonment to a large extent of the old theories of inspiration and canonicity, affecting to some extent

at least our apprehension even of the historical contents of the Bible. For some time these results were ignored by dogmatic and practical theologians; and dictionaries, and systems of theology, and sermons were written without any regard to changes that had taken place in the current conceptions of the nature and composition of the Bible; somewhat as commentaries on the Bible continued to be written for a long time after the establishment of the modern astronomy and the new geology without any reference to the results accomplished by these sciences. Geologists might have proven that it must have required millions of years for the deposition of the different strata of the earth's crust with the organic remains which they contain; but commentators still continued to maintain that the world was created in six days not quite six thousand years ago. So Biblical criticism had proven, for instance, that Moses *could* not have written the Pentateuch; and yet in sermons and theological treatises the Pentateuch continued to be quoted as if there could never be any doubt of its Mosaic authorship and literal historicity. But now all this is in a large measure changed; and this dictionary, given to the theological public by Dr. Hastings and his many distinguished collaborators, exhibits evidences of the change on almost every page. In some respects these changes may not go far enough. There may be some conservative shrinking from accepting the extreme results of Biblical criticism and of Historical science. In other respects they may go too far, and the results of future investigations may compel more conservative statements. No such work, of course, can be perfect for all time. But after all this new dictionary is up generally to the measure of modern theological science, and will answer the wants of theological students for a long time to come.

In a work of this kind the shorter articles will be the more numerous; but for an estimate of its merits one will turn to the longer and more important articles. We, accordingly, refer to some features of a few of the longer articles. The article on the *Language of the Old Testament* was prepared by Prof. D. S. Margoliouth, of Oxford, and consists of ten pages. In it we are told that the Hebrew language is the Israelitish dialect of the Canaanitic, and that the latter was a daughter of the Arabic, which was a written language already at the time when the former separated from it. The Hebrew became fixed in its peculiarities as a separate language about the time of David. In the article on the *Logos*, consisting of four pages, and written by Dr. F. G. Purves, of Princeton, it is shown that the Logos doctrine of St. John, instead of having been received by direct divine communication, had its roots in the Old Testament as well as in contemporary Jewish and Gentile thought. In the Old Testament, in the book of Proverbs, for example, the term *word* is used in the sense of "God's self-manifestation by an agent more or less conceived as personal, yet blending with the divine personality itself." Heraclitus among the Greeks used the term *Logos* for "the universal

law according to which the evolution of the universe proceeds", and the Stoics used it for "the rational principle in the universe, in one respect divine, in another finite, the divine reason and governor of the cosmos." From these sources Philo obtained the term, and used it to denote the "divine reason attaining existence objective to God for the purpose of creation, being not really personal but personified." St. John's use of the term is connected with these sources. "He adopted his phraseology because in Jewish and Gentile circles the term was familiar."

Dr. Plummer, of University College, Durham, contributes a six-page article on the *Lord's Supper*. He holds, with McGiffert and others, that there is strong reason for believing that the words, bracketed by Westcott and Hort, in Luke 22: 19, 20, are not original, but a very early interpolation. If this be true, then there is no direct proof from the Gospels of an immediate divine institution of the Lord's Supper. Such proof, however, may be derived from St. Paul, whose account is primary, having been written prior to any of the Gospels. Prof. L. I. M. Bebb, of St. David's College, Lampeter, who writes the article, of twelve pages, on the Gospel of St. Luke, thinks that about A. D. 80 may be accepted as the probable date of this Gospel, and that its sources consisted of our Gospel of Mark, a collection of our Lord's discourses also used by Matthew, some independent oral traditions, and some special written sources for chapters one and two. The article on *Miracles*, of seventeen pages, is from the pen of Dr. J. H. Bernard, of King's College, London. He begins the discussion of the subject by noting the fact that the very circumstances, namely, the narratives of miracles, which were in the beginning regarded as the strongest arguments of the divinity of Christianity, are the ones which now require the most apology. But while granting the force of some of the arguments against miracles, the author contends that there is no sufficient reason for rejecting them. The article is a complete and thorough discussion of the difficult subject of which it treats and deserves to be well studied.

In these times of enthusiastic Pentateuch study one naturally turns to the article on *Moses* to see what new light may be thrown upon some of the leading problems of the higher criticism. The article is by Prof. W. K. Bennett, of New College, London, and consists of ten pages. At the beginning the old derivation of the name of *Moses*, meaning *drawn out of the water*, is set aside in favor of an Egyptian root, *mes, mesu, child, son*. Moses is accepted as the leader under whom Israel is delivered from bondage in Egypt. Through him Israel received a divine revelation. He originated or formulated many customs and institutions from which the later national system was developed. Israel owed to him its national existence. So much, the author of this article thinks, may be affirmed. But Moses' work and personality can not be exactly defined. The data are wanting. Later ages ascribed to him much that was only a development from his beginnings. He stands in the Old Testament record in such isolated

grandeur that the traits of individual human character are lost. We pass over the articles on the *New Testament Canon* by Dr. V. H. Stanton, on the *Old Testament Canon* by Dr. F. W. Woods, on Palestine by Col. C. R. Conder, on the *Parousia* by Dr. W. A. Brown, and on the *Passover* by Dr. W. I. Moulton of Cambridge, remarking only that, according to Dr. Moulton, the Passover, as it is described in the Old Testament, combined in itself features belonging to an original feast of much larger proportions, or took up into itself in course of time various features from what were in reality different festivals.

The article on *Paul, the Apostle*, is contributed by Professor G. G. Findlay, of Headingley College, Leeds. It covers 36 pages. The author accepts the hypothesis of a second imprisonment. The first imprisonment terminated in the Apostle's liberation shortly after writing the Epistle to the Philippians. Subsequently he made tours of inspection to the churches, visited Spain, and wrote the Pastoral Epistles. In fact it seems to be for the purpose of getting time and circumstances for the writing of these Epistles that the hypothesis of a second imprisonment has been invented. "The letters to Timothy and Titus," says Professor Findlay, are writings of Paul's old age. They bear a conservative stamp. 'Guard the deposit; hold fast the form of sound words'; this is their predominant note. Sound doctrine and practical piety are the interests in which they center. Paul's great creative days are over." To which we would say: all right, *if the letters are genuine*. But may not the characteristics of the Epistles referred to be evidences that *they are not genuine*? The spirit of these letters is so entirely different from that of the undoubted Epistles of Paul, that we at least can hardly understand how they could have proceeded from the same mind. To say that Paul was in his dotage when he wrote them, is hardly satisfactory. We notice only one more article, namely, the one on the *Apostle Peter*, by Dr. F. H. Chase, of Christ College, Cambridge. It covers 64 pages, and presents a complete study of the person, character, history, and labors of the Apostle. There is scarcely any personage in history with whom there are connected so many unsolved problems as that of St. Peter. Tradition and legend have woven around his name a web of stories through which it is now almost impossible to get a correct view of his person and character; and we are not sure that the author of this exhaustive article does not yield too much to the influence of the tissue of fables which surrounds the name of the great Apostle. The tradition of the twenty-five years episcopate at Rome is of course rejected as unhistorical. But the story of the Apostle's presence and martyrdom at Rome is accepted as probable. But when shall we suppose that this occurred? Peter could not have been in Rome previous to Paul's writing his Epistle to the Romans, nor during the time of his first captivity. The author of the article under consideration, therefore, suggests that Peter arrived in Rome, perhaps at Paul's request, shortly after the latter's liber-

ation, and labored there until Paul's second arrival as a prisoner, and then suffered martyrdom with him. That must be confessed to be an ingenious combination. But will it hold? The first Epistle of Peter is pronounced genuine by the author of this article. The genuineness of the second Epistle is, of course, denied and its composition is supposed to have taken place during the first quarter of the second century.

What we have said in the last paragraph shows that we do not regard all the conclusions in this dictionary as infallible. Other criticisms might doubtless be made on other articles. But what one looks for in a biblical or theological dictionary is not so much finality of conclusions as material for independent study and for reaching conclusions. In a work like this we expect to find given the arguments on all sides of a disputed question, so that we may be in a position to make up our own answers. And in this regard our expectation is not disappointed in the dictionary before us. It is all that the Biblical student can desire, now and for a long time to come. And no real student of the Bible can afford to be without it. It only remains to say, in conclusion, that one volume more will complete the work; and this will be eagerly looked for by those who have the three volumes now published.

**AN EXPOSITION OF THE GOSPELS OF THE CHURCH YEAR, on the Basis of Nebe.**

By Prof. Edmund Jacob Wolf, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Church History in the Gettysburg Theological Seminary. Pages 914. Price, \$4.50. Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, Pa., 1900.

Ministers who observe the order of the Church Year in their ministrations, will welcome this book as offering them important and valuable help. Works of the same kind are scarce in the English language. The English speaking denominations, with the exception of the Episcopalian, do not generally observe the Church Year; and as among the Episcopalians the liturgy greatly overshadows the sermon in public worship, the literature bearing upon the subject of the Church Year does not partake much of a homiletical character. In German, works on the Church Year are abundant. We have, for instance, *Das Evangelische Kirchenjahr*, by Friedrich Strauss, Alt's *Kirchenjahr*, treatises on the subject in the various works on practical theology, like that of Achelis, and especially *Die Evangelische Perikopen des Kirchenjahrs*, by Prof. A. Nebe. The last named work consists of three volumes with a total of 1,600 pages, and contains a large amount of valuable exegetical and homiletical material, and much also that to an American preacher can not have much value—for example, frequent and long quotations from the Greek and Latin fathers in their original languages.

Professor Wolf's work, now under notice, is professedly based upon that of Nebe. It is, however, not a translation, as is manifest at once from the difference in size. Nor is it a condensed reproduction. It is in fact an independent work, adopting the plan and spirit of Nebe, and containing frequent quotations from Nebe, but

giving quotations also from many other commentators, like Meyer, Bleek, Keil, Alford, Beyschlag, besides presenting much original matter. The work possess especially three qualities to which we would call especial attention. First, it is a real scientific commentary on the Gospel lessons contained in the pericopal system of the Church Year. It is not what is sometimes called a *homiletic commentary*, or a *practical commentary*. Commentaries of this kind are numerous, and cover all parts of the Bible, but are all of them of more or less doubtful value. They all trespass more or less upon the province of the preacher. They aim to be applications of Scripture rather than explanations. Their object is to make preaching easy by furnishing the preacher with practical thoughts, which he can just retail to his congregation. But that is not preaching; for no thought can really be practical for a congregation that has not originated in a sense of its capacity and wants, of which the commentator can know nothing. The only really practical commentary that a preacher can possess is *that which he makes for himself*. Now Professor Wolf's book on the Gospel pericopes does not make the mistake of claiming to be a *practical commentary*. It aims to be a *real commentary* based upon the original language of the New Testament. Its object is to bring out the meaning of the writers of the Gospel, leaving it for the preacher to determine what meaning it may have for the particular congregation to which he is to preach on any particular Sunday. In this consists its general value as a commentary.

But in the pericopal system the particular Gospel lessons appear, and must be treated, not as standing in the organism of the original Gospels, but in the organism of the Church Year. This fact must modify somewhat their interpretation. It must be shown, as far as this may now be possible, why any particular Gospel lesson stands in the pericope of any particular Sunday, what is its connection with preceding and succeeding lessons, and what its particular meaning in this connection. Professor Wolf's exposition generally meets these requirements. He gives no general theory of the Church Year. That does not properly belong to his plan. But he generally begins the exposition of the Gospel of a particular Sunday by means of an introduction in which he briefly discusses the relation of the lesson to the idea of the day, and to preceding lessons. This relation is frequently referred to also throughout the exposition of a lesson. And this is the second quality that distinguishes this *Exposition of the Gospels of the Church Year* from an ordinary commentary. A third quality which is of a more directly homiletical character, consists, in addition to the exposition of each Gospel lesson, of a number of *sermon outlines*. These are usually adapted from Nebe, and may be helpful to some preachers. Few preachers may use them as they are; and in fact that is not the design of them, we suppose; but to many preachers they may be suggestive as to the invention of outlines of their own. They are samples intended, not to supersede, but to stimulate the preacher's own invention.



Professor Wolf is a conservative commentator, with whose interpretations of Scripture we can generally agree. He tells us in the preface of this work that he follows "the maxim that in the exposition of Scriptures the true rendering is to be sought and not a new one," and adds that "a claim for originality in this domain is open to sundry suspicions." With the first of these propositions we of course agree; only we would add that in order to be true, it is often necessary that an exposition should be new. If all exegetical questions had been settled by the interpretations of the fathers, according to the claims of Romanism, and if nothing new were possible in this domain, then what would be the use in any one's writing a new commentary? Would this not be a superfluous waste of theological energy? While, therefore, we hold that the old should always be treated with respect and reverence, and that no commentator should begin his work until he has made himself thoroughly familiar with the work of his predecessors, yet we believe that, after one has done so, some claim for originality is no more presumptuous than is the claim to the right of writing a new commentary at all. Indeed we believe that it is only the conviction of having something new or original to say that gives one the right to publish a book on any subject; and we are sure that Professor Wolf acts on this principle in his own theological and literary work.

We are of the opinion, however, that Professor Wolf's conservatism sometimes leads him into paths that are not safe, and into which we at least cannot follow him. We find an illustration of this kind in his comments on Luke, 21: 32; forming a part of the Gospel for the second Sunday in Advent: "This generation shall not pass away, till all things be accomplished"—all things foretold in the foregoing eschatological discourse. What is it that makes commentators unwilling to accept the natural and obvious meaning of this statement, adopted by Luther, that within the life time of the then existing generation of men the signs mentioned in the discourse should be witnessed? Is it not the fear of the consequences which would follow such an admission? What influence would this have upon our theory of inspiration, or upon our theory of the person of Christ? Hence commentators have for ages tormented themselves with the effort to discover a meaning of "this generation" that should enable them to escape the unwelcome implication. Professor Wolf quotes Nebe to the effect that the *usus loquendi* of the New Testament does not favor the natural sense of *generation* adopted by Luther. But we believe that any one need but consult his Greek concordance in order to be convinced of the contrary. Professor Wolf, after discussing and setting aside some of the old interpretations, finally adopts the following: "This race, this perverse class of men, will remain to the end and will regard my coming as an old wife's fable." We submit that in all cases the better way is to accept the most natural sense of Scripture, and then adapt our theology to that sense. The end of the world did not occur in the life-time of our Lord's contem



poraries, in spite of the statement that it would. Now whatever may follow from that proposition must be accepted as truth; and we are sure too that such results will in the end be found to be more consonant to the truth of Christianity than are the artificial conclusions which so many theologians are so unwilling to give up.

Similar criticisms might, in our judgment, be made upon Professor Wolf's explanations of other passages. For instance, his comments on "the Star of Bethlehem" are, in our opinion, rather too curious to be true. The idea that the Magi must have known of the ancient revelation concerning a coming king of Israel through Balaam and Daniel, and that the miraculous star was really a conjunction of planets in the constellation of the Fish, although it has been supported by weighty authorities, is an idea which we can by no means accept. We are sure, at least, that this was not at all the kind of phenomenon the Evangelist was thinking of when he wrote that "the star, which they saw in the east, went before them till it came and stood over where the young child was." But the criticisms which we have now made do not at all, in our view, diminish the value of Professor Wolf's work, in reference to the end for which it is intended. On the contrary, we believe that he has laid under obligation not only ministers of his own church, but ministers of other churches as well, by bringing out this work in so attractive and intelligible a form. Professor Wolf's style is clear. He writes no obscure sentences. And the book contains a great amount of exegetical and homiletical material that must be exceedingly valuable to ministers of the Gospel who make any account of the Church Year. On this account we can cordially commend it to ministers of our own church. Many of them are governed in their pulpit work by the idea of the Church Year. We believe that there is no better order than that to be observed in the regular pulpit ministrations of God's house, and we commend this book of Professor Wolf's as a valuable aid to that end.

THINKING AND LEARNING TO THINK. By Nathan C. Schaeffer, Ph.D., LL.D., Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Pennsylvania. Pages 351. J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1900.

Dr. Schaeffer needs no introduction to the readers of this REVIEW, to whose pages he has at different times been a contributor. Moreover, in his capacity of Superintendent of Public Instruction he has lectured on educational subjects in all parts of this as well as in many other States, and has established a high reputation for scholarship and intellectual ability. In any book he might write the public would therefore naturally expect a very high degree of excellence. That expectation is not disappointed in the work now before us. This work is the first volume in Lippincott's *Educational Series*, to be brought out under the general editorship of Prof. N. G. Brumbaugh, of the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Brumbaugh, in a general preface, speaks of it in the following language, which, after a careful perusal of the

book, we can fully endorse: "The discussion takes on the modest but stimulating style of the public speaker. The author has for many years been among our foremost lecturers on education. The temper of the discussion is moderate and constructive. There will be found here no wild excess, no straining after fanciful effect, no advocacy of sensational and ephemeral methods; nor is there a trace of pessimistic and destructive criticism of the earnest teachers who are conscious of limitations and reaching out hopefully for help. On the contrary, the discussion is full of real sympathy, founded upon personal experience with teaching in all its phases, and abounds in stimulating suggestion."

The work is intended mainly as a contribution to the science or theory of pedagogy, and will be of special interest to teachers and professors in all grades and kinds of educational institutions. It should be read by all college and normal-school professors, by all superintendents of schools, by teachers in high schools and academies, and also by the great army of teachers in our public schools. The latter especially would find it educational and instructive, if they were willing to do the amount of studying which it either presupposes or suggests. But while of special interest to the professional teacher, the book will prove of interest to all educated men and women, and especially to preachers and all others who are in any way interested in the subject of education. A mere glance at the table of contents will confirm this statement. The following are the topics treated in the twenty-two chapters of which the book consists: Make the Pupils Think: Thinking in Things and in Symbols; The Materials of Thought; Basal Concept as Thought-Material; The Instruments of Thought; Technical Terms as Instruments of Thought; Thought and Language; The Stimulus to Thinking; The Right Use of Books; Observation and Thinking; The Memory and Thinking; Imagining and Thinking; The Stream of Thought; The Stream of Thought in Listening and Reading; The Stream of Thought in Writing, Speaking and Oral Reading; Kinds of Thinking; Thinking and Feeling; Thinking and Willing; Thinking and Doing; Thinking in the Arts; Thinking and the Higher Life.

From this it will be seen that Dr. Schaeffer discusses in this volume some of the most interesting and profound questions in psychology and philosophy. In fact the contents of the book might not inaptly be designated as an application of the science of psychology to the art of teaching. What is thinking? What are the different kinds of thinking? How does thinking differ from knowing? How is thinking related to language? These and other questions discussed in this book are some of the fundamental questions of psychology and philosophy. Is thinking possible without language? This question, which is the subject of an interesting volume by the late Max Müller, is disposed of as follows by Dr. Schaeffer: "If by language is meant oral speech and written words, the sign language of deaf mutes is sufficient to compel an affirmative answer to the question. Moreover, there are

modes of thinking and of expressing thought other than by the use of words." Then follow illustrations of this kind of thinking by means of signs and symbols. This is no doubt correct. But we believe that it is correct, too, to say that there can be no thought without language or words; and we do not believe that Dr. Schaeffer would dissent from this view. The word is the necessary form of thought; and even thinking without uttering words is an inward formulating of words in the mind. Words may also be considered as symbols of thought; and then there is no essential difference between the sign-language of deaf mutes and the word-language which is the ordinary medium for the expression of thought. So intimate, indeed, is the relation between words and thoughts that much of a child's education consists in the acquisition of words. And Dr. Schaeffer, in this volume, dwells upon the disciplinary value of the study of Greek roots and inflections. While on this subject of language, we may quote the advice which Dr. Schaeffer, himself a Pennsylvania German, gives to Pennsylvania Germans in reference to the teaching of their children. "Children whose mother tongue is a dialect," he says, "should be trained in one or more of the languages that have been enriched by centuries of development and literary culture. The best that the people of Pennsylvania-German extraction can do for future generations is to make the transition as speedily as possible from their vernacular—so poverty-stricken in its vocabulary—to the English, with its abundant vocabulary and its unsurpassed literary treasures." That we who also are Pennsylvania German, consider sound advice.

We have said that this book should be of interest to preachers as well as to teachers. But in fact preachers are *teachers*, performing essentially the same functions which the men and women employed in the school room perform. This is true not only of their activity in the Sunday-school and in the Catechetical class but no less also of their activity in the pulpit. It is true, of course, that the Sunday-school teacher and the Catechist, in order to be successful, must understand the general principles of pedagogy; but so also must the preacher. Even in regard to the emotional and persuasive side of his activity the preacher does not differ as much from the teacher as is usually supposed. Hence what Dr. Schaeffer says in the following sentences in regard to the conditions of successful teaching, is true also in regard to the conditions of successful preaching: "Education results not from highly differentiated methods, but primarily from the play of mind upon mind, heart upon heart, will upon will. In the difficult art of making others think the most important factor is the teacher himself. Thinking begets thinking. \* \* \* A teacher whose power to stimulate thought is not superior to dead leaves and bugs and butterflies must have reached the dead line. Teachers may be divided into two classes,—those who have ceased to grow and those who are still alive and growing. Under the tuition of the former the boy soon loses interest in study, and seldom acquires

the power to think. From a dead tree you can not propagate life. Ingraft a lifeless teacher upon the school; the most skilful devices of school management and recitation serve only to intensify the dull routine. \* \* \* It takes life to beget life. A growing mind is required to beget growth in other minds. A good thinker begets habits of close and careful thinking in those whom he moulds." Our apology for this somewhat lengthy quotation is the extreme importance of the subject to the teacher and, *mutatis mutandis*, to the preacher. The teacher rules and influences the minds of his pupils by the force of his own intellectual and moral life. Hence, as Dr. Schaeffer says, further, "The teacher must make himself what he wishes his pupil to be. If foot-ball and base-ball and boating form the staple of his thinking the center of his affections, these athletic sports, in ways that are marvellous and often past finding out, become the objects of thought in which his students will delight. If the truths and principles of science absorb his interest and engage the best thought of his conscious hours, these will determine the moulding influence which he will unconsciously exert upon others." Thus one or two professors can set a college crazy on foot-ball, or on anything else; and they can also create an enthusiasm for science, for philosophy, or for any other noble intellectual aim.

There are various other points in the book under consideration which we should like specially to notice, if our space permitted. One point, for instance, relates to the use of books, or the ways of reading books. There are people who have never really read a book to any purpose in their life. We quote but one sentence: "If the reader allows the ideas of a book to pass through his mind as a landscape passes before the eye of a traveller, ever seeking the excitement of something new and never stopping to reflect upon the contents of the book so as to weigh its arguments, to notice its beauties, and to appropriate its truths, the book will leave him less able to think than before." The following on the relation of feeling to thinking will especially interest preachers: "Without the ability to feel strongly, it is impossible to stir the hearts of an audience. A strong character is impossible without strong emotion. Jesus could weep and denounce. \* \* \* The men and women who have done most for the race showed the element of strong feeling in their thinking and in their efforts at philanthropy and reform." On the subject of "learning to do by doing," which is a favorite idea of many now even in regard to preparation for the ministry, Dr. Schaeffer uses the following language: "Would you, with life or property at stake, allow a novice to plead your cause in court in order that he might learn to plead by pleading? Who would waste the golden Sabbath hours in listening to one who was trying to learn to preach by preaching?"

But we have no room for further observations on this book. We cordially commend it to our readers. If ministers generally would read it and heed the advice which it contains, there would be no such thing as a dead-line, and men would not be laid upon the

shelf at a time when those in other professions are at the height of their ability and usefulness. Having *learned to think* and *continuing to think*, they would keep their minds fresh and vigorous, and in vital sympathy with the intellectual life of the present age, and thus preserve their usefulness by preserving their youthfulness.

**BRAIN IN RELATION TO MIND.** BY I. Sanderson Christison, M.D., Author of *Crime and Criminals*, etc. Second Edition. Pages, 143. The Meng Publishing Company, Chicago, 1900.

The subject of this book is an ever interesting and fascinating one. What is the relation of the soul to the body, of the mind to the brain? Are the activities of the nerve centers and of the mind one and the same thing? Or does the mind act through the nervous system, producing physical effects while being itself an immaterial substance? Or are states of consciousness wholly different from nervous states, so that the former are not functions of the latter, but merely occur during their functioning? The author rejects the first theory entirely, and while believing that the mind and brain mutually condition each other, holds to the sound doctrine that the mind has an existence of its own. He does not even lay as much stress upon brain-convolutions and brain-weights as some do, although he admits that they are not without psychic values. The book is illustrated throughout with representations of the brain and nervous system in various forms, and numerous facts are introduced into the discussion in order to make it intelligible to the lay reader.

**BIBLE SCHOOL PEDAGOGY.** *Outlines for Normal Classes.* By A. H. McKinney, Ph.D., with an introduction by Jesse Lyman Hurlbert, D.D. Pages 78. Price, Cloth 40 cts.; paper 25 cts. Eaton and Mains, New York; Jennings & Pye, Cincinnati, 1900.

Bible teaching, as it now prevails in Sunday-schools, is an art. No one can undertake it with any hope of being successful without having studied the principles which underlie the art of teaching generally. This implies some knowledge of the philosophy of the human mind, of the tendencies of human nature, especially child-nature, and of methods of teaching. Such knowledge as this it is the purpose of this little book to communicate. The arrangement and style of the book are simple and easy. In progressive lessons the reader is taken through the study of the mental faculties, the manner of preparing lessons, the methods of communicating knowledge, the classification of scholars, the government of the school, and many other matters about which a successful Sunday-school teacher needs information. We are not one of those who habitually find fault with Sunday-school teachers for not being better than they are; we believe, however, that a work like the one before us, well studied would tend greatly to improve our Sunday-school teaching. Pastors could not do better than to

procure this book for the use of their teachers and then organize them into classes for the purpose of studying it under their direction. We believe that such a movement would result in benefits all around.

**ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES:** *A Guide to the Study of the International Sunday-school Lessons.* With Original and Selected Comments, Methods of Teaching, Illustrative Stories, Practical Applications, Notes on Eastern Life, Library References, Maps, Tables, Pictures, Diagrams, for 1901. By Rev. F. E. Neely, D.D., and R. R. Doherty, Ph.D. Pages, 392. Price, \$1.25. Eaton & Mains, New York; Jennings & Pye, Cincinnati, 1900.

The title page of this book is so full and significant of its contents that there is scarcely anything to be added to it in the way of description. We can only say that we regard this work as one of the best commentaries on the *International Lessons* for the coming year. Some help of this kind every intelligent teacher will need, and for the purpose intended we do not know of anything better in the market than this. The profuse illustrations and maps add to its value. And so also does the fact that the comments are based, in part at least, upon the Revised Version. A brief introduction to the books of the Old and New Testaments in which the Lessons for the next year occur, and a general introduction on the chronology of the Old Testament, are interesting features of these *Illustrative Notes*.

**POSTMARKED "COLIMA."** By Julia Suesseroth Alleman. Pages, 353. Price, \$1.25. Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

This is a novel and a love story. The plot turns upon the loss of a letter written by a young lady to a young man at sea, who had asked her to marry him. The letter contained her answer and her promise. But he did not get it for twenty-five years, and the young sea captain wandered disconsolately about the world during all these years, never returning to the place where he supposed that only disappointment and misery would await him. One day the letter, which had been lying in a South American postoffice, turned up. The long-waiting lover returned to his home and found his "St. Frances" still faithfully waiting for him. She had meanwhile spent her time in a life of charity, which earned for her the title of a *saint* in reality. The usual result followed. The lovers were married, and were happy. The interest of the story is kept up throughout. There is no sick or maudlin sentiment. The tone of the story is healthy, and it will be read generally with pleasure and profit.